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United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation. 
Yearbook of the United Nations 
UN Security Council Official Reports 
United States of America 
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (Soviet Union) 
World Health Organisation 
World Intellectual Property Organisation 
World Trade Organisation 
World War 1 
World War 2 
Yearbook of the International Court of Justice 
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ad hoc 
cause celebre 
competence de la competence 
compromis 
Consent ante hoc 
Consent post hoc 
erga omnes 
ex aequo et bono 
exces de pouvoir 
forum prorogatum 
in abstracto 
Glossary 
for a specific purpose. 
a famous lawsuit, trial or controversy. 
competent to determine competence; the 
ability of a court or tribunal to determine its 
own jurisdiction or authority to hear a case. 
an agreement to refer to arbitration or to 
judicial settlement some matter(s) in dispute, 
these being defined more clearly in the 
compromis. 
Consent given prior to the initiation of 
proceedings; before the occurrence of a 
dispute or matter in which the provision(s) of 
an international instrument regarding the 
peaceful settlement of disputes by arbitration 
or adjudication will be invoked. 
after the initiation of proceedings. 
valid against 'all the world' (against 
everyone). 
a judgement of an international court or 
tribunal based not on strict rules of 
international law but on justice and fairness 
( equity). 
beyond the powers of a tribunal. 
the situation in which the consent of a party to 
a court's jurisdiction is implied from its 
conduct such as it taking part in proceedings. 
[where there is no formally expressed consent 
to a court's jurisdiction and the parties 
acquiesce, pleading the merits of the case, 
such action constitutes forum prorogatum]. 
in the abstract; without reference to specific 
circumstances. 
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inter alia 
inter se 
ipso facto 
locus standi 
non liquet 
pactum de contrahendo 
par in parem non habet imperium 
per capita 
ratione temporis 
sine qua non 
ultra vires 
among other things. 
between the parties to a specific transaction. 
by that very fact. 
the existence of a sufficient legal interest In 
the matter or case in issue. 
when in a hypothetical situation a court is not 
able to give a decision on law because it lacks 
legally relevant rules. 
clause in a treaty which obligates the parties 
concerned to conclude a further agreement on 
a specific matter. 
the principle that one sovereign State cannot 
sit in judgement on another sovereign State by 
reason of their legal equality. An equal has no 
authority over an equal. 
of or for each person. 
by reason of time. 
a condition which must be accepted in order 
for the proposing a party to accept the 
agreement. 
outside the lawful powers of a person or agent. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
Arbitration is a method that has been employed for the settlement of disputes ever since 
the earliest civilisations of mankind. Since it is essentially a voluntary means of dispute 
resolution, it is the parties who determine when to resort to arbitration, as well as the issues 
that are to be submitted to arbitration. State consent is a sine qua non for the initiation of 
any arbitral proceedings in a dispute involving States as parties. In its recent form, inter-
State arbitral practice is a sequel of early Anglo-American practice, namely, the settlement 
of certain controversies that arose between Great Britain and the USA under the 1794 Jay 
Treaty and the 1871 Alabama Claims arbitration. The success of those and a number of 
other arbitral settlements, as well as the attractive nature of arbitration which maintains the 
parties' freedom in determining the structure, composition, jurisdiction, rules of procedure 
and the laws to be applied by the tribunal, all stimulated the momentum of arbitral practice 
which gradually increased since the 19th century and resulted in the establishment of a 
number of multilateral frameworks that provided for arbitration. These include the 1899 
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which codified the 
laws of arbitral procedure and presented the international community with the first 
international court of arbitration, 'the Permanent Court of Arbitration'; the second Hague 
Convention in 1907; the 1924 Geneva Protocol; the 1928 & 1949 General Acts for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes; the 1958 ILC Model Rules on Arbitral 
Procedure (which are all referred to hereinafter as general inter-State arbitral 
mechanisms)l. Almost all of those mechanisms were established with a common aim of 
striking a balance between on the one hand, the interests of the international community as 
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a whole in preserving international peace and stability through devising a compulsory 
framework which States would be obliged to resort to automatically when the need arises (a 
notion which seems to contradict with the free and voluntary nature of arbitration 
mentioned above), and on the other, the interests of each State individually, through the 
avoidance of infringing the principle of State sovereignty, a basic rule of international law, 
whereby State consent is the basis of the jurisdiction of international tribunals. Bet\yeen the 
two came the question of whether the obligatorium would cover categories of disputes that 
States considered as affecting their vital interests or national honour (the justiciable / non-
justiciable or legal/political dispute dichotomy) or whether they were to be excluded 
totally or partially, and who was to determine that. 
With the rapid expansion of the members of the international community during the last 
century from a few dozen States during the League of Nations era to where we stand today 
in which the composition has exceeded 190 States and the various social, ideological and 
religious diversities that have emerged as a result, and with the emergence of a new rival to 
international arbitration, namely, international adjudication following the establishment of 
the PCIJ, actual State resort to international arbitration in the post WWl era has gradually 
declined. In the current era, recourse to inter-State arbitral tribunals is a rather rare 
occurrence, except for a few but important recent exceptions, such as the 1988 Taba 
arbitration between Egypt and Israel; the two awards of the tribunal in the Hanish Islands 
dispute 1998 and 1999 between Yemen and Eritrea; the Boundary and Mass Claims 
Commissions sitting currently at the Hague that were established pursuant to the Peace 
Agreement signed between Eritrea and Ethiopia on December 12, 2000; and the successful 
work of the Iran-USA Claims Tribunal established in 1981 which, in addition to claims 
between the two Governments, was also concerned with claims of the nationals of each 
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Government against the other Government. This is also the case with regard to general 
inter-State arbitral treaty practice, inasmuch as with the exception of the arbitral provisions 
embodied in UNCLOS III which, however, is only concerned with maritime issues, no 
further significant efforts were made in order to adopt a further general inter-State arbitral 
mechanism following the ILC's 1958 Model Rules. It is interesting to point out that some 
of those general inter-State arbitral mechanisms are now obsolete, while the others are 
seldom, if at all, referred to in actual inter-State dispute settlement practice, leave alone the 
fact that the provisions of most of them are considered now outdated according to current 
international standards. 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the pattern of the rise and fall of inter-State 
arbitration as a means of international dispute settlement through the reflection of the legal 
doctrine over the past 100 years. The discussion will touch upon a number of basic issues 
related to the public international arbitral sector, such as the true nature of arbitration, as 
well as the origins of current-day arbitral practice, arbitral procedure, State practice, the 
legal and non-legal dispute dichotomy, jurisdiction of international tribunals, and the 
historical development of general inter-State arbitral mechanisms in the 20th century. Our 
examination will be conducted mainly in the light of the provisions of the various 
international instruments concerned with the peaceful settlement of international disputes 
adopted in the past century and also the views of leading legal writers and scholars on 
various aspects of the international arbitral process and State practice. It is interesting to 
note that despite the dramatic change in the level of utilisation of inter-State arbitration, 
within the domain of academic research, studies concerning the area of inter-State 
arbitration are rather scarce; the issue has been neglected. Instead, interest has shifted 
almost totally to arbitration in other fields and recent studies on arbitration are devoted to 
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the settlement of disputes between States, commercial concerns and individuals. Public 
international arbitration in general is a means of dispute resolution that was able to deliver 
prior to the current decline in tribunal utilisation and is still capable of fulfilling an 
important role in the area of peaceful settlement of international disputes, despite the 
significant changes that have occurred to the fabric of the international community over the 
past 100 years and the various ideological, cultural and religious diversities that have 
emerged as a result (the Iran - USA Claims tribunal and the two awards in the Hanish 
Island arbitration are examples). However, it may be that its image needs to be polished 
and re-introduced (hence, a few suggestions as to possible ways of revitalising the public 
international arbitral sector are provided at the end of the general conclusion in Chapter 
Six). 
The study is divided into six main chapters, each covering a certain aspect of the issue 
under consideration. The first chapter is intended to provide the reader with a general 
background on the concept and nature of international arbitration, the origins of current 
arbitral practice and its historical evolution starting from the 19th century, as well as the 
main fundamental features of international arbitration which have made it an attractive 
means of settlement to States, namely, the parties' influence over the composition of the 
tribunal; their freedom in specifying the law(s) applicable; their freedom to specify the 
basic considerations with regard to the award; the possibility of secrecy: and the non-
intervention by third parties into proceedings. 
Chapter Two will attempt to provide a general background on the rise and fall of 
international arbitral practice by reviewing the momentum of arbitral practice in the last 
two centuries in the domains of both the number of disputes submitted to arbitration during 
that period and also arbitral treaty practice, which has tailed off following the 2nd \Vorld 
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War. The discussion in this respect will also include an examination of a number of 
possible factors behind States' disinclination to resort to arbitration, namely, the argument 
regarding the justiciability or otherwise of disputes; previous negative experiences with 
arbitration; the avoidance of the reaction of internal political factions within the State in the 
case of a non-favourable award; and the nature of dispute settlement by legal means. The 
examination will also reflect upon certain aspects of Soviet international law and practice 
concerning arbitration and also the practice of the so-called developing States in Africa and 
Asia. 
Chapter Three will be totally devoted to the State consent requirement. The discussion in 
this respect will examine the principle of State sovereignty with regard to its origins; its 
main internal and external aspects; and the compatibility of the granting of consent by 
States for the submission of their disputes to international tribunals with the doctrine of 
State sovereignty. Light will also be shed on the significance of State consent in the field of 
the peaceful settlement of disputes, and how consent to arbitration is expressed. 
In Chapter Four, light will be shed on the concept and nature of compulsory arbitration; the 
legal and non-legal dispute dichotomy with regard to its origins, theoretical dimensions and 
its implementation in actual dispute settlement and treaty practice. The discussion will also 
reflect on the compulsory jurisdiction of the IC] by first discussing of all the voluntary 
means in which consent is expressed to the IC], and then examining the Court's 
compulsory jurisdiction under the Optional Clause. 
Chapter Five will focus on the historical background and procedural aspects of the past 
general inter-State arbitral mechanisms. 
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Each chapter will be started with an introduction and followed by a conclusion and 
endnotes. A general summary and conclusion will follow in a separate chapter at the end of 
the thesis. 
The central topic of this thesis is arbitration; however, where necessary, our discussion may 
also include other means of dispute resolution from among those listed in Art. 33(1) of the 
UN Charter, especially, international adjudication via. the IC]. In this respect, since the 
dicta of the IC] and arbitral tribunals on the issue of State consent to the jurisdiction of 
international tribunals are usually referred to by writers on consent to arbitration in an 
amalgamated matter, without distinction between the two areas, a similar approach will be 
adopted in our discussion on the issue. However, a distinction will be made with regard to 
the procedural and practical aspects of the granting of consent by States to each means. 
The discussion in the thesis is confined solely to the area of inter-State arbitration 
involving public international law disputes between States only. However, where relevant, 
mention will also be made of certain examples of disputes involving States and non-State 
parties. 
XXIV 
Notes to Introduction: 
1 Note that the whole of this study is concerned solely with those arbitral mechanisms indicated above under 
general inter-State arbitral mechanisms and which were intended for application on the universal level in 
general for the settlement of disputes involving States as parties (only) and concerning questions of a purely 
public international law character. The term general inter-State arbitral mechanisms for the purpose of this 
study does not cover regional instruments, such as the 1948 Pact of Bogota or the 1957 ECPSD; or specialised 
instruments such as UNCLOS. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
Preliminary Considerations on International Arbitration 
Introduction: 
Before wading through the technical aspects of State recourse to arbitration, and the 
various features and difficulties therein, it would be useful first of all to provide a general 
background on four major issues: first, the concept and nature of international arbitration, 
in order to underline the characteristics that distinguish it from other means of peaceful 
settlement; second, the origins of current arbitral practice in the 1794 arbitration under the 
Jay Treaty and the 1871 Alabama Claims arbitration, with their major contributions to the 
areas of international arbitration and international adjudication; third, the major 
developments in international arbitral practice in the 20th century; and fourth, an 
examination of some of the main distinctive procedural characteristics of international 
arbitration. 
1. The Concept and Nature of International Arbitration: 
In order to provide a clear description of the concept of inter-State arbitration, it appears 
necessary first of all to specify its status in relation to the other current methods of dispute 
resolution. The most useful criterion in this respect would appear to be Art. 33( 1) of the UN 
Charter in which the main means of settlement may be classified into diplomatic means 
(negotiation, good offices, inquiry. conciliation and mediation), and legal means 
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(arbitration and judicial settlement via the ICJ)1. Although all those means share the 
common aim of resolving a particular dispute peacefully, a distinction may be drawn 
between the functioning of the two categories indicated above, in as much as, with the 
exception of negotiation, the settlement of a particular dispute by diplomatic means 
involves the participation of a third party whose decisions are of no binding force on the 
parties to the dispute, while in contrast, the settlement of a dispute by legal means involves 
the submission of the dispute by the parties to an arbitral tribunal or an international court, 
in this case the ICJ, whose decisions are of a binding nature on the disputants. 
Although it may appear not difficult to recognise the difference between the two 
categories of dispute resolution methods, it seems necessary to shed some light on the main 
characteristics of the two peaceful methods falling under the second category, viz. 
arbitration and judicial settlement. Arbitration is defined by Art. 15 and 37 of the 1899 and 
1907 HCsPSID respectively as " ... the settlement of differences between States by judges of 
their own choice, and on the basis of respect for law" and by Oppenheim2 as " ... the 
determination of a difference between States through a legal decision of one or more 
umpires or of a tribunal, other than the International Court of Justice, chosen by the 
parties." On the other hand, judicial settlement was defined by Steinberger3 as ..... the 
employment of the judicial functions of international courts ... for the purpose of settling 
actual disputes between subjects of international law concerning their international 
relations." Shaw4 clarified the concept of international adjudication as comprising" ... the 
activities of all international and regional courts deciding disputes between subjects of 
international law, in accordance with the rules and principles of international law." From 
the above definitions, it appears that the concepts of both methods are closely similar, 
especially as they both share the common features that they are solelv concerned \\ ith 
disputes involving States as parties5 and, therefore, State consent is a prerequisite for the 
utilisation of both means6; they both have the objective of reaching a final7 and binding8 
settlement of the dispute; and also the decision in both methods (unless otherwise agreed 
between the parties) is to be in accordance with internationallaw9. However, it was this last 
feature which gave rise to the long debated question regarding the distinction between the 
two methods and whether arbitration is a " ... judicial process designed to reach a decision 
based on the application of legal principles, or ... an extension of a diplomatic process aimed 
at finding a middle ground that, it is hoped, will be perceived as fair and acceptable to the 
parties."lo The view which upholds the judicial nature of arbitration is illustrated by the 
statement of Professor Carlston II who, whilst acknowledging the element of compromise in 
the decisions of arbitral tribunals, maintains that " ... it remains a judicial process 
characterised by a respect for law and legal process", a view which coincides with the 
definition of arbitration presented by the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID cited above, which 
indicated that the award of the tribunal is to be on the "basis of respect for law". Scottll, 
however, drew a distinction between the basis of respect for law and the application of 
principles of lawl3 by arguing that " ... the two are not co-extensive, the possibility of 
compromise is not thereby excluded, because arbitrators may respect law without following 
it". The arguments in favour of the distinction between arbitration and judicial settlement 
were based on a number of criterial4, a comprehensive examination of all of which would 
fall beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it appears necessary in this respect to 
shed some light on a fundamental factor which served as one of the bases of the arguments 
regarding the distinction between the two methods, namely, the jurisprudence of 
international arbitral tribunals and the effect of their decisions on the development of 
international law. The argument in this regard may be based on two foundations. The first 
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is regarding the temporary nature of arbitral tribunals which, even in the case of the PCA, 
cease their duties once they have rendered an award. Arbitral tribunals are therefore 
deprived of one of the fundamental characteristics of an international judicial court capable 
of building a real case law, viz. permanencyl5. This could be understood from the 
statement made by Brierli 6, who indicated that an arbitrator: 
" ... differs from the judge of a standing court of justice in being 
chosen by the parties, and in the fact that his judicial functions end 
when he has decided the particular case for which he was 
appointed. The distinction is important, because a standing court is 
able to build up a judicial tradition and so to develop the law from 
case to case; it is, therefore, not only a means of settling disputes, 
but to some extent a means of preventing them from arising 
[emphasis added]." 
It may be said that the most significant attempt to overcome this issue was the 
establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration by the 1899 HCPSID which, as Pinto 
points out" ... confirmed the evolution of arbitration as an essentially judicial mode ... ,,17. 
Nevertheless, the creation of the PCA added nothing new to the issue and the fundamental 
principle of the parties' freedom to constitute the tribunal for each individual case (which 
ceases its duties after reaching the award) still remained 18. This was recognised through the 
comments made by the founders of the PCA who considered the name PCA a misnomer, as 
the court's nature is in contradiction with the nature of a real permanent Courtl9. This fact, 
as we shall examine in Chapter Five20, later induced the parties to the 1907 HCPSID to 
address the cravings of the international community for 'a real permanent court' through 
the unsuccessful Draft Convention on a Judicial Arbitration Court, which later paved the 
way for the establishment of the PCIJ. 
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The second foundation to the argument about the distinction between arbitration and 
judicial settlement may be the decisions of arbitral tribunals. In this regard, those who argue 
in favour of the distinction believe that, unlike proceedings before the ICl2l , an arbitral 
tribunal, despite being bound by its legal obligations under the compromis (when it 
expressly states so) to base its decisions in accordance with law, shows an inevitable 
tendency to waive the application of strict principles of law in order to reach an acceptable 
settlement of the dispute22 by the application of other considerations, such as justice or 
equity or ex aequo et bono23. The roots of such a belief may be traced back to the Greece of 
Aristotle, who was quoted by Grotius in the 17th century as saying: 
an equitable and moderate man will have recourse to arbitration 
rather than to strict law ... because an arbitrator may consider the 
equity of the case, whereas a judge is bound by the letter of the law. 
Therefore arbitration was introduced to give equity its due weight.24 
However, in criticising this approach, Lauterpacht pointed out that" ... there exists 
in any case the very strongest objection to a view that decisions of an adjudicating body can 
be partially legal and partially non-legal. A body wielding such powers is not a legal body 
at all.,,25 In this regard, since arbitration, as Reisman26 pointed out, is "a creature of 
contract", it may be argued that if the basis of the decision of the tribunal specified by the 
parties in the compromis is to be in accordance with international law, then the tribunal 
must confine itself to acting within the sphere of action defined in the compromis, and any 
departure from this principle has been generally accepted27 as rendering the award null and 
void on the ground of excess of jurisdiction (exces de pouvoir)28. This also may be 
supported by the provisions of Art. 38 of the Statutes of both the PCIJ and the IC], as \\ell 
as Art. 2(2.i) of the ILC Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, in which the prior consent of 
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the parties is a basic prerequisite for the tribunal to make a decision ex aequo et bono. 
However, if the parties expressly granted such authority to the tribunal, the question 
regarding the development of international law by such a decision still remams 
controversial29 . Despite the complexity of this issue, the debate as to whether arbitration is 
judicial or diplomatic in nature may be concluded by the lengthy remark of Judge 
Holtzmann3o who indicated that: 
To this long-debated question, I have two observations and one 
more fundamental comment. First, 'diplomatic' and 'judicial' 
approaches often lead to similar results, by application of those 
principles, in parties receiving less than total victory or complete 
defeat. Second, compromised decisions are not always 
advantageous, because reasoned arbitral awards shown to be 
grounded on legal principles can (even if disappointing) often be 
more easily accepted, intellectually or politically, than decisions 
that can not be seen to have objective motivation. Third-and most 
important- the question of the nature of arbitration need not be 
debated at all, for arbitration is whatever the parties mutually agree 
that it should be. If parties want their dispute to be decided in 
accordance with established procedures and by application of 
defined legal principles, they are free to say so, or, alternatively, 
they are equally free to agree upon other procedures and guidelines 
for decision. 
2. The Origins of Present Day Arbitral Practice: 
An all-inclusive examination covering the settlement of international differences by 
arbitration in the perspective of world history would lead us back into the mists of 
antiquity. The evidence provided through ancient inscriptions and literature dating as far 
back as the ancient Greek era shows that arbitration is a method that has been employed for 
the settlement of disputes for more than 20 centuries31 • To trace arbitral practice over such a 
period would require more than one thesis. However. the limited scope of this thesis 
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permits us to focus only on the starting point of current arbitral practice, which is generally 
ascribed to the settlements of certain controversies that arose between the mother country, 
Great Britain, and its former colony, the USA in 1794 under the Jay Treaty and 1871 under 
the settlement of what are known as the Alabama Claims. Both of these played a major role 
in the formation of some of the basic principles of international arbitration and adjudication 
which remain to this day the common law practice in those two areas. 
2.1. The 1794 Arbitration under the Jay Treaty: 
The 1794 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, commonly known as the Jay 
Treaty32, between Great Britain and the USA is, due to its substantial impact on arbitral 
practice and the major role it played in the renaissance of international arbitration at the end 
of the 18th century after a period of abeyance33, considered by the vast majority of writers34 
as the starting point of contemporary international arbitral practice35. 
The initiative for the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the treaty was taken 
by George Washington, the first American President, with the aim of resolving the 
differences36 between the two States which still existed after the end of the American War 
of Independence and also to improve Anglo-American relations which were strained, 
especially after Great Britain entered into the war of the French Revolution. Therefore, with 
the aforesaid objectives in mind, President Washington, after the situation further 
deteriorated in 1794 and threatened to lead to war, sent Chief Justice John Jay as Envoy 
Extraordinary to London to negotiate with the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
Lord Greenville, on a settlement of the issues outstanding between the two nations. The 
result was the signing of the treaty on November 19, 1794 (ratification exchanged on 
October 28, 1795)37. The Treaty provided for three mixed commissions to deal \\ith the 
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questions that could not otherwise be disposed of in the negotiation of the treaty which 
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also classified the questions that were to be submitted to each of the commissions. Art. 8 of 
the treaty embodied certain provisions regarding the payment of the expenses of the 
commissions and also the replacement of any of the members of the commissions in certain 
circumstances. The treaty also specified the method of appointing the members of all three 
commissions, a fixed time limit of 18 months for the reception of claims submitted to the 
second and third commission, which was subject to extension in certain cases, and the 
method by which the commissions were to reach their award, which was by majority vote. 
The practice of appointing a neutral member as umpire, however, was not introduced in the 
provisions of the treaty38. 
The first commission set up under Art. 5 of the treaty was charged with the 
determination of the precise position of the Saint Croix River, indicated in Art. 2 of the 
1783 Paris Peace Treaty, which formed a part of the north-eastern boundary of the USA 
with Canada. According to Art. 5, the members of the first commission were three in 
number, one to be appointed from each side, and the third (the umpire) to be appointed 
either by agreement between the aforesaid members or, in case of failure to reach an 
agreement, by lot in their presence. In fact, it proved unnecessary to resort to lot and the 
commission was able to reach a unanimous award on the issue on October 25, 179839 . 
The second commission, set up under Art. 6 of the treaty for the purpose of dealing 
with allegations of judicial obstructions by certain American States to the collection of 
certain debts owed to British creditors was, according to the article, to be composed of five 
members, two to be appointed from each side and the umpire to be appointed either by 
agreement between them or, in case of their failing to reach an agreement, by lot in their 
presence. In the beginning, the commission found no difficulty in deciding a large number 
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of claims but, as a result of serious differences of opinion between the members that arose 
later, especially over the issue of whether it was the duty of the British creditors to exhaust 
local remedies before resorting to the commission, the commission was dissolved after the 
two American commissioners withdrew in 1799. However, after extensive negotiations, the 
issue was settled later by the Kings-Hawkesbury Convention of January 8, 1802, which 
annulled Art. 6 of the Jay Treaty and determined that the USA should pay a lump sum of 
$600,000 in three annual instalments to Great Britain as a settlement of all claims40. 
The number and method of appointment of members of the third commission, set up 
under Art. 7 of the treaty with the task of dealing with the claims arising from the unlawful 
seizure of American ships and cargoes by Great Britain during its war with France, was the 
same as the second commission. The third commission met a number of difficulties during 
its work. First of all, it faced claims of jurisdiction made by the American Commissioners, 
in cases already decided by British courts. After this question was resolved, the 
commission's work was again brought to a standstill after the 18 month time limit for the 
bringing of claims under Art. 7 of the Jay Treaty elapsed. After this issue was also resolved, 
the work of the commission was again halted in 1799 when the British commissioners 
suspended the proceedings until the dispute between the members of the second 
commission was resolved. After the 1802 Kings-Hawkesbury Convention, the commission 
met again and was able to work smoothly until the end of its proceedings on February 2, 
1804. The commission rendered 565 awards, 553 of them in favour of American subjects 
and the other 12 in favour of British claimants41 . 
Schwarzenberger42 cites a number of factors which indicate the judicial character of 
all three commissions established under the Jay Treaty. namely, the professional 
qualifications of the members of all three commissions, which chiefly consisted of 13\\yers 
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of a wide cultural background; the provision that members of all three commissions were to 
swear that they would impartially render their award on each subject according to the 
evidence laid before them by each party43, a provision which provided the commissioners 
with a degree of autonomy against unwarranted interference by either of the parties; the 
basis of the decisions of all three commissions, indicated in the treaty either by implication, 
such as in the case of the first commission which depended generally on the interpretation 
of the 1783 Paris Peace Treaty, or expressly in the case of the second commission which 
was according to Art. 6, to decide in accordance with the merits of the several cases" ... and 
as equity and justice shall appear to them to require", and the third commission which was 
to decide as indicated in Art. 7 " ... according to the merits of the several cases, and to 
justice, equity and the law of nations"; the quality of the awards rendered by the 
commissions, especially the third commission, whose awards produced the most 
remarkable contributions to substantive international law on major issues such as necessity 
and maritime neutrality44; the legal effects of the awards of all three commissions which 
were all to be final and conclusive45 ; and the structure of the commissions. In addition to 
the above, the commissions of the Jay Treaty established a number of important precedents 
which, to this day, form some of the fundamental elements of international judicial and 
arbitral proceedings, such as the tribunal's right to determine its own jurisdiction 
(competence de fa competence) and the exhaustion of local remedies46. However, it appears 
that the overall significance of the Jay Treaty arbitrations was that, despite the difficulties 
faced by the second and third commissions, they affirmed the efficiency of arbitration as a 
means of settlement of even the most perilous forms of controversies which would 
otherwise have been settled by war47. 
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2.2. The 1871 Alabama Claims Arbitration: 
The 1871 Treaty for the Amicable Settlement of all causes of differences between 
Great Britain and the USA, signed in Washington48 for the settlement of the differences 
arising out of what are known as the Alabama Claims, marked a new epoch in the field of 
international arbitral practice. The case arose out of claims made by the US Government 
that Great Britain had, during the American Civil War, violated neutrality by allowing the 
Alabama, which was a ship used by Southern States against the Northern States during the 
war, along with a number of other ships alleged to have committed acts of depredation 
during the war, to be built on British soil and to be freely admitted into the ports of British 
colonies49 . One of the most significant aspects of the whole case was the parties' agreement 
to submit the dispute to arbitration which, in the first instance, was avoided on the ground 
that the national honour of the parties was at stake50. However, after tense negotiations, the 
agreement to submit the dispute to arbitration was finally signed at Washington on May 8, 
1871. 
The first and foremost distinguishing feature of the treaty was the laws that were to 
be applied by the tribunal. Three rules were especially adopted for this specific case, which 
were generally known as the Three Rules of Washington51 . It was agreed that the tribunal 
was to apply these rules irrespective of their consistency with customary international law 
as it stood when the acts, which were the subject of the dispute, had been committed, a 
provision which was adopted in view of the uncertainty of the principles of international 
law that governed the duties of neutrality at the time when the acts were committed52 . 
Another striking feature of the treaty was that it provided in Art. 1, for the first time, 
for the participation of a third party neutral authority, along with Great Britain and the 
USA, in the appointment of the members of the tribunal, who were in this case fiye in 
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number, one each to be appointed by the Queen of Great Britain, the President of the USA, 
the King of Italy, the President of the Swiss Confederation, and the Emperor of Brazil. The 
Treaty also provided that a party, in certain cases, might appoint another arbitrator to 
replace one originally appointed by that party, and in case of failure to do so within two 
months, the King of Sweden and Norway might be requested to act as an appointing 
authority. 
The tribunal was able to reach a decision on September 14, 1872, by a majority of 
four votes to one, by which it indicated that Great Britain had failed, by omission, to fulfil 
the duties prescribed in the Three Rules of Washington established by Art. 6 of the Treaty 
regarding the ship, the Alabama53and by which the USA was to paid a lump sum of 
$15,500,000 in compensation by Great Britain. 
The Alabama Claims arbitration had a major influence on the creation of a number 
of international instruments54 and introduced into international judicial law a number of 
principles55 which, ever since, have been standard practice in international arbitral 
proceedings56. These include a tribunal model containing a predominant neutral element; 
the simultaneous submission by the parties of the memorials, counter-memorials and 
evidence, thereby avoiding the labelling of parties as plaintiff and defendant and the 
resentment that may consequently occurS7 ; and the provision in Art. 7 that the award 
" ... shall be made in writing and dated, and shall be signed by the arbitrators who may 
assent to it." Moreover, although the treaty did not oblige the members of the tribunal to 
reason its award, the tribunal did so and also, for the very first time, permitted the common 
law practice of permitting the publication of dissenting opinions. The assertion of the 
tribunal's right to determine its own jurisdiction58, although a precedent established by the 
commissions acting under the Jay Treaty, and also the formulation of the laws that \\crc 
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applied by the tribunal through the Three Rules of Washington59, were other features of the 
Alabama case which gained general recognition. 
The significant aspect of the Alabama Claims arbitration and the impact it had on 
arbitral practice following that period can be deduced from the words of Bodie60 who in 
this respect stated: 
"Two large states had agreed to submit to arbitration a case that had 
brought them to the brink of war. Until this point, arbitrations had 
been sporadic and over non-vital interests, settling disputes over 
such issues as boundaries, fisheries, maritime prizes, and pecuniary 
claims. This case really did serve to change the tone of international 
arbitration." 
3. Arbitral Practice in the 20th Century: 
The momentum of arbitral treaty practice and State recourse to arbitration61 , as well as 
the establishment and provisions of the past major arbitral mechanisms adopted for the 
application of arbitration on the multilateral level and State attitudes towards them62 will be 
considered elsewhere in this thesis. The following discussion is intended only to examine 
very briefly the major developments that have occurred in the field of international arbitral 
practice during the 20th century. In this regard, it appears that arbitral practice evolved 
rapidly in that era and developed in accordance with the changing circumstances and needs 
of the world society. As a result, numerous national institutions concerned with 
arbitration63 emerged and arbitration within the international level was no longer confined 
to the 'traditional' area of inter-State disputes (i.e. boundary delimitation, treaty 
interpretation, State responsibility .... etc) but also extended to other new and specialised 
. h h .. 11 1 64 d 65 categories of disputes suc as t ose concernmg mte ectua property an even sports . 
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Among the major developments in the field of international arbitration during the 20 th 
century66are the following: 
(A) The emergence of the rapidly expanding area of international commercial arbitration 
which led to the establishment of a number of institutions and agencies devoted to the 
settlement of disputes within the commercial context, such as the ICC, the ICSID, the 
AAA, the LCIA, the SCC and the NA167, and also the adoption of a number of 
procedural rules that are to be applied by the parties to such categories of disputes68 . In 
this regard, one may notice a reciprocal relationship between the two areas of 
international commercial arbitration and inter-State arbitration, inasmuch as, while the 
latter provided the basic foundation from which the rules of procedure of international 
commercial arbitration were derived, the provisions of certain mechanisms for the 
arbitral settlement of inter-State disputes were based on arbitral rules which were 
originally framed for their application in disputes which fall within the commercial 
context. An example is the PCA' s 1992 Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes 
between Two States, which were based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 
December 15, 197669. In actual practice within the context of inter-State disputes, the 
UNCITRAL Rules were applied recently, after a few slight modifications, by the 
tribunal in the 1997 Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area case between 
Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina7o. 
(B) The 20th century also witnessed the emergence of the concept of 'specialised 
arbitration' whereby the agreement to arbitrate, in certain cases, requires the 
appointment of persons knowledgeable of the questions that may arise under the 
agreement. This new feature, as Sohn 71 pointed out, may be ascribed to the fact that: 
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Modem international agreements tend to be more sophisticated than 
the older agreements which were usually satisfied with general 
principles. The new ones tend to be more specialised, are frequently 
technical in character, and their interpretation may require 
appropriate technical expertise. 
The concept of specialised arbitration also applies to the functioning of certain 
institutions that specialise in the arbitral settlement of a certain category of disputes, 
such as the ICC regarding commercial disputes and the ICSID regarding investment 
disputes. However, within the context of inter-State disputes, the foremost example of 
this form of arbitration appears to be the arbitral mechanisms established under the 
1982 UNCLOS72 . 
(C) The settlement of a multitude number of claims between citizens of different States; 
between citizens of a certain State and another State; or between States themselves 73 by 
a mixed claims commission (mixed arbitral tribunal) established by agreement between 
two or more States, is a practice which gained great significance in the 20th century. 
The origins of this practice can be traced to the second and third commissions 
established under the 1974 arbitration under the Jay Treaty74; the Mixed Arbitral 
Commissions established by the Peace Treaties75 following the First World War 
between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one side, and each of the Central 
Powers on the other, and in the post WW2 era, the Mixed Claims Commissions 
established under the 1953 London Agreement on German External Debts76. 
Nevertheless, it was the Iran-USA Claims Tribunal established under Art. 3(1) of the 
1981 Claims Settlement Declaration between Iran and the USA 77 and praised by 
Lillich 78 as " ... the most significant arbitral body in history" and by Shaw79 as ..... one 
of the most sophisticated attempts at resolving international claims attempted" which 
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underlined the effectiveness of mixed claims commissions, due to the magnitude of the 
task and the quality of its awards8o. It restored the status of arbitration in general as a 
means of settlement of even the most complicated and intricate forms of disputes. 
4. The Main Attractive Features of International Arbitration: 
Arbitration in general is a flexible means of dispute resolution in which the compromis 
plays the role of the statute of the tribunal. What makes arbitration so special is that the 
compromis in ad hoc arbitration is formulated by mutual agreement between the disputants 
who lay down the basic procedural guidelines for the work of the tribunal. This reflects one 
of the main distinguishing characteristics of inter-State arbitration, namely, party 
autonomy. The following discussion is intended to shed some light on the main attractive 
procedural features of inter-State arbitration, which made arbitration a preferred means of 
inter-State dispute settlement, namely, the parties' influence over the composition of the 
tribunal; their freedom to specify the law(s) applied, the main procedural guidelines of the 
tribunal; the basic considerations with regard to the award; the possibility of secrecy; and 
non-intervention by third parties81 . 
4.1. The Parties' Influence over the Composition of the Tribunal: 
One of the main traditional distinguishing factors of arbitration is the freedom of the 
parties to select and choose the members of the tribunal. However, in this respect, parties, 
when selecting a specific person as an arbitrator, are guided by certain considerations. 
mainly the moral and professional qualifications of the proposed arbitrator(s). In this 
respect, Arts. 23 and 44 of the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID respectively regarding the 
16 
requirements of the four arbitrators selected by the parties to the Conventions both pointed 
out that they were to be persons" ... of known competency in questions of international law, 
of the highest moral reputation, and disposed to accept the duties of [a]rbitrator." Art. 2 of 
the Statute of the IC] regarding the Organisation of the Court indicated that the Court: 
" . shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected 
regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral 
character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective 
countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are 
jurisconsults of recognised competence in international law. 
However, with the decline in general treaties of arbitration82 and the emergence and 
rapid expansion of the area of specialised arbitration, the requirements of the arbitrator(s) 
also include that the arbitrator(s) are to be knowledgeable or 'specialised' in the questions 
that may arise under the agreement from which the obligation to arbitration derives83 . For 
example, with regard to international investments disputes, Art. 9 of the ICSID Arbitration 
(Additional Facility) Rules indicates that the arbitrators are to be " ... persons of high moral 
character and recognised competence in the field of law, commerce, industry or finance, 
who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgement". In the domains of inter-State 
arbitration, the expertise requirement can be inferred from Art. 3(5) of the 1958 ILC Model 
Rules on Arbitral Procedure which indicates that, subject to the" ... special circumstances 
of the case ... " the arbitrators shall be selected " from among persons of recognised 
competence in international law". Moreover, this requirement is clearly expressed in Art. 
2( 1) of Annex VII (Arbitration) of UNCLOS III which states that "[ e ]very State Party shall 
be entitled to nominate four arbitrators, each of whom shall be a person experienced in 
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maritime affairs and enJoymg the highest reputation for fairness, competence and 
integrity,,84. 
Nevertheless, State practice indicates that States have entrusted persons from 
various categories as arbitrators, such as Heads of States85 in the Beagle Channel case86, 
Chiefs of Justice of National Supreme Courts in the 1928 Tinoco Concessions arbitration 
between Great Britain and Costa Rica87, international lawyers in the Island of Palmas 
b· . 88 d ar ItratlOn ,an even the Secretary General of the UN was appointed as an arbitrator in the 
1986 Rainbow Warrior case between New Zealand and France89. In all of the aforesaid 
cases, the tribunal was composed of a sole arbitrator. One of the main reasons that induces 
the parties to a dispute to entrust a sole arbitrator with the task of arbitrating a dispute, is 
the saving in expenses and time9o. Nevertheless, Simpson and FOX91 point out that such 
practice nowadays seems to be rare, inasmuch as in modern arbitral practice, the arbitrator 
is expected to give a decision on his own personal and undivided responsibility. Therefore, 
States, having that in mind, are less willing to place the entire responsibility upon the 
shoulders of one man. In addition to this possible explanation for States' non-preference of 
the single arbitrator tribunal, there appear to be certain other factors which may induce 
States not to resort to this form of tribunal, such as the fear of corruption, bias towards one 
of the parties, resignation or even death of the arbitrator and the unnecessary extra expenses 
and delay that may result thereby. Moreover, the magnitude and gravity of the issues at 
stake may be two other factors which guide States' determination as to which form of 
tribunal to select. If the dispute involves multitude claims on the part of one or both parties, 
it appears logical that the entertainment of such a dispute would be too heavy a burden 
upon one arbitrator. Moreover, the importance of the issues involved may also become 
another influential factor inducing the parties to seek a decision on the dispute based on the 
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responsibility and determination of more than one arbitrator. This may explain the 
preference for collegiate tribunals composed of an uneven number of arbitrators, i.e. three-
man and five-man tribunals92 , especially the former, which is the most resorted to in 
t · 93 I h' d C I 94· . prac Ice . ntIs regar, ar ston cItes one of the mam advantages of three-man tribunals 
over tribunals composed of a sole arbitrator, namely, that while the arbitrator in the latter 
only hears the arguments of the agents appointed by the parties, the neutral member or 
'umpire' in three-man tribunals, whose vote is decisive in the case where the two national 
arbitrators disagree, will hear in addition to the arguments of the respective agents of each 
party, the views of the national arbitrators. 
The five-man tribunal is the second most resorted to in practice after the three-man 
tribunal. The reasons why these forms of tribunals are less resorted to in practice than three-
man tribunals, according to Carlston95 , is that they are more expensive than three-man 
tribunals and more cumbersome to select and to administer. However, despite these 
considerations, five-man tribunals are provided for in almost all of the major inter-State 
arbitral mechanisms adopted during the past century96 and, moreover, a number of 
important international arbitrations that took place during the second half of the 20th 
century were of this kind97 . 
4.2. The Parties' Freedom to Specify the Law(s) Applicable: 
In principle, the parties in the compromis specify the basis of the decision of an 
arbitral tribunal. Almost all the most recent international agreements for arbitration provide 
for international law as the applicable law by the tribunal98 . International la\\ is also to be 
applied in the case where the compromis makes no express provision for the law to be 
applied by the tribunal99 . The parties may prefer to apply certain other rules to govern the 
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decision of the tribunal, such as, for example, the Three Rules of Washington, which were 
applied in the Alabama Claims arbitration 100, or the principles specified in the British 
Guiana- Venezuela Boundary dispute, which provided that fifty years' occupation should 
give rise to a prescriptive title to territory 1 01 , and the Trail Smelter case l02 , which provided 
that the law applicable was " the law and practice followed in dealing with cognate 
questions in the United States as well as international law and practice." In the absence of 
any international law applicable to a certain case, the tribunal is to make its decision in 
accordance with the principles of ' justice and equity' 103. However, as indicated by the 
practice of the peA in the Norwegian Shipowners' Claims case 104, the words justice and 
equity cannot, in this context, be understood in the traditional sense in which these words 
are used in 'Anglo-Saxon' jurisprudence and are to be distinguished from any particular 
system of jurisprudence or the municipal law of any state lO5 • The tribunaL as a general rule, 
may not enter a finding of non liquet l06 . This view is also drafted in Art. 11 of the ILC 
Model Rules which indicates that" The tribunal may not bring in a finding of non liquet on 
the ground of the silence or obscurity of the law to be applied". 
As to the power of an arbitral tribunal to decide ex aequo et bono, some 
international instruments 107, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary 108, do 
. I d'd h' b . 109 empower a tnbuna to eCI e on t IS aSls . 
4.3. The Parties' Freedom to Specify the Major Procedural Guidelines 
Regarding the Functioning of the Tribunal: 
The parties to a tribunal of arbitration are represented by agents and counselor 
advocates. The agent is the direct representative of his government and acts as an 
intermediary between his government and the tribunal, while the counselor advocates are 
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retained by the parties for the prosecution and defence of their rights and interests before 
h 'b 1110 t e tn una . However, agents or counsel need not be lawyers 111 , although self-interest 
will ensure that governments will select persons of acknowledged competence in 
international law to represent them before an arbitral tribunal I 12. 
The rules of procedure of an arbitral tribunal are usually either specified in the 
compromis, or, in the case where the rules of procedure in the compromis prove to be 
. ffi' +: 1 b . 113 msu IClent, lormu ated y the tnbunal ,and in some other cases, although not often, they 
may be negotiated in whole or in part between the agents of the two parties l14 . Arbitral 
procedure with regard to the presentation and rebuttal of claims by each party is comprised, 
in general, of two distinct phases 115. The first is the written pleadings which usually 
consists of the memorial or 'case,116; the counter-memorial or 'counter-case,117; the 
replyl18; and the rejoinder l19. The written pleadings are all to be made by the order and 
within the time limit fixed by the compromis, which may be extended either by mutual 
agreement between the parties or by the tribunal, when it deems it necessary for reaching a 
just decision and each party is to communicate a certified true copy of every document 
produced by it to the other part/ 20 . 
The written pleadings may be filed by the parties either simultaneously or 
successively, although each of these approaches has its disadvantages. For example, if the 
parties agree to file their pleadings successively, than they must bear in mind that the party 
which files its pleading in the beginning is the plaintiff while the other is to be considered 
the defendant. There may be genuine difficulty in reaching agreement on this point such 
as, for example, in territorial disputes where both parties may consider themselves 
plaintiffs, or in a complex case where each party has claims against the other. Therefore, 
the solution to this procedural difficulty is the simultaneous filing of the pleadings, a 
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practice engendered through the Alabama Claims arbitration 121, although this approach has 
its disadvantages, inasmuch as until the first pleading has been filed, neither of the parties 
can know the essential details of the case which it has to meet l22 . 
The second phase of arbitral procedure is the oral hearings which, in principle. are 
directed to the issues that have developed by the written pleadings of the parties 123. 
Moreover, they are to be presented in the same manner; for example, if the written 
pleadings have been filed successively, the hearings are to be presented in the same order as 
the pleadings, while in the case where the pleading have been filed simultaneously, the 
tribunal is to determine the order of the hearings 124. This was the practice of the tribunal in 
the Rann of Kutch case, when by lot it selected India to present its oral hearings first 125. The 
oral hearings are to be presented by either the agent or counsel of each of the parties and the 
tribunal, after due notice, is to designate the time, place and the period of time allowed for 
the hearingsl26. These are to be conducted by the president of the tribunal and, only when it 
is so decided by the tribunal with the consent of the parties, are to be made public. The 
records of the hearings are to be kept and signed by the president of the tribunal and the 
registrar or secretary, and only those so signed have an authentic characterl27 . 
When the agents, counsel and advocates have completed their presentations and 
submitted all evidence and explanations to support their case, the proceedings shall 
formally be declared closed128. Nevertheless, Art. 21(2) of the ILC Model Rules empowers 
the tribunal, as long as the award has not been rendered, to re-open the proceedings after 
their closure " .... on the ground that new evidence is forthcoming of such a nature as to 
constitute a decisive factor, or if it considers, after careful consideration, that there is a need 
for clarification on certain points." However, Simpson and Fox indicate that if this 
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prerogative is exercised by the tribunal, it should ensure that each party is given a 
reasonable opportunity of rebutting any new evidence that may be presented against it 129. 
The proceedings may be discontinued in ad hoc arbitral settlements; however, such 
action is only possible by mutual agreement between the parties. On this issue, Art. 22( 1) 
of the ILC Model Rules indicates that "except where the claimant admits the soundness of 
the defendant's case, discontinuance of the proceedings by the claimant party shall not be 
accepted by the tribunal without the consent of the defendant [emphasis added)". The 
requirement of the consent of the defendant party in this regard is presumably designed to 
safeguard the interests of the defendant party, which is unwilling to see the termination of 
the arbitration without securing from the tribunal a pronouncement in its favour. Therefore, 
in the case where the plaintiff party admits the soundness of the defendant's case, the 
consent of the defendant would no longer be a prerequisite 130. In the case where the parties 
to a dispute reach a settlement on the dispute, that is, before the end of the proceedings of 
the tribunal, it is for them to decide on the procedure to be adopted in such event, such as, 
for example, whether the tribunal should immediately be dissolved or should first record 
the agreement reached 131. However, Art. 23 of the ILC Model Rules indicates that the 
tribunal in such a case is to take note of the settlement and it may, if it thinks fit and at the 
request of either party, embody the settlement in the award. 
4.4. The Freedom to Specify the Basic Considerations with Regard to the 
Award: 
The award of an arbitral tribunal is to be rendered usually within a period fixed in the 
compromis which is also to indicate the method of reaching the award. This is usually 
based on the majority of votes of the members of the tribunal 132 and their deliberations in 
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this respect are usually to be secret l33 . The compromis usually indicates that the award is 
bindingl34 . The basic characteristics of the award according to the ILC Model Rules on 
Arbitral Procedure135 are that: 
(a) It is to be drawn in writing and bear the date on which it was rendered' , 
(b) It is to contain the names of the arbitrators and shall be signed by the President of the 
tribunal and the members of the tribunal who have voted for it· , 
(c) It is to state the reason on which it was based; 
(d) It is, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, to be read in public sitting, the agents 
and counsel of the parties being present or duly summoned to appear; and 
(e) It is to be binding only on the parties to the dispute and carried out in good faith 
immediately, unless the tribunal otherwise has allowed a time limit for the carrying out 
of the award or any part of it. 
When considering the provisions of some international treaties regarding the disputes 
that may arise between the parties with regard to the interpretation or execution of the 
award, we can find that some treaties indicate only that the question is to be submitted to 
the tribunal that rendered the award l36 . Nevertheless, the ILC Model Rules under Art. 33 
adopted a more strict approach in this respect by providing a fixed time limit of three 
months in which the parties are to refer the question to the tribunal that rendered the award 
and in case of their failure to do so within the aforesaid limit, the issue may be referred to , 
f . h f h . 137 the IC] at the request 0 elt er 0 t e parties . 
The right of the parties to demand revision of the award could be reserved in the 
compromis. This right, according to Art. 83 of the 1907 HCPSID, can be sought only on the 
ground of discovery of a new fact that is to constitute a decisive factor and that \\ as 
unknown to the tribunal or to the party which demands revision at the time the disCllssion 
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was closed. The application must be addressed to the tribunal that rendered the award 
within a period fixed by the compromis. The tribunal, during the proceedings of revision. is 
to make a finding as to the existence of the new fact and rule on the admissibility of the 
application 138. 
4.5. The Possibility of Secrecy: 
Hearings before the ICJ are, as a rule, open to the public except in the case where 
the parties may demand otherwise 139. Moreover, the Court may" ... after ascertaining the 
views of the parties, decide that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed shall be 
made accessible to the public on or after the opening of the oral proceedings"14o. The 
Registrar is to transmit a copy of any application or notification of a special agreement 
instituting proceedings before the Court to, in addition to the Secretary-General of the UN, 
all members of the UN and to any other State(s) entitled to appear before the Court l41 , and 
any judgement rendered by the Court must be made public 142. All of the foregoing aspects 
of proceedings before the ICJ give arbitration a significant advantage over judicial 
settlement when it comes to confidentiality. This can be clearly understood from the 
statement of Sir Robert Jennings 143 in which he pointed out that: 
... any case before the International Court of Justice is ipso facto 
something of a cause celebre, and a special cause celebre, and a 
special object of juristic comment. Now that fact is that litigants, 
whether governments or individuals, are not usually ambitious to be 
remembered by posterity as parties to a cause celebre, especially a 
lost one. What governments very often want, when they consider 
whether to submit a dispute to litigation, is to sweep that dispute 
under the carpet as decently, fairly and as quietly as may be. Hence 
the relative popularity of quiet arbitration. 
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The parties, by resorting to ad hoc arbitration can, if they so wish. conduct the 
d· . I 144 d . procee mgs m tota secrecy an avoId the hanging of dirty laundry in public 145 . This is 
because of the nature of ad hoc arbitration in which the whole scenario of the settlement 
process is mutually agreed upon between the disputants. Nevertheless, within the domains 
of institutionalised arbitration it appears that some instruments do provide for the 
discussions to be made public if the tribunal so decide, however, usually after the consent 
of the disputants is obtained. The traditional examples in this respect are Arts. 41 and 66 of 
the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID respectively which both stated that the discussions " ... are 
only public if it be so decided by the tribunal, with the assent of the parties". Also in this 
respect Art. 16(1) of the 1958 ILC Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure provided that the 
hearings were to be public " ... only if the tribunal so decides with the consent of the 
parties". 
4.6. Non-Intervention by Third States: 
The Statute of the IC] allows third States to intervene in cases pending before it 
under two circumstances, namely, in the case where a State may consider that it has an 
interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the Court's decision whereby it is 
required to submit a request to the Court seeking its permission to intervene
146
; and in the 
case where the construction of a treaty or convention to which the State willing to intervene 
is party is in question 147. However, again, the element of party autonomy in arbitration, ad 
hoc in particular, gives it virtue over judicial settlement when it comes to precluding third 
States from intervening in proceedings before the tribunal 148 . Nevertheless, the provisions 
of some multilateral instruments on the peaceful settlement of international disputes by 
inter alia arbitration did permit third party intervention in circumstances almost similar to 
26 
those indicated above, such as Arts. 36149 and 3i50 of the 1928 and 1949 General Acts for 
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes respectively, or only in the case where the 
third State considers that" .. .its legitimate interests are involved ... " as in Art. 33(1) of the 
1957 ECPSD I51 . 
Conclusion: 
International arbitration is a method for the settlement of disputes that has its roots 
in the earliest civilisations of mankind. In its recent form, arbitral practice, as many writers 
have indicated, is a sequel of early Anglo-American practice, namely, the settlement of 
certain controversies under the 1794 Jay Treaty and the 1871 Alabama Claims arbitrations. 
However, the practice of arbitration subsequently evolved in accordance with the changes 
in the circumstances in the world community and covered a broad area of affairs, such as 
trade, navigation and labour. In the domain of inter-State arbitration, controversies arose 
over the nature of arbitration and whether it is a judicial process guided by the strict 
application of law or falls between the two methods of judicial settlement and conciliation 
by reaching an equitable but binding settlement of the dispute. Although the majority view 
appears to fall in favour of the latter, however, arbitral compromissory clauses are still 
included in the provisions of numerous international treaties and agreements on both the 
152 d d b' . . bilateral and multilateral levels and on a very large scale . In ee , ar ItratlOn IS a 
voluntary means of dispute resolution, one in which the parties (mainly in the case of ad 
hoc arbitration) are to specify the main and basic procedural guidelines of the functioning 
of the tribunal. This underlines one of the most prominent characteristics of international 
arbitration, one which constitutes its very essence, viz., party autonomy153 which is a 
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concept synonymous with a basic necessity In arbitral settlements, namely. consent. 
Although a number of attempts were made for the adoption of an international compulsory 
arbitral mechanism, some composed of stringent watertight rules of procedure 154 which 
intended to strip it of its voluntary nature, it may be said that the flexibility in arbitral 
proceedings155, which maintains the parties' freedom to specify the tribunal's structure. 
composition, jurisdiction, procedures to be followed and the laws to be applied, as \\ell as 
allowing the possibility of secrecy and avoiding intervention by a third party, distinguishes 
international arbitration from proceedings before the Iel. It is this feature, which has 
attracted States to this method of settlement over the years. 
Indeed, party autonomy is a traditionally fundamental principle of international 
arbitration, one that comes as a natural consequence of the doctrine of State sovereignty. 
This latter is also in itself composed of a number of sub-doctrines and principles, the most 
important of which, within this context, is the principle requiring the consent of States 
parties to a dispute before the initiation of any legal proceedings on the international level 
involving States as parties. In a naturally antagonistic world, means were necessary to be 
sought in order to deviate States from the course of armed conflict to peaceful and civilised 
means for the settlement of their differences. In the vanguard of those means was 
arbitration, which was viewed by many States as the most effective and reliable means of 
dispute settlement 1 56. However, in order to ensure that States made recourse to arbitration, 
several compulsory multilateral arbitral mechanisms were established, thereby stripping 
arbitration of its voluntary nature and also the element of party autonomy which were both 
among the main reasons why arbitration was so popular among States. Moreover, the 
framers of those instruments had to reconcile between the submission of important issues to 
the jurisdiction of international tribunals under the compulsory obligation arising from 
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them on the one hand, and the State consent requirement on the other. The basic 
characteristics involved in the above formula, as well as the attitudes of States towards 
those mechanisms in general, will be examined elsewhere in this thesis. However. it is 
interesting to point out that despite of the flexibility and attractive nature of arbitration, 
States' attitude towards arbitration in general has changed dramatically, and recourse to ad 
hoc inter-State arbitration reached the current level where the occurrence of a settlement 
every once in a while is considered as a rarity. The following chapter is intended to provide 
a number of possible reasons why States may opt for other means of dispute settlement 
rather than for arbitration, as well as presenting a brief evaluation of the momentum of 
arbitral practice within the domains of tribunal activity and treaty practice in the last two 
centuries. 
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Notes to Chapter One: 
1 Along with those peaceful means, Art. 33 provided that the parties may also" ... resort to regional agencies 
or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice." For a highly authoritative and excellent 
background on the concept, application and functioning of all those means within the context of Art -. '"' 
• • • jj. see 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
The Rise and Fall of Inter-State Arbitration 
Introduction: 
The following discussion aims at examining a number of possible factors which 
may induce some States to opt for diplomatic in lieu of legal means of inter-State dispute 
settlement techniques when the need arises. The discussion will also examine the attitudes 
of certain Communist and so-called Third World States towards the peaceful settlement of 
disputes by arbitration. However, to enable the reader to appreciate our discussion in this 
respect and the dimensions of the issues under focus, it appears necessary first of all in the 
following to provide a review of the momentum of inter-State arbitral practice in the past 
two centuries within the domain of both tribunal activity and, also, treaty practice. 
1. The Momentum of Arbitral Practice in the Last Two Centuries: 
Although the establishment, provisions and the evaluation of the past general inter-
State arbitral mechanisms will be considered in detail in Chapter Five, this part of the 
chapter is intended to provide only the broadest and most general background on the 
evolution of inter-State arbitral practice from the 19th century till the current era I. The 
discussion will be conducted under two sub-headings; the first is concerned with a limited 
examination of State practice within the domains of inter-State arbitral settlements: and the 
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second with international arbitral treaty practice on both the bilateral and multilateral levels 
and the scope and fields of their application. 
1.1. Tribunal Activity: 
When considering arbitral practice within the 19th century era, it appears from the 
well presented but imprecise2 survey of Professor StUyt3 that most of the 222 arbitral 
settlements that took place within that era were ad hoc (isolated arbitration). However, 
when analysing the findings of the aforementioned authority of arbitral practice during that 
era, one may realise the gradual and, in one instance, fluctuating pace in arbitral settlements 
from decade to another. For instance, the first decade (1800-1809) witnessed only one 
arbitral settlement, that between Spain and the USA in 1802. During the second decade 
(1810-1819), arbitral practice witnessed an increase, with the number of settlements 
reaching 17. However, this advance was followed by a considerable setback in the third 
decade (1820-1829) in which the number of settlements dropped to 4. Arbitral activity 
gained gradual momentum in the years that followed, reaching a total of 5 settlements in 
the decade (1830-1839); 9 in (1840-1849); 21 in (1850-1859); 24 in (1860-1869); 27 in 
(1870-1879); and 42 in (1880-1889), culminating in a peak of 72 settlements during the 
decade (1890-1899). The increase in arbitral activity in the second half of the 19th century 
seems to reflect States' confidence in arbitration as an alternative for the ready but 
increasingly unattractive option of resorting to the use of armed force for the settlement of 
their disputes4• This, as well as the successful outcome of a number of arbitral settlements, 
especially the award in the Alabama Claims arbitrationS, had a positive impact on the vast 
growth in arbitral treaty practice, on both the bilateral and multilaterallevels
6
. 
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However, despite this increase in tribunal activity, Pint07 pointed out that certain 
characteristics of the arbitral process in that era, namely, the ex aequo et bono nature of the 
decisions of arbitral tribunals8 and also, the vulnerability of the arbitral process, which 
could be thwarted by the non co-operation of one of the parties to the dispute, a major 
problem which was witnessed earlier in the functioning of the second and third 
commissions acting under the Jay Treaty9, gave impetus to the trend towards the adoption 
of a more judicial model. The attempts to rid arbitration of its rather ancient and embryonic 
character in which equity served as the basis of arbitral decisions, by converting it into a 
rather judicial process guided by the application of strict principles of lawlO, and the 
establishment of an international tribunal which, notwithstanding the doctrine of sovereign 
equality of States and the consensual nature of recourse to arbitration, was to enjoy 
compulsory jurisdiction similar to that exercised by domestic courts, were both central to 
the evolution of mechanisms for the settlement of inter-State disputes by arbitration ever 
since the arbitrations under the Jay Treaty and the Treaty of Ghent. Nevertheless, it appears 
that the most momentous step in this direction was the 1899 Hague Convention for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which, as a Pinto II pointed out, " ... confirmed 
the evolution of arbitration in an essentially judicial mode and introduced the basic 
elements which have since been held to characterise international arbitration.,,12 The 
significance of the 1899 Hague Convention lies in the fact that it was the first and most 
influential international mechanism to consider the peaceful settlement of disputes as a 
whole l3 . It resulted in the codification of the law on international arbitral procedure, 
introduced a new element into the concept of international arbitration, viz. institutional 
arbitration and resulted in the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (the 
PCA). However, despite the significance ascribed to the 1899 Convention, it failed in 
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achieving some of its main objectives, inasmuch as the PCA established by the convention 
was neither permanent nor a court and lacked any form of jurisdiction except for that 
conferred upon it by the parties resorting to itl4. No real compulsory mechanism was 
established and no clear clarification of which disputes were legal Gusticiable) and which 
disputes were non-justiciable was adopted 15. 
When turning to the momentum of arbitral practice in the 20th century, it appears 
that an evaluation based on the figures provided in the survey of Professor StUyt16 (which 
covers arbitral practice only to the end of the 9th decade of that century) reveals two basic 
stages, the first covering the first three decades of that century and the second starting from 
the fourth decade onwards. The first stage, which may be considered as an extension of the 
positive attitude towards arbitral settlement which culminated in the second half of the 19th 
century and was greatly influenced by the impact of the 1899 Hague Convention and later 
on the 1907 Hague Convention, witnessed 156 arbitrations (65 in the decade 1900-1909, 36 
in the decade 1910-1919, and 56 in the decade 1920-1929). However, this considerable 
momentum in tribunal activity later declined rapidly and fluctuated in the second stage, 
when arbitration appeared to have lost its attraction as a basic element in States' foreign 
relations. The overall total of arbitrations in that era was even lower than that in the first 
decade of the century (62 settlements, 18 in the decade 1930-1939; 6 in the decade 1940-
1949; 14 in the decade 1950-1959; 8 in the decade 1960-1969; 5 in the decade 1970-1979; 
and 11 in the decade 1980-1989). However, the period which followed Stuyf s 
documentation witnessed a number of very important arbitrations. Most notable in this 
respect is the work of the Iran-USA Claims Tribunal which constituted the aftermath of tht? 
1979-1980 hostage crisis 17 and most recently the awards in both stages of the Hanish Island 
arbitration between Yemen and Eritrea 18. 
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The subject matters of the disputes submitted to arbitration during the 20th century_ 
according to Stuyt's survey, appear to be not very different from those of the century 
before. They covered a broad area of issues, such as State responsibility for injuries to 
aliens; boundary disputes; pecuniary claims; indemnity claims; fishery rights; and treaty 
interpretation. However, the question whether all these categories of disputes were always 
considered suitable for determination by an arbitral tribunal, or even the ICJ, will be dealt 
with in Chapter Four19. 
1.2. Arbitral Treaty Practice: 
The conclusion of arbitral treaties20 is a practice which gained momentum following the 
successful outcome of the 1794 arbitration under the Jay Treaty already examined above21 _ 
The Jay Treaty arbitration initiated, to some extent, the conclusion of a considerable 
number of arbitral treaties, especially between Latin American States in the 19th centuryn. 
However, it was left to the 1899 HCPSID, which was influenced by the earlier success of 
the Alabama Claims arbitration, to fuel the already existing practice of the conclusion of 
arbitral treaties. The impetus imparted to the concept of arbitration at the beginning of the 
20th century as a result of the 1899 Hague Convention not only made possible a 
considerable increase in the number of arbitral compromissory clauses embodied in the 
provisions of treaties concluded between States at that time, but also gave the genuine 
arbitral treaty an important role in connection with the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes23 . This fact is illustrated by the large number of arbitral treaties concluded 
following 1899, reaching its peak in the period following WW1, in which a number of 
treaty systems for the pacific settlement of international disputes were introduced
24
, which 
prescribed arbitration alone25 , or arbitration in conjunction with other means of 
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settlement
26
. However, the vast majority of those treaties provided only for 'conditional' 
arbitrability of all disputes; in other words, matters affecting the independence, national 
honour and vital interests of the parties were excluded from arbitration by means of 
reservation clauses, a practice which was engendered through the Franco-British Treaty of 
Arbitration of 190327• Even where unconditional arbitrability was agreed upon, the treaties 
only rarely contained provisions aimed at preventing an unwilling party from frustrating 
proceedings in a particular case, and the execution of the treaty was, therefore, left to the 
good will of the parties28. 
The period following the Second World War, owing to the lack of homogeneity in the 
post-war society of States29, witnessed a change in the attitude of States towards the 
practice of concluding arbitral treaties; this time, however, in a negative direction. Hardly 
any extension of the system of bipartite arbitral treaties took place and new treaties of this 
type nowadays seem almost non-existent. Moreover, only a few of the arbitral treaties 
concluded between the wars are still in force and even fewer continue to be applicable30. 
State interest, instead, shifted to the practice of inserting compromissory clauses3 ) into the 
provisions of the vast number of international treaties concluded on the bilateral or 
multilaterallevel32, a practice which still remains predominant. 
Within the context of multilateral treaty practice, the picture is no different. In this 
respect, although it may be said that the area of arbitral procedure is greatly indebted to the 
procedural frameworks established by some of the major international arbitral instruments 
adopted during the 20th century33. Nevertheless, the practice of concluding international 
instruments totally devoted to the pacific settlement by, inter alia, arbitration of all forms 
and categories of inter-State disputes of a public international law nature in general, such as 
the 1899 & 1907 HCsPSID; the 1924 Geneva Protocol; and the 1928 General Act, has 
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almost totally tailed off in the post-war era, with a few exceptions, such as the 19..+9 
Revised General Act, and on the regional level, the 1948 Pact of Bogota~ the 1957 
European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and the 1964 Protocol of 
Conciliation, Arbitration and Mediation of the OAU. Further attempts to adopt a 
comprehensive multilateral arbitral mechanism for application within the international level 
were sought through the ILC's proposed 'Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure'. But, 
unfortunately, those attempts were severally aborted and, instead, the proposed draft 
convention was downgraded to the level of Module Rules on Arbitral Procedure in 195834. 
The applicability and effectiveness of the ILC Model Rules, as well as the past general 
inter-State arbitral mechanisms mentioned above and States' attitudes towards them will be 
assessed elsewhere in this study35. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that despite the 
astoundingly overall high number of treaties that provided for arbitration concluded since 
the beginning of this century, State recourse to arbitration pursuant to such provisions when 
an actual dispute arises is just as astoundingly low36. 
2. Possible Factors behind a State's Disinclination to Arbitrate: 
From the past review of the momentum of State recourse to international arbitration and 
arbitral treaty practice it appeared that arbitration is currently almost absent in the inter-
State dispute settlement arena. The purpose of this part of the chapter is to examine a 
number of possible factors that may induce States not to resort to legal means of settlement 
in general and arbitration in particular when the need arises: 
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2.1. The Substance of the Dispute: The Justiciability and Non-Justiciability 
of International Disputes in Practice: 
In Chapter Four, an examination will be made of the theoretical dimensions of the 
issue of the justiciability or non-justiciability of international disputes37 . However, in this 
part of the chapter, the issue will be examined from a different angle, namel\'. that 
regarding its direct affect on a State's determination to resort to legal means of settlement 
either on an ad hoc basis when the need arises or even pursuant to a prior commitment to 
arbitrate 38 . 
The effect of the issue of justiciability or non-justiciability within the context of 
international arbitral practice is twofold, i.e. either during the process of determining 
whether or not the dispute, according to the respective State's opinion, is suitable for 
submission to the jurisdiction on an international tribunal, or in inter-State treaty practice 
by directly influencing the extent of the compulsory nature of a given dispute settlement 
mechanism or even by guiding a State's determination whether or not to accept the 
provisions of a certain international instrument that may specify arbitration as a means of 
settlement39. However, the major problem is that there exists no clear dividing line between 
the issues that are justiciable and those that are not40 . A dispute, be it one regarding a 
boundary delimitation claim or the interpretation of a treaty or a question concerning State 
responsibility, all of which have formed the subject matter of a large number of arbitral 
settlements in the past two centuries, may not be considered justiciable in certain 
circumstances41 . In practice, a State's refusal to resort to arbitration on the ground of the 
non-justiciability of the dispute is illustrated in the statement made by the Government of 
the USA regarding its refusal to agree to the demands of Columbia, that the legality of the 
former's actions involving the gaining of independence by Panama, and in particular its 
premature recognition of Panama, as well as its measures with regard to the construction of 
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the Panama Canal, be submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCA at the Hague for 
determination 42. In its refusal, the USA stated that: 
[i]ndeed the questions presented .... are of a political nature such as 
. , 
natIons of even the most advanced ideas as to international 
arbitration have not proposed to deal with by that process. 
Questions of foreign policy and of the recognition or non-
recognition of foreign States are of a purely political nature, and do 
not fall within the domain of judicial decision43 . 
The USA relied in its rejection of the Colombian demand for arbitration, inter alia, on the 
widely recognised44 principle regarding the political nature of the act of granting or 
withholding recognition to States and which, therefore, inter alia, made the dispute a non-
legal or non-justiciable one in the eyes of the US Government. Nevertheless, in other 
disputes of more or less intensity and which were clearly susceptible of settlement by legal 
means, such as those with Honduras and Mexico concerning certain acts committed against 
US nationals, namely, the shooting in the case the former and the imprisonment in the case 
of the latter of US nationals by those two States, the USA turned down the offers to 
arbitrate made by each of those States on the ground that, in her opinion, the issue of 
national honour was involved. Instead the USA enforced its respective indemnification 
claims by pressure in the former case and even by military force in the latter case 45. 
The current stand off between the Republic of Iran and the United Arab Emirates 
regarding the former's occupation on November 30, 1971, of the three small but strategic 
islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs located at the mouth of the Strait of 
Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world's oil supply passes. is another example of the 
rejection of a State of an offer to adjudicate a clearly justiciable dispute. The island of Abu 
Musa, prior to the Iranian occupation, was controlled by the Sheikhdom of Sharjah. while 
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the Greater and Lesser Tunbs were under the rule of the Sheikhdom of Ra's Al-Kaymah. 
Both Sheikhdoms are now part of the current UAE, which was formed shorth' foIIO\\'in o 
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Iran's invasion of the islands in 1971 46. No attempts were made by the UAE either 
individually or collectively with the assistance of other States to retrieve the islands by use 
of military force. Nevertheless, it has asserted its sovereignty over all three islands on 
numerous occasions, such as recently at the 21 st Gee summit at Manama on December 
2000, which in its Final Declaration embodied the members' assurance to the UAE of the 
Gee's" ... support for their right to the three islands and its refusal to go along with their 
occupation by Iran .... [as well as the] full sovereignty of the UAE over the islands, an 
integral part of the Emirates ... ,,47. However, such statements were met with strong 
resentment from Iran, which has repeatedly asserted its jurisdiction over all three islands on 
the basis of historical48 and geo-strategic49 factors. Such conflicting views regarding the 
claims of sovereignty over the islands are further fuelled by the existence of large oil 
deposits near Abu Musa50. 
The subject matter of the questions involved in the Iran / UAE dispute, such as 
unlawful occupation, title to territory, sovereignty and treaty interpretation, may clearly 
indicate that the dispute is one of a legal nature susceptible of settlement by the 
employment of judicial or arbitral processes, in the same way as other disputes in that 
region, such as the Hanish Island dispute between Yemen and Eritrea which was settled by 
arbitration51 or, most recently, the Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial 
Questions between Qatar and Bahrain which was settled by the Ie] through its recent 
judgement in March 16, 2001 52 . Indeed, the view that the dispute would and should be 
settled by such means was expressed in a number of statements made by UAE officials
53 
such as that most recently by Sheikh Ziad, President of the UAE, who on December 1. 
49 
2001, urged Iran to agree to submit their dispute to international adjudication via the IC] or 
to direct serious negotiations between the two States54. Such offers were regularly turned 
down and firmly rejected by Iran, which maintains that its sovereignty over the island is not 
negotiable
55
. The Iranian rejection of the offers to settle the dispute by legal, as well as 
diplomatic
56 
means, and the grounds on which the Iranian claims of sovereignty to the 
islands were based, clearly indicate that there is, from the Iranian point of vie\\. a non-
justiciable dispute at hand. This can be easily understood from the statements made by Iran 
on a number of occasions, such as its declaration following the GCC's 1992 summit that if 
the UAE were to attempt to take the islands, it would have to cross 'a sea of blood' to do 
S057. Most recently, in a statement made by Iran's Interior Minister, Abdol-Wahid Mussavi-
Lari, in response to the final communique of the 21 st GCC summit held at Manama on 
December 2000, he stated, "I caution Emirati leaders not to get fooled by the propaganda 
campaign because Iran will never yield a single inch of its territory,,58. 
The Iran / UAE example illustrates that, in the absence of an effective compulsory 
framework, it is the States who determine when to resort to peaceful means of settlement 
and under which terms. This is visible not only in actual inter-State dispute settlement 
practice but also in treaty practice through the inclusion of reservation clauses excluding 
what a State might see as 'non-suitable' for third party settlement, an issue which will be 
examined in detail in Chapter Four59. When examining some of the current disputes and 
conflicts of today, it appears that a great majority of those disputes are susceptible of 
settlement by legal means (leave alone diplomatic means). However, such disputes or 
conflicts become embroiled in political or ideological or religious tension too great to allo\\ 
for even the thought of seeking a legal solution, even on the basis of compromise or a 
decision ex aequo et bono60 . Indeed it appears unimaginable for a highly volatile dispute. 
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such as, the question of Jammu & Kashmir6I between India and PakI'stan 0 h' h h 
, n w IC t e two 
States are currently on the brink of full-blown direct military confrontation, to be submitted 
to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. Such categories of disputes are too hot to handle 
due to their political and / or religious content. However, although a State sometimes may 
view a certain dispute as susceptible to a 'legal' settlement or in other words 'justiciable'. 
however, it must also be born in mind that there exist certain other considerations which 
may guide a State's determination in this respect and which will be examined in the 
following, 
2.2. Previous Negative Experiences with Arbitration: 
In some situations, a certain State's attitude towards arbitration may be affected by an 
'unexpected' award which, from its point of view, is totally or partially biased to the other 
party involved in the settlement and contrary to its respective legally founded claims, or has 
only acknowledged part of that State's rights, a reaction which may lead to a total or partial 
feeling of mistrust towards arbitration, This psychological barrier towards arbitration may 
overlap with certain controversial issues that have surrounded arbitration and are discussed 
elsewhere, such as the true nature of arbitral proceedings, whether a judicial process based 
on strict principles of international law capable of providing afinal and decisive settlement 
to the dispute or, otherwise, a diplomatic process based more on compromise, and the issue 
regarding the uncertainty of arbitral awards62, The following discussion will focus on an 
illustrative example in this regard63 , namely, the official reaction of the Government of 
India following the award of the tribunal in the Rann of Kutch case, 
The Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary case, generally known as the Rann of Kutch 
case64, between India and Pakistan is one concerned with an arbitral settlement involving 
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two traditionally hostile neighbouring States. The disputed area known as 'the Great Rann 
of Kutch' or 'the Rann' formed a sector of the disputed boundary ben.veen India and 
Pakistan, situated in the western region of the Indian subcontinent with what was formalh' 
the Indian princely State of Kutch lying to its south and the British-Indian province of Sind 
to its north, an area which possesses unique and rare geographical features. For half of each 
year, the Rann is a dry salt-crusted desert or marsh, while for the reminder it is inundated 
except for a few elevated islands 'bets'. This even led to a certain degree of controversy 
between the parties as to the exact nature of the area, India claiming that is was 'land' while 
Pakistan claiming that it was a 'marine feature'. 
With the partition of British India into the two Dominions of India and Pakistan 
following Indian independence in 1947, Sind became part of Pakistan while Kutch acceded 
to India. Pre-existing uncertainties about the precise location of the Kutch-Sind boundary in 
the Rann area developed into a maj or international boundary dispute between India and 
Pakistan. India claimed that the whole of the Rann was Indian territory, while Pakistan 
claimed only the northern part of it. After prolonged diplomatic correspondence and direct 
negotiations between the Governments of India and Pakistan, military hostilities erupted 
between the two States in April 1965. However, after mediation of the British Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson, both parties to the dispute consented to the settlement of the 
dispute by international arbitration65 in the Cease-Fire Agreement of June 30, 196566 , 
Analysis of the procedural aspects of the settlement and the functioning of the tribunal can 
be found elsewhere67• However, within the context of this discussion it appears relevant to 
focus on the aspect concerning the award of the tribunal, which is the main source of 
India's negative reaction towards this settlement in particular and inter-State arbitration in 
general. In a majority award, based to a large extent on its appraisal of the facts. the three-
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man tribunal awarded the bulk of the disputed territory to India (nearly 90%), while 
recognising the remaining 10% as belonging to Pakistan. The award of the tribunal 
according to Art. 3( 4) of the 1965 Cease-Fire Agreement was to be binding on both 
Governments and was not to be questioned on any ground whatsoever. Both parties were to 
undertake" ... to implement the findings of the Tribunal in full as quickly as possible .... ". 
In fact, the award of the tribunal was respected by both parties and implemented in 
accordance with Art. 3(4) above, although the Indian nominated arbitrator dissented, 
upholding India's claims over all of the disputed area. However, this respect and 
implementation of the award of the tribunal did not prevent the Indian media, as well as a 
number of its highest State Officials from expressing their profound feeling of 
dissatisfaction with the terms of the award, which was described as 'perverse', 'political', 
'politically motivated' and a 'reward for Pakistan,68. Most of the criticism centred on a 
number of statements made by the chairman of the tribunal while giving details of the 
boundary that was determined by the tribunal69, especially those regarding two deep inlets 
which, despite evidence that they formed a part of Kutch (or Indian) territory, were 
awarded to Pakistan on the ground that the two inlets were surrounded by Sind (Pakistani) 
h . L ,. f' 70 territory. Therefore, from C aIrman agergren s pomt 0 VIew : 
... it would be inequitable to recognise these inlets as foreign 
territory. It would be conducive to friction and conflict. The 
paramount consideration of promoting peace and stability in this 
region compels the recognition and confirmation that this territory, 
which is wholly surrounded by Pakistan territory, also be declared 
as such. 
The amount of criticism levelled at the award seems to be a natural response. 
especially given the nature of the relations between the two States, and also the fact that 
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pursuant to the terms of the award, India was to vacate some of the strategic military points 
it had occupied during its clashes with Pakistani forces in 196571 . Even Prime Minister 
Indira Ghandi herself, 'Yhile expressing that the award would be honoured and 
implemented by her government, indicated that " ... it was evident that the tribunal's 
[a]ward was not merely based on the material produced by the two countries but also on 
certain political considerations"n. Indeed' the element of compromise appears evident in 
the statement of the Chairman of the tribunal quoted above, regarding the two inlets that 
were awarded to Pakistan. However, this seems to contradict an earlier statement made by 
the tribunal, in which it ruled out the possibility of deciding ex aequo et bono 73. 
Such an 'un-welcomed' outcome of an arbitral settlement may leave its negative imprint on 
the attitudes of decision-makers towards arbitration for a long period of time. This, in the 
aftermath of the Rann of Kutch case, is illustrated in the statement made by India's Deputy 
Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, in the front page of the Times of India on February 28, 
196974, in which he pointed out that he was unhappy about the award and felt that India 
should not resort to international arbitration in the future in similar cases. Such a view 
was also echoed, but in a more extreme instance, by former High Court Judge and ex-
Minster of External Affairs of India, M.C. Chagla, who stated in the Indian Express on 
February 20, 196875 , that India should shy away in the future from resorting to international 
tribunals. The best justice that India can get in such situations, according to Mr Chagla, is 
"from our own strength and not from looking to any international tribunal or the Security 
Council, whether it is a question of Kashmir or any other territory". According to him, 
India must depend on its own resources for the solution of such issues. Although India has 
appeared before the IC1 in three cases 76 following the 1968 Award in the Rann of Kutch 
case (her overall number of appearances before the Court was four; in three of them as 
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defendant
77 
and in one as plaintiff appealing against a decision of the ICAO Council to 
assume jurisdiction in a case between India and Pakistan involving aerial transport 
agreements 78), India to date, has never since resorted to ad hoc inter-State arbitration 
, 
despite its being a Signatory State of the 1899 HCPSID. It seems that India like a oreat 
b 
many States of the world preferred79 (and continues to prefer) flexible 'diplomatic' means 
of settlement, i.e. negotiation ... etc, where greater control may be exercised over the 
outcome of the settlement process. Although India put arbitration to the test in the Rann of 
Kutch case, nevertheless, from the comments made in the aftermath of the award by India's 
most senior State officials, and also from India's practice with regard to the reservations 
attached to its current declaration lodged to the IC] under the Optional Clause8o• there 
appears to be no intention on India's part to repeat the experience. 
2.3. Domestic Factors: The Avoidance of the Reaction of Internal Political 
Factions within the State: 
In 1991, the Administrative Council of the PCA assigned a work group for the purpose 
of considering, inter alia, the reasons for lack of recourse of some States to the Court for 
the settlement of their disputes81 • Among the first factors constituting the groups finding 
was, inter alia, the reluctance on the part of some governments: 
... to remove a dispute from the level of negotiation, over which it 
exercises control, and to submit it an external tribunal - whether an 
international court or an arbitral tribunal - for a decisio.n that mi~ht 
not seem justified to domestic constituencies .... [ emphasIs added] . 
According to this finding, it appears, unsurprisingly, that domestic political factions 
within the political arena of a State may be a driving force against a decision to submit a 
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particular dispute to peaceful settlement by legal means. However, the influence of the 
above factor, as we shall see below, does not appear to be confined to States' reluctance to 
resort to the peA's machinery alone, but has also played a role in States' reluctance to 
resort to inter-State arbitration in general. Indeed, the submission of a certain dispute, 
especially one affecting a State's national honour or vital interests, or in the case \\here 
there exists a certain degree of religious or ideological or cultural rivalry between both 
governments and / or the population on both sides (any of which could lead to the dispute 
being categorised as a political one), by a government to international arbitration or 
adjudication may be considered by the electorate or opposition, or even certain factions 
within the ruling political party itself, as an unforgivable mistake if the settlement does not 
go its way. Such a mistake may have grave political consequences for that party's future in 
subsequent elections. This can be deduced from Darwin's83 observation on the influence on 
foreign policies of internal political forces, in which he pointed out that: 
... a political leader rarely gains internal political support by a 
generous or internationally minded external policy. This is equally 
true in a parliamentary regime with an open debate between 
Government and Opposition, and in a power struggle within the 
committees of a one- party or authoritarian regime. 
Therefore, in order to avoid this possibility, recourse to a more controllable means 
I.e. negotiations, is the logical alternative for some governments or, in other cases, the 
dispute is left open and passed on to the succeeding government or even to the next 
generation, in order for them to find a way out on their own responsibility84. However. the 
fear of domestic reactions within the State as a deterrent against the submission of a certain 
dispute to legal means of settlement is a factor which is not solely confined to the instance 
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where the State concerned is a representative democracy in to the western sense of the term, 
but may also be present in the minds of decision makers in any other form of political 
85 Th· . 
system. IS Issue seems to have a close connection to the issue of the justiciability or 
otherwise of disputes86 . 
2.4. The Reality of the Inter-State Dispute Settlement Process by Legal Means: 
According to Darwin87 , the main constituting elements of an inter-State dispute88 are: 
1- The dispute must be between States; 
2- The dispute must lead to some action by the aggrieved State (e.g. diplomatic protest or 
propaganda campaigns or application to an international organisation). In the absence of 
this factor, the dispute may not be considered an active one; 
3- The dispute must be related to a reasonably well-defined subject matter. 
Therefore, according to this observation, once the above elements all exist in a certain 
dispute, then it is an inter-State dispute. The settlement of an inter-State dispute by 
arbitration does not occur in a spontaneous manner, but is an issue which, according to 
Rusk89, requires: 
1- A willingness (consent) to settle the dispute by arbitration; 
2- Factors that mitigate against settlement of the dispute by negotiation, such as, for 
example, public opinion; 
3- A need for legal third party assistance as an only possible way out of the dispute; 
4- The availability of rules of international to govern the dispute. 
Needless to say, the premier function of international arbitration is to produce a settlement 
of a dispute. However, is the award in itself enough to turn the last page of that dark chapter 
in the relations between the disputants? This brings to mind the logical question once asked 
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by Darwin
9o
, when is a dispute considered to be 'settled'? In his reply to that question he: 
indicated that: 
The word 'settlement' has in it an element of ambiguity. In one 
sense, a dispute may be regarded as settled when it has been 
submitted to a procedure which leads to a binding decision; in 
another, it is only settled when the disputing parties accept, even 
reluctantly, a solution reached and cease to foreword opposed 
viewpoints. The latter sense is in part subjective and psychological. 
The interplay of these two factors must be constantly borne in mind. 
Thus, in general a judicial settlement settles a dispute effectively in 
the psychological sense .... [emphasis added]. 
However, the settlement of the dispute, as indicated above, does not necessarily mean that 
the state of hostility that may exist between the disputants as a result of the dispute will be 
dissolved. In some situations, a State may feel that there is no need to resort to arbitration 
or adjudication if the dispute, from its point of view, forms a secondary and minor aspect of 
a more general and complex problem not to be dealt with by the tribunal or court91 • This 
can be understood more easily when examining the conception of the terms 'dispute' and 
'conflict' adopted by Collier and Lowe92, who pointed out that the two should be 
distinguished. According to them: 
... the term 'conflict' is used to signify a general state of hostility 
between the parties, and the term 'dispute' to signify a specific 
disagreement relating to a question of rights or interests in which 
the parties proceed by way of claims, counter-claims, denials and so 
on. Conflicts are often unfocused, and particular disputes arising 
from them are often perceived to be as much the result as the cause 
of the conflict. Conflicts can rarely, if ever, be resolved by the 
settling of the particular disputes which appear to constitute them: 
the feeling of hostility almost inevitably survive the settlement of 
the disputes. 
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They support this view by reference to the immediate crisis that emerged following the US 
Embassy hostage incident in Tehran, although it was solved later by the release of the 
hostages following a number of corresponding concessions made by the USA, nevertheless, 
a general state of hostility still exists between the two States to this day93. Even the 
successful functioning of the Claims Tribunal established pursuant to Art. 3( 1) of the 1981 
Claims Settlement Declaration between the USA and Iran94 had no significant impact on 
the state of relations between the two States. 
The strict nature of legal means of settlement also causes some States to fear these 
means
95
. This issue, within the context of international adjudication, was raised by some of 
the participants in the International Symposium on the Judicial Settlement of International 
Disputes that took place in 1972 at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law 
and International Law at Heidelberg, Germany96, as a cause of State reluctance to resort to 
the IC}. For example, Mr. Castaneda97 of Mexico argued that it is possibly the most 
important factor contributing to State reluctance. This factor, as a cause of State hesitation 
to judicial settlement, was best illustrated in the observation of Professor Morawiecki98 , 
who pointed out that judicial settlement: 
... afforded a very rigged and final way of solving international 
disputes, and they [the governments] preferred to settle them by 
political [diplomatic] means .... The judicial process might force t~e 
parties into the role of adversaries of whom only one could Win 
while the other one had to lose. Thus it corresponded rather to the 
model of a 'zero sum game', not to the typical political [diplomatic] 
games in international relations which were more like 'non zero 
sum games': in which both parties could win or both could lose. 
A former Judge of the IC}, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice99 once indicated that: 
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· .. no tribunal that is a court of law .... can give a decision that will 
be welcomed with applause by both or all parties, all groups, or all 
shades of opinion, ideological or other.... In short, one of the 
penalties of going to law, and one of the reasons why .... there is a 
reluctance to do so, is that someone has got to lose or be 
disappointed. 
Indeed, the fear of losing a case might sometimes carry far greater political weight than the 
advantages that might be gained from the settlement of the dispute 100, especially in the case 
where the relations between the disputants may be tense as a result of ideological or 
political or religious rivalry. Therefore, diplomatic means of settlement in this respect 
appears to be a more attractive option, on the basis that the final outcome, as well as any 
concessions made by the parties and whatever issue those concessions may be concerned 
with, is tailored in accordance with what each party has agreed. In other words, each party 
is the master of its own fate with regard to the dispute. This view, within the Symposium, 
was expressed by Professor Helmut Steinberger 10 1 , who indicated that the natural priority 
of diplomatic means over legal means is owed to the fact that disputants in diplomatic 
settlements are able to discuss all types of problems that may exist between them, legal or 
otherwise. Therefore, the chances of reaching a settlement to the dispute are thus 
considerably enhanced. Moreover, he pointed out that diplomatic means of settlement seem 
to be more discreet and flexible than judicial means, and above all, they provide a chance to 
avoid a defeat of another State in Court, which may have a far reaching negative impact on 
the relations between the two States. 
The views cited above were concerned with international judicial settlement under the IeJ. 
However, one may ask whether arbitral awards are any different? When recalling our 
discussion in Chapter One regarding the true nature of international arbitration 102, it 
appeared that among the factors on which the attack on the judicial nature of arbitration 
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was based was the inevitable element of compromise in arbitral awards, despite the absence 
of the consent of the parties to a decision of that nature. Indeed, Rosenne103 in an 
observation on the differences between international arbitration and adjudication under the 
ICJ pointed out that "[a]n arbitrator may find it possible to act as amiable compositeZlr. 
which the Court [the ICJ], it seems, in principle cannot or should not dO"IO.+. However, 
regarding the school of thought which upholds the diplomatic nature of international 
arbitration and which results in a decision based on compromise, irrespective of whether 
consent to that affect was granted or not, it may be asked whether that was what the 
disputants, or at least one of them, really asked for? When looking at the award of the 
tribunal in the Rann of Kutch case examined above 105, and the official reaction of the 
Government of India towards it, the answer to the question seems to be in the negative l06 . If 
the parties had really sought a compromise decision in the first place, they would have 
resorted to a real and genuine 'diplomatic' means of settlement, in which they and not the 
tribunal were to play the active role in determining the final outcome. Indeed, the loss of 
the parties' control over the outcome of the settlement process was pointed out by 
Bowettl07 as among the factors which deter States from recourse to international arbitration 
or adjudication. The comment of Judge Fitzmaurice108 in this respect is of timeless 
relevance and deserves extensive quotation. According to his view, such reluctance is 
because of the: 
... preference of almost all governments for the prosec~t.ion and 
settlement of international disputes by means of the polItIcal arts 
they understand, rather than the juridical ones the~ do not a~d tend 
to dislike, together with their dislike of the commitment entaIled by 
recourse to arbitration or adjudication - a dislike \vhich .... stems 
from the loss of all freedom of manoeuvre once the dispute is fairly 
in the hands of a court or arbitral tribunal. No longer then -
whatever may be achievable through the forensic arts - can the 
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out~~n:e be influenced by what is so dear to the heart of the 
pohtI~Ian - the proc~ss o~ propaganda, persuasion, bargaining. 
lobbYIng, and the mantpulatIOn of votes. It is the feeling of loss of 
control o.ver the ~ture of the case when it becomes sub judice, and 
goes as It were Into cold storage for perhaps two or three years 
bef~re the final decision is given, as compared to with the ability to 
ret~In su~h contr~l. whenever the matter is dealt with on a political 
baSIS or In a polItIcal forum, which, even if only subconsciously, 
causes government to shy away from the arbitrator and the judge. 
Nevertheless, strict decisions based on the application of strict black letter law may in 
themselves form a source of friction in inter-State relations, especially in the case where the 
disputants enjoy friendly relations. Therefore, it has been suggested by Bilder109 that this 
issue may form a factor which may cause States to hesitate to resort to such means of 
settlement. According to him: 
... [w ]here two nations are necessarily involved in continuous long 
term relations, a solution which legally 'settles' a particular dispute 
but leaves one party feeling it has been treated unfairly may 
ultimately do more harm than good. Feeling of resentment and 
attempts to compensate in other areas for an unfavourable 
judgement may hamper future working relationships between the 
parties or even alienate the losing party from the legal system. 
This is also attributed by some l IO to the quarrel like nature of dispute settlement by legal 
means in general involving claims, counter-claims and evidence, etc. Moreover. some 
States consider an offer to arbitrate or a unilateral application filed to the Ie) as an 
unfriendly act lll , a factor which mainly manifests itself in the case where a weak State is 
the plaintiff against a more larger and powerful one l12 . This factor may be more signi ficant 
in the case where the underdeveloped State may receive political or economic aid from the 
defendant to be, the richer and more sophisticated and industrialised State. In such a cas~ it 
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would appear more efficient (politically and / or economically) for the underdeveloped 
applicant to resort to the less provocative and more flexible alternative of diplomatic means 
rather than taking a step which may be perceived by its larger and more powerful adversary 
as 'a bite to the hand that feeds it' thereby risking the possibility of the loss or suspension 
of such aid or support. This issue, within the context of offers to arbitration, was expressly 
considered more than a century ago at the 1899 HCPSID which in Art. 27 113 stated that: 
[t]he signatory Powers consider it their duty, if a serious dispute 
threatens to break out between two or more of them, to remind these 
latter that the Permanent Court [the PCA] is open to them. 
Consequently, they declare that the fact of reminding the conflicting 
parties of the provisions of the present Convention, and the advice 
given to them, in the highest interests of peace, to have recourse to 
the Permanent Court, can only be regarded as friendly actions 
[emphasis added]. 
Moreover, later on, the Institut de Droit International in its Neuchatel Session adopted a 
Resolution in 1959114 whereby it declared that: 
.... recourse to the International Court of Justice or to another 
international court or arbitral tribunal constitutes a normal method 
of settlement of legal disputes as defined in Article 36, paragraph 2, 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
Consequently, recourse to the International Court of Justice or to 
another international court or arbitral tribunal can never be regarded 
as an unfriendly act towards the respondent State 1 15 
The issue was also addressed in the 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of 
International Disputes which stated that " ... [r ]ecourse to judicial settlement of legal 
disputes, particularly referral to the International Court of Justice, should not be considered 
an unfriendly act between States". In recent UN Resolutions concerned with peaceful 
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settlement, such as, for example, General Assembly Res. 54/28 of January 21, 2000 
regarding 'The United Nations Decade of International Law', this issue is not mentioned 
expressly; however, it may be deduced from their content which carries the weight of the 
organ as well as the whole international organisation in which the Resolutions \\ ere 
promulgated, and which expressly encourages States to make full use of the means 
available for the settlement of disputes116• Although it has been mentioned 11 ? that there is 
extreme difficulty in providing' actual proof about States that have shied away in practice 
from international arbitration or adjudication in order to avoid exasperating another State, 
nevertheless, State practice does affirm the fact that a unilateral application filed against a 
State may be met with a strong and angry reaction from that State118• 
The element of unpredictability in international arbitral awards or judicial decisions 
may be another factor which gives rise to State reluctance to resort to those means 119. As 
has been pointed out120, settlement by legal means is certainly a good way of obtaining a 
decision and disposing of the problem. There is, however, no guarantee that the decision 
will be the 'right' one, because, even apart from the possibility of deliberate prejudice or 
clear incompetence by an international tribunal, any settlement of an international dispute 
by legal means involves a large element of chance. No matter how careful the parties are in 
selecting arbitrators or judges, no matter what the judges' reputations, any judge or 
arbitrator may simply fail to understand an issue, be subconsciously biased, try to avoid 
responsibility by compromising, or just reach a wrong decision. Akehurst 121 pointed out 
that judges are likely to be influenced consciously or unconsciously by political 
considerations in the case where the subject matter of the dispute falls within an area where 
the law is uncertain. 
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Along with the above-mentioned factors behind State reluctance to resort to 
arbitration in particular comes the time element. The parties have to negotiate the essential 
details of the compromis, including the method of appointment of the members of the 
tribunal, their names, the tribunal's jurisdiction, the law(s) applied .... etc. All of this may 
take a significant period of time and may offer scope for frustration and impediment of the 
settlement process by an unwilling party. It has been widely acknowledged that resort to the 
ICl, a pre-constituted judicial body with its own pre-established Registry, pre-drafted 
Statute and Rules of procedure and pre-specified rules of law to be applied to the dispute, is 
more efficient than arbitration in this respect l22 . Moreover, the parties in ad hoc arbitral 
settlements bear the expenses of the whole settlement (e.g. fees and expenses of the 
members of the tribunal; expenses of agents, counsel, experts and witnesses; any expenses 
with regard to the implementation of the award; and all other expenses related to the 
tribunal and its functioning) on their own. It can be imagined how heavy the bill would be 
on the exchequer of an underdeveloped State, especially bearing in mind the long period of 
123.[:'. d . time that some settlements may take . Therefore, as lar as expenses are concerne , It 
appears that recourse to the ICl is a more efficient option than ad hoc arbitration 124. 
3. The Attitudes of Certain Groups of States towards Arbitration: 
The discussion above on the momentum of arbitral practice, in particular, tribunal 
activityl25, underlined the current almost absolute standstill in such practice. Some States 
may have been individually influenced by any of the factors examined under heading (2) 
above. However, there are certain negative views and positions held by some in this world 
towards international arbitration, which have been a factor that allegedly influenced certain 
groups of States to abandon legal means of dispute settlement in general and inter-State 
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arbitration in particular, thereby, contributing significantly to the low number of disputes 
that were submitted to arbitration in the past century. Although this diverse world contains 
competing universal views in this respect, space in this section permits us to examine only 
two examples, namely, the positions of the former Eastern Bloc States of Europe and that 
of African and Asian States. In this section, an attempt will be made to clarify the positions 
of these groups of States towards inter-State arbitration. 
3.1. The Attitudes of the former Eastern Bloc States 126 towards International 
Arbitration: 
The first category of States accused of the almost total abandonment of inter-State 
arbitration (and even legal means of settlement in general) and which call for some 
examination in this respect were the States that composed what was formally known as the 
Eastern Bloc. However, again, space limits our discussion to only one of the 
aforementioned group of States, namely, the former USSR 127. The discussion in this respect 
will focus only on the practice of the former USSR with regard to the question of State 
sovereignty; adherence to international treaties or organisations that provided for 
arbitration; and its attitude towards the issue of compulsory jurisdiction. 
Any mention of the 1899 HCPSID, the first and one of the most influential 
multilateral mechanisms for the settlement of inter-State disputes by peaceful means, 
almost immediately brings to the mind the enthusiastic invitation of Czar Nicholas II of 
Russia to the diplomatic representatives of the States that were to participate in the 1899 
Hague Peace Conference which underlined the main aims of the conference, namely. the 
adoption of effective measures for the reduction of military and naval armaments and, most 
important of all in this respect, to devise means necessary for averting armed conflict 
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between states by the employment of peaceful methods of settlement, especially good 
offices, mediation and arbitration 128. However, this favourable position towards arbitration~ 
as well as legal techniques of dispute settlement in general, was to change dramatically 
following the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. The atmosphere following the famous 
October Revolution is best illustrated in the words of Hazard 129 who indicated that: 
" .Russia's new era was opened by men accepting no concept of 
restraint other than that of expediency; recognising the power of no 
unseen hand preventing the doing of what seemed necessary to 
speed the historical process toward its inevitable conclusion in a 
communist society. God was banished from their thoughts as 
legendary, lacking scientific proof of being. Natural law in the 
sense of the Greek philosophy was relegated to the scrap heap as a 
myth of history. 
The founder of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference was, on the inter-State dispute settlement 
level, transformed into " ... a systematic enemy of arbitration" 130. The newly emerged USSR 
owed no homage to law as a superior authority limiting realisation of its plans and 
objectives, but viewed it as a tool which was to be manipulated in accordance with the 
changing needs and interests of the State. This was clearly epitomised in the famous theme 
of Lenin, 'a law is politics' 131. The USSR adopted the doctrine of quasi-absolute 
sovereignty l32 in theory and practice towards the questions of international law and 
sovereignty. It took international law into its own hands and unilaterally determined matters 
of international concern or the interpretation of international treaties and other international 
obligations by its own sovereign will, in spite of the interests and rights of the other parties 
involved. Moreover, one of the most prominent Soviet jurists in the area of international 
law, A.1. Vyshinsky, even went on to assert the primacy of Soviet municipal la\\ ov~r 
international law in the case where the two were in conflict. Soviet Governments felt that 
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they had the supreme authorisation to decide unilaterally whether and what changes needed 
to be carried out in the internal as well as in the international spheres l33 . This school of 
thought was quite evident in the minds and writings of some of its most prominent legal 
jurists, such as F.J. Kozhevnikov l34 (former Soviet Judge to the ICJ, 1953-1960) who 
sought to justify the 'just nature' of the Soviet Union's war against Finland in 1939 on the 
ground that " ... the Soviet Union has the right to ask for the shifting in her favour of the 
frontiers of a neighbouring State if, in the opinion of the USSR, that State endangers the 
security of the Soviet Union,,135. However, this absolutist Soviet approach cannot be looked 
at separately from the Cold War context it existed in and which started following WW2. In 
that struggle, sovereignty was constantly referred to by the USSR as the key concept in 
international relations and the basic legal means of shielding its freedom of action from 
what it considered as external interference in its own business l36 • This can be easily 
understood from the statement of Korovin 137, another prominent Soviet jurist, who pointed 
out that: 
[t]he Soviet Union is destined to act as the champion of the doctrine 
of 'classical' sovereignty in so far as its formal seclusion acts as a 
legal armour protecting it from interference of those factors under 
the pressure of which the frontiers of the contemporary capitalists 
States are changed and the forms of their laws are altered. So long 
as beyond the frontiers of the USSR there is only the ring of 
bourgeois encirclement, every limitation of sovereignty on behalf of 
it would be a greater or lesser victory of the capitalist world over 
the socialist order .... 
Therefore, Soviet jurists viewed the relativist theory of sovereignty. which will be 
examined elsewhere in this studi 38, with suspicion. They perceived it as a means of 
imposing limitations on the sovereignty of the USSR to the direct benefit of its capital ist 
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rivals or as a means designed for subjecting the USSR to legal norms which were originally 
formed and created by capitalist States and, therefore, reflected the views and interests of 
those States
l39
, who were referred to by Korovin 140 as the 'grave-diggers' of sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, it seems incorrect to suggest that Soviet legal jurists envisaged lawlessness. 
Tunkin 141, one of the Soviet Union's leading legal jurists, pointed out that the ideas and 
principles of the October Revolution have functioned in the direction of creating ne\\ 
international relations and a new international law. According to him: 
... the Soviet Union, and now the other Socialist States as well , 
tirelessly struggle for the introduction of progressive principles and 
norms into international law so that it becomes a more effective 
means of strengthening international peace and developing friendly 
relations among States on the basis of equality and self-
determination ofpeoples l42 . 
He believed that the principles and norms of international law (as applied by Western 
States) were operative essentially only in relations between civilised or Christian States and 
did not apply to there relations with Asian and African States. The Soviet State, according 
to him, was the only State which favoured the complete application of such principles to all 
States equally 143 . 
When it comes to the question of the peaceful settlement of inter-State disputes by 
legal means, it appears that although the USSR Government following the October 
Revolution did not reject the obligations that were made by Tsarist Russia in the field of the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, such as the 1899 HCPSID or membership to the PCA, nor 
did it later on reject Art. 33 of the UN Charter l44, nevertheless, the USSR, either in State or 
treaty practice, was never a real advocate of public international adjudication or arbitration. 
especially compulsory adjudication or arbitration, which it viewed as a stark violation of 
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State sovereignty. However, this resistance to compulsory reference of disputes under 
multilateral treaties was dissipated, in very extraordinary circumstances 145, in cases \\"here it 
could not be avoided and would not lead to a possible infringement of the USSR's domestic 
affairs, or in cases where the interests of the USSR that were to be served by participation 
in an organisation or convention appear to outweigh the risk involved in accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of an international tribunal 146 . Regarding treaty practice, the USSR 
in the field of peaceful settlement of international disputes usually concluded agreements 
with other States which did not provide for an obligatory solution, and were traditionally 
framed in such a manner that the presence of a neutral member or umpire in any permanent 
or ad hoc tribunal established for that purpose was avoided (the principle of parity) and that 
the possibility of third party arbitration was exc1udedI47 . An explanation of the Soviet non-
preference of third party arbitration or the traditional arbitral tribunal which consists of an 
odd number of arbitrators was provided by Kozhevnikov l48 . In his words: 
It goes without saying that under all circumstances there wi II 
remain unchanged that general principle of Soviet foreign policy, 
under which Soviet diplomacy will always seek to obtain such a 
bench for the arbitration tribunals or for other similar agencies as 
will guarantee to the USSR the same measure of disinterestedness 
and justice as is assured other [s ]tates. 
Regarding the Soviet view towards the ICJ, a number of arguments were advanced 
by Soviet jurists for the purpose of justifying this feeling of mistrust towards the Court, 
such as that State sovereignty was limited by international adjudication which imposes a 
binding judgement that is to be carried out by the State even in the event of an adverse 
pronouncement l49 ; that the Court in the majority of cases placed political considerations 
over purely legal arguments; that the Court is dominated by bourgeois and bourgcois-
70 
oriented judges, which makes it easier for the Court to resort to all sorts of quasi-juridical 
suppositions and sophistry in order to justify its otherwise unlawful decisions 150. that , 
adjudication is a very complex and formal procedure and, therefore, cannot be as adequate 
and effective as some of the diplomatic means of dispute settlement, such as negotiation; 
that the question of compulsory jurisdiction enshrined in 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ was 
contrary to the principle of the freedom of selection of means 151; that the quality of the 
judgements of the Court varied depending on the nature of the dispute, i.e. in the case 
where juridical aspects prevailed over political ones in contentious cases and requests for 
advisory opinions, the Court rendered, as a rule, just judgements and acceptable advisory 
opinions. However, once the political aspects in a contentions case or request for an 
advisory opinion prevailed, the Court often rendered ill-based judgements and advisory 
The USSR's negative attitude towards international adjudication and compulsory 
jurisdiction, as we shall see in Chapter Five of this study, was on a number of occasions a 
major stumbling-block in the way of the international community's quest in the past 
century towards the establishment of an effective and mandatory machinery for the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes by, inter alia, arbitration. Nevertheless, during 
the imminent decline of the Communist State at the late 1980s, a major crack in the wall 
with regard to the Soviet attitude towards such means of settlement occurred as a result of 
Perestroika that started in 1985153 . The change was manifested in the address of President 
Gorbachev to the UN on December 7, 1988 154, in which he suggested that all States should 
recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ with regard to human rights agreements. 
The address was subsequently followed by the Decree adopted on February 10, 1989, by 
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the President of the USSR Supreme Soviet recognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
IC] in six human rights conventions155. 
3.2. The New African-Asian States and their Views towards the issue of Dispute 
Settlement by International Arbitration: 
It is commonly known that the group of States which make up what is known as the 
'Third World' or 'Developing Countries' constitute the overwhelming majority of the 
international community156. The vast majority of these States were formerly subject to 
colonial domination. However, after their emancipation from the fetters of colonialism, 
most of these States found themselves face to face with a number of new other problems, 
such as the lack of infrastructure; economic underdevelopment and (what concerns us in 
this respect) numerous disputes with neighbouring States of an inter-State character 
concerning issues such as unsettled boundaries, title to territory and so on (especially in 
Africa)157. In this regard, it appears that examination of the position of the Third World 
States of Africa and Asia (hereinafter cited as Afro-Asian States) towards the issue of the 
settlement of their inter-State disputes by legal means in general and arbitration in 
particular is necessary, in order to understand the possible reasons why such a significant 
number of disputes has not been submitted to such means of settlement by those States. 
The debate on Afro-Asian States' views towards dispute settlement will be started by 
considering those States' views towards international law in general, since, this is the law 
usually applied by international tribunals. However, it must be admitted first of all that the 
category of States under examination cannot properly be treated as a single unit, in view of 
the considerable degree of diversity in those States' cultural and ideological backgrounds; 
their degree of economic or social development; their political alignment; and their 
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respective systems of public orderl58 . Regarding those States' attitudes towards 
. t t' I lB' I 159 . d' merna lOna aw, ner yonce m lcated that some of those nations were .... .inclined to 
look onto international law as an alien system which the Western nations, whose moral or 
intellectual leadership they no longer recognise, are trying to impose upon them,,160. It has 
been pointed outl61 that such a negative and, to a certain extent, suspicious attitude towards 
international law is owed to the concepts of law that prevail in most of those States which, 
although differing from one culture to another, are always profoundly distinct from that 
predominating in the Westl62. International law since Grotius and especially after the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648 was largely European in both character and application l63 . However, 
can this issue be linked to how Afro-Asian States viewed international law? In this regard, 
Anghie 164 draws attention to a significant relationship between 19th century positivism and 
colonialism. According to him, after numerous colonial wars, virtually all of the territories 
of Asia, Africa and the Pacific that were under the colonial control of the major European 
States by the beginning of the 20th century were subjected to a system of law that was 
fundamentally derived from European thought and experience. According to the prevailing 
positivist jurisprudence at the time, the confrontations were not looked at as confrontations 
between two sovereign equals, but between a sovereign European State and a non-
European, and at the same time, non-sovereign entityl65. This confrontation, according to 
Anghie l66, posed: 
., .no conceptual difficulties for the positivist jurist who basicall~ 
resolves the issue by arguing that the sovereign state can do as It 
wishes with regard to the non-sovereign entity, which lacks the 
legal personality to assert any legal opposition. 
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A similar tone also appeared in the positivist vocabulary at the time which referred to the 
peoples of those non-European entities in denigrating terms, presented them as suitable 
objects for conquest and legitimised the use of the most extreme forms of violence against 
them l67 . 
The development of international law during that era in which the current Afro-Asian 
States were under the sway of colonial predominance l68 has led to certain concerns from 
the part of most of those States that in a certain case they might be held subject to 
obligations dating from their colonial past, ones they had no say in. This factor within the 
context of those States' attitudes towards peaceful settlement by legal means appears to 
have created a feeling of mistrust from those States towards those means for their 
application of rules of law that those States did not participate in creating and which, from 
their point of view, are basically of European origin and liable to sacrifice their interests to 
169 those of Western States . 
The old law / new law argument, as well as the feeling of suspicion towards the' European 
origin' of current international law, was clearly expressed in the statement of the 
Ambassador of India to the UN in 1961 during the Security Council's debates on the Status 
of Goa 170 in which he pointed out that: 
[i]f any narrow-minded legalistic consideratio~s arising fr~m 
international law as written by European law WrIters should arIse 
these writers were, after all, brought up in the atmosphere of 
colonialism .... The tenet which .... is quoted in support of colonial 
powers having sovereign rights over territories which they w~n by 
conquest in Asia and Africa is no longer acceptabl~. It IS the 
European concept and must die. It is time in the twentIeth century 
h . d' dl71 t at It Ie . 
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The argument regarding the uncertainty of many of the rules of international law applied by 
international tribunals l72 was expressly pointed out by some of the delegations that 
participated in the deliberations of the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly 
during the 1960s on the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations l73 . They attributed their lack of confidence in the ICl, as well as arbitration, to the 
state of the substantive rules of international law as they existed which, in their view, were 
in large part antiquated, inequitable, fragmentary and uncertain 174. However, despite these 
doubts, it would be a great exaggeration to say that those States rejected all the rules of 
international law which were laid down before their independence, inasmuch as many of 
those rules operate to their advantage 175. A number of Afro-Asian writers went on the 
defensive with regard to accusations concerning those States' position towards international 
law, indicated above, by providing a clearer picture of those States' views and opinions in 
this respect. For example Anand 176 indicated that international law was in fact accepted and 
respected by those States, except where it is still found to support past colonial rights or is 
clearly inequitable from their point of view, according to the current standards of 
. '1' . 177 M Sh'h t 178 d ~ d d th St t " d" d' . I CIVI IsatlOn . oreover, I a a elen e ose a es VIews regar mg JU ICla 
settlement, by pointing out that members and representatives of 'new States' to the ILC as 
well as the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly respectively: 
... have occasionally called for quantitative changes in international 
law to meet the quantitative change in the international community, 
but none of them have asserted that short of these changes no 
confidence will be invested in international adjudication. 
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The attitudes of some of these States towards dispute settlement by legal means at a certain 
stage has been greatly influenced by the ICJ's 1966 Judgement in the South West Africa / 
Namibia case l79 which led to profound and widespread dissatisfaction with the Court's 
Ruling and which was expressed in criticism of the Court's insensitivity to anti-colonial 
and anti-apartheid sentiments as formulated in resolutions and declarations of the UN 
General Assembly, and also criticism of the composition of the Court l80 . Indeed, the issue 
regarding the composition of the ICJ in the light of the concept of geographical distribution 
has also been classified as a cause of reluctance of Afro-Asian States to resort to the ICJ I81 . 
However, the importance of this factor has been downplayed by some writers I 82, who 
considered it only as a psychological barrier. With those causes of hesitation towards the 
ICJ in mind, international arbitration would appear to be a more suitable option for such 
States, on the basis that the members of the tribunal 183, as well as the law(s) applied, are all 
specified by the parties. Even the neutral member or umpire, subject to the provisions of the 
compromis in this regard l84, is to be one approved by the parties. 
The work group assigned by the Administrative Council of the PCA in 1991 185 to 
consider, inter alia, the reasons for lack of recourse of some States to the Court, found that 
among the reasons behind the reluctance of some developing countries to have recourse to 
the PCA, and to international arbitration in general, was the lack of human resources that 
would enable them to present their cases effectively. This has also been acknowledged by 
the former Judge and President of the ICJ, Keba Mbaye, during the 60th Anniversary of the 
Court of Arbitration of the ICC in 1983. He pointed out that" ... developing countries were 
rarely the venue of an international arbitration, and, even more rarely, produced 
arbitrators" I 86. However, the effect of this factor has been played down by Cassese l87 who 
pointed out that any of those States can nowadays rely upon the services of a few 
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outstanding lawyers who are in no way inferior to those belonging to sophisticated and 
more industrialised States. The argument of lack of highly qualified legal expertise in Afro-
Asian States would seem to be of questionable validity. Indeed, the current composition of 
the ICJ consists of four Asian Judges and two African ones. Moreover, States such as Egypt 
have produced a significant number of highly qualified international legal personnel 188. In 
this regard, one must not forget the zealous efforts of the Asian-African Legal Consultative 
Committee in providing highly qualified legal training, services and advice to States in both 
continents 189. 
Despite the factors already proposed as reasons for the reluctance of Afro-Asian States 
to have recourse to legal means of settlement, Professor Anand 190 points out that the real 
causes of reluctance to resort to the ICJ or any other tribunal by Afro-Asian States are no 
different from those of any other State. In this regard he notes a number of factors already 
discussed in this chapter, namely, a lawyer-like fear of losing the case l91 ; the non-
justiciability of certain classes of disputes l92 ; and the perception of international litigation 
as an unfriendly act l93 . As for many States world-wide, diplomatic means of settlement are 
the usual and favoured alternative for Afro-Asian States. This appears evident when 
examining State practice, in particular, the experience of African States in dispute 
settlement by legal means l94 . The first point which draws attention in this regard was the 
non-mentioning of the IC] in the machinery established by those nations' principal regional 
organisation, namely, the 1964 Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration 
adopted by the (former) OAUI95 . Although the inclusion of arbitration in this regard was 
considered by some l96 as an acknowledgement of the value of arbitration as an institution, 
nevertheless, neither the arbitral machinery of the Commission nor its mediation and 
conciliation provisions were ever applied in practice. In fact, all of the inter-State disputes 
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that were settled in Africa following 1964 were settled outside the framework of the OAU's 
Commission. Even the non-mentioned IC] was resorted to by some African States 197 on a 
number of occasions instead of the obsolete machinery of the commission 198. Recourse to 
the World Court was also made by a number of Asian States as well l99 • Nevertheless, when 
compared to the overall number of unsettled disputes in both continents, such recourse is 
considered relatively still too low. Moreover, (with regard to African practice) some 
writers200 pointed out that the decision to have recourse to the I C] by some African States 
was not made because those States originally favoured judicial settlement, but because 
those States had no other choice after recourse to other means of settlement proved 
ineffective; the IC] was their only and final alternative in getting a definitive ruling on the 
dispute and bringing it to an end. The failure of the OAU's Commission in general was 
attributed by some201 to the formality and institutional framework of the Commission, 
along with the provision for arbitration, which made the Commission appear to those States 
more as a court whose decisions were binding which, therefore, entailed (from their point 
of view) an element of partial surrender of their sovereignty202, something that those States, 
as well as Third W orId States in general were hesitant to accept. This has been recognised 
in the statement of Mr M.A. Odesanya203 , the first President of the Commission, in a paper 
presented by him at the Third Annual Conference of the Nigerian Society of International 
Law, held at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos between 19-20 March, 
1971. According to him: 
Sovereign States are understandably jealous of their sovereignty 
and independence. My O.A.U. experience is that they will always 
show great reluctance in limiting their own political and diplomatic 
freedom beyond that which they regard as absolutely necessary to 
secure their immediate objectives. In one inter-State dispute after 
another, secret offers of assistance by my Commission could not 
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induce the States involved in the dispute to submit to the 
jurisdiction of a body they persistently regarded as judicial. The 
political element in most inter-State disputes even where such 
political element is not the predominant one makes States assume 
that their vital interests are at stake in every dispute. 
Afro-Asian States unsurprisingly (like a great many of the Members of the UN) have 
shown no enthusiasm towards the Optional Clause (to date only 28 of those States have 
accepted the Optional Clause204). Neither did the OAU's Commission of Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration provide for compulsory jurisdiction. 
When it comes to inter-State arbitration the picture is even less encouraging. Apart 
from the two awards in the Hanish Island case205 between Yemen and Eritrea and the 
Boundary and Mass Claims Commissions established pursuant to the Peace Agreement 
signed between Eritrea and Ethiopia on December 12, 2000206, no major arbitration of the 
likes of the Taba arbitration207 or the Rann of Kutch arbitration208 has taken place (or is 
likely to occur in the near future) in either continent. The instances (albeit few) in which 
recourse was made to the IC] or to arbitration (albeit few) by Afro-Asian States seem to 
refute any suggestion that those States are in general anti-judicial or anti-arbitral. With 
regard to the almost total lack of recourse to inter-State arbitration it must be pointed out 
again that Afro-Asian States are not alone in this respect. The reluctance to resort to 
arbitration is a general issue, the causes of which appear to be related generally to the 
special circumstances and considerations of each individual State, some of which have been 
examined in this chapter. 
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Conclusion: 
From the review of arbitral practice above it appears that inter-State arbitration in 
the domains of both tribunal activity and multilateral general arbitral treaty practice is at an 
almost absolute standstill at the moment. As shown in the review of the momentum of 
arbitral practice based on Stuyt's survey above, the level of State practice following the 
WWl fell dramatically. In this regard, the creation of the PCIJ, now succeeded by the ICl, 
appears to have almost wiped out ad hoc inter-State arbitration from the dispute settlement 
arena when it comes to State recourse to either means, notwithstanding that both, in 
principle, are intended to produce a binding judgement or award in the dispute, based on 
international law (of course when overlooking the debate regarding the diplomatic or 
otherwise judicial nature of arbitration already examined in Chapter One209). Nevertheless, 
this issue within the context of State recourse to the PCA will be examined in detail in 
Chapter Five21o• 
This chapter has examined a number of possible reasons behind the reluctance of 
some States to resort to inter-State arbitration. Those factors are: the non-justiciability of 
certain disputes from the respective State(s)' point of view; previous negative experiences 
with arbitration; the fear of the reaction of internal political factions within the State if the 
settlement does not go its way; and certain aspects of the legal means of dispute settlement 
which may convince some States to resort to other, more flexible, non-legal means of 
dispute settlement. What can be noticed in this respect is that none of the above factors can 
be looked at as forming a constant deterrent which would totally alienate a State from 
having recourse to inter-State arbitration in particular or legal means of dispute settlement 
in general. State practice in this regard seems to indicate that, although a certain State may 
not prefer arbitration or adjudication as a result of one of the factors above, nevertheless, it 
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may still resort to it in certain circumstances. This appears clear in the USA's recourse to 
the IC] in the 1987 Electtronica Sicula S.p.A (ELS1) case211 with Italy following its famous 
withdrawal from proceedings in the Nicaragua case, or the number of cases pending before 
the IC] involving different African States212 . Even the acceptance of the former Soviet 
Union of certain instruments that provided for international arbitration or adjudication, 
despite its vigorous defence of its ideological principles213 , may also be used as evidence to 
support this view. With regard to these latter two examples, it appears that the discussion 
supports the view that the former Eastern Bloc and current Afro-Asian States had a 
negative attitude towards legal means of settlement in general and inter-State arbitration in 
particular and, therefore, contributed significantly to the low number of disputes submitted 
to arbitration, especially in the second half of the past century. However, now that the 
confrontation between East and West has ceased to exist, more attention should be paid to 
the views and concerns of Third W orId States in general, should the international 
community decide in the future to adopt a new multilateral international instrument devoted 
to the settlement of disputes by arbitration, since it is these States in general that would 
mainly benefit from such a mechanism and form its major clients. 
What can be deduced in this regard is that there appears to be no invariable practice 
when it comes to State hesitation towards ad hoc arbitration; the whole question appears to 
be dependent upon the circumstances of each individual State at the time the dispute arises 
and its own assessment of what actions are more effective in turning the situation into its 
own advantage. In the centre of all that comes the importance of the dispute as a major 
driving force which guides a State's determination on the steps to be taken with regard to 
the settlement of the dispute - whether to opt for settlement by legal means or pursue a 
diplomatic settlement, or even no settlement at all. The question regarding the justiciability 
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or otherwise of international disputes appears to be indeed the mother of all factors behind 
a State's reluctance to resort to arbitration or international adjudication in that the effects of 
this factor are not only evident in the domains of actual dispute settlement practice as we 
have seen in the Iran / UAE example above214, but also extended, as we shall see in Chapter 
Five, to multilateral treaty formation with regard to the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes by, inter alia, arbitration. Moreover, that question was central to the debates 
regarding the issues of compulsory arbitration and adjudication. 
It is the voluntary nature of arbitration and the freedom of action of the parties with 
regard to agreeing on the essential details of the settlement process which made arbitration 
an attractive forum for inter-State dispute settlement in the first place. However, despite 
this inherent characteristic of arbitration, in addition to the aforementioned factors behind 
State reluctance to arbitration which existed even in normal circumstances, irrespective of 
any formal commitment to arbitrate, schemes were sought in order to drag States into 
arbitration by means of an obligatory commitment (compulsory arbitration) 
notwithstanding those causes of reluctance, and in defiance of the nature of arbitration 
itself. Hence, the question of justiciability and its theoretical dimensions will be examined 
in detail in Chapter Four, in conjunction with the issue of compulsory arbitration. However, 
before moving on to that stage, we shall in the following chapter, lay the foundation for that 
discussion, by shedding some light on a major principle of international law which explains 
why a State, in principle, cannot be compelled to appear before an international court or 
tribunal in the same manner as individuals, namely, the necessity of State consent as the 
basis of the jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, which is a sub-doctrine of the 
mother principle of State sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Consent to Arbitration: 
A Fundamental Element of State Sovereignty 
Introduction: 
The initiation of the arbitral process as a whole is dependent on the consent of the 
parties to the dispute to refer it to arbitration, a principle which also applies in the case of 
the submission of a particular dispute to international adjudication under the JCl I , State 
consent is considered as a sine qua non for the submission of a particular dispute to 
arbitration or international adjudication under the JCl2 , Moreover, the availability of State 
consent is an essential factor not only before the submission of the dispute to arbitration, 
but also during the various stages of the arbitral process3, 
The discussion in this chapter will be mainly devoted to the consent requirement 
and will involve an examination of the main principle of international law from which the 
requirement is derived, namely, State sovereignty; the significance of State consent in the 
field of inter-State dispute settlement in general and how it is expressed in the case of 
international arbitration in particular. 
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1. The Principle of Sovereignty: 
In order to develop a clear understanding of the concept and significance of the 
consent requirement in inter-State dispute settlement to be examined in infra (2) of this 
chapter, it appears necessary first of all to clarify the basis from which the requirement is 
derived, namely, the principle of sovereignty and the main relevant factors therein. The 
reason for the inclusion of the principle of sovereignty within the context of our discussion 
on State consent is that a State's granting or withholding of consent to the submission of a 
dispute to legal or even diplomatic means of dispute resolution, as well as to adhere to an 
international instruments that provides for the settlement of disputes by such means is 
considered as an attribute of State sovereignty. Indeed, Nantwi4 pointed out that " ... the 
engagement by a sovereign State to submit its disputes with another sovereign State or 
other sovereign States to international adjudication .... is, indeed, attributable to the very 
exercise of sovereignty .... ,,5. 
The discussion on the principle of sovereignty will be conducted under two major 
headings. The first examines the historical origins and evolution of the principle, including 
two of the main theories regarding sovereignty. The second is concerned with the main 
elements of sovereignty as currently applied to govern relations between States. However, 
since the area of sovereignty in international law is a very broad and complex issue, a 
comprehensive examination of which would be far beyond the limited scope of this section, 
the following discussion will only briefly elucidate the basic aspects of the principle, and 
especially those relevant to the issue of State consent and the peaceful settlement of 
disputes. 
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1.1. The Origins of the Principle: 
Sovereignty, as Nincic6 points out, is "a political concept which was subsequently 
given legal expression ... " Although the (origins) of the legal doctrine of sovereignty are 
often traced to the French jurist and philosopher, Jean Bodin 7, a number of writers8 have 
pointed out that the concept of sovereignty was not his creation9. Nevertheless, it was he 
who gave it doctrinal shape through his famous Six Livres de fa Repub/ique (Six Books of 
the Commonwealth) 10. However, it is important to point out that Bodin's conception of 
sovereignty was not primarily concerned with its application in the external context to 
govern the foreign relations of States at that time, but instead with the political order within 
the State and the relations between the ruler and his subjects II; Bodin viewed sovereignty 
as " ... the absolute and perpetual power. .. " within a State l2 . On the essence of the authority 
of the sovereign, Bodin 13 indicated that" ... the principal mark of sovereign majesty and 
absolute power is the right to impose laws generally on all subjects regardless of their 
consent." The law, as he pointed out, was" ... nothing else than the command of the 
sovereign in the exercise of his sovereign power.,,14 However, he further pointed out that 
the sovereign himself was not bound by such laws l5 . Although Bodin has often been linked 
to the early theories of absolute sovereignty, it appears that he did not envisage such a 
notion 16, inasmuch as he recognised that the authority of the ruler was limited by the laws 
of God (Divine Law) and the Laws of Nature 17, and also that certain limitations were 
imposed by the sovereign upon himself, such as his obligations towards other sovereigns 
or, in certain cases, obligations towards his subjects, and his observance of international 
engagements or agreements with other States l8 . Bodin's theory of sovereignty, especially 
the aspect concerning the limitations of the rulers' authority by Divine Law and the La\\s 
of Nature, which represented the Natural Law School of thought, received the full 
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recognition of two of the most prominent founders of international law 19, namely, Hugo 
Grotius20 and Emerich de Vattel21 . 
Generally speaking, sovereignty, within the context of the modem nation State, is 
said
22 
to be a product of certain social and political developments that occurred in medieval 
Europe, namely, the struggle of the ruler to escape certain restrictions imposed upon his 
authority by the feudal order on the one hand and the Holy Roman Empire23 on the other, in 
order to achieve an authority independent of any other higher authority. This struggle, as 
Nincic
24 
points out, " ... contributed to the downfall of a social and political system which 
had outlived its usefulness and to the creation of a new and more advanced one." Although 
what emerged was a 'new' social and political system in the words of Nincic, nevertheless, 
Brierly25 pointed out that the previous system did leave its marks on this new emerging 
conception of authority. In particular, the nature of the relations between the 'lord' and his 
'vassal' within the context of the feudal conception of society was reformulated and applied 
in the new system to govern relations between the ruler and ruled. As Brierly puts it: 
... there were elements in the feudal conception of society capable 
of being pressed into the service of the unified national States which 
were steadily being consolidated in Western Europe from about the 
twelfth to the sixteenth centuries, and influential in determining the 
forms that those States would take. Thus, when its disintegrating 
effects on government had been eliminated, the duty of personal 
loyalty of vassal to lord which feudalism has made so prominent 
was capable of being transmuted into the duty of unquestioning 
allegiance of subject to monarch in the national State; the intimate 
association of this personal relationship with the tenure of the land 
made the transition to territorial monarchy easy and natural: and 
the identification with rights of property of rights which we regard 
as properly political led up to the notions of the absolute character 
of government, of the realm as the 'dominion' or property of the 
monarch, and of the people as his 'subjects' rather than as citizens. 
Feudalism itself had been an obstacle to the growth of the national 
State, but it left a legacy of conceptions to its victorious rival which 
strongly emphasised the absolute character of the government. 
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Sovereignty, which played a major and decisive role in the above struggle in favour 
of the total authority of the ruler, was understood at that time to provide theoretical 
justification for arbitrary rule in both domestic and external affairs; in other words, the 
absolute dominion of the ruler in the internal, as well as external affairs of his State , 
independent of any limitation whatsoever, as well as the inclination to identify sovereignty 
with force. These were the basic characteristics of the so-called theory of absolute 
sovereignty26. This absolutist theory which dominated the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries and 
practically continued up to the First World War was subsequently elaborated and 
rationalised by a number of leading theorists in different parts of Europe, such as Hobbes, 
Hegel, Spinoza and Kant27• Nevertheless, it should be noted that there were wide-ranging 
differences among the various theories and conceptions of sovereignty within the absolutist 
context and that some of the more moderate ones tended to come close to the theory of 
relative sovereignty28 examined below. However, in its more extreme forms29, the 
application of this notion of sovereignty in State practice would obviously lead to total 
anarchy and chaos. This was recognised by Fenwick30, who criticised it as: 
... a doctrine of legal anarchy, which fastened its hold upon 
governments, and in the name of maintaining the independence of 
States, denied their responsibility to the community as a whole and 
left sovereign weak States to the mercy of the sovereign strong. 
Moreover, Brierly3l, in a lecture delivered at the Hague Academy of International Law in 
1936 on the rules of the law of peace, drew attention to the fact that, as a matter of 
principle, those theorists who developed the doctrine of sovereignty were not interested in 
the relations of States inter se, but were all concerned with the single State in abstrm;IO; 
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they paid comparatively little attention to the question as to how the theory of sovereignty 
could be applied in a world composed of a fair number of sovereign States. He argued that 
the confusion reigning around the concept of sovereignty in international law is very 
largely due to the fact that the sovereign State was first defined by individuals like Bodin, 
Hobbes and Hegel, who, whatever their status was at their time, were not international 
lawyers and did not pause to think whether their theories would fit the facts of international 
relations. This theory, in principle, is inconsistent with a system of international law which, 
as we shall see in infra 1.2 of this chapter, is based on a foundation of reciprocal rights and 
duties imposed upon States in order to preserve their co-existence. 
The increasingly obvious need to ensure the mutual adjustment of sovereignty in 
order to achieve peaceful co-existence among sovereign national States, led a number of 
theorists to seek ways to place sovereignty under certain limitations. This brings us to the 
theory of relative sovereignty. In the relativist school of thought,32 the expression 
'sovereignty' came to mean that, while sovereign States were the sole masters of their 
actions, not all actions were permitted to them33 . Moreover, the perennial antinomy 
between sovereignty and international law according to the relativist school of thought was, 
clearly and irrevocably, settled in favour of the latter; and the limitations imposed upon 
sovereignty were defined by the law of nations and not by the States themselves. 
Furthermore, the concept of sovereignty came to merge more and more with that of 
independence. However, independence within this context does not connote independence 
from norms which should apply equally to all sovereign States; rather, what is meant is 
independence from any other sovereign authority. As an important corollary to States' 
independence came the concept of the equality of States3-l as a principle governing the 
external affairs of States and the autonomy of States in their internal affairs (or matters 
103 
which fall within their domestic jurisdiction), and as a safeguard to that autonomy came the 
principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States. 
The above developments came hand in hand with the revolutionary changes that 
occurred in the late 18th and the early 19th centuries and which gave rise to a new concept of 
sovereignty or, rather, led to the modification of the concept which had already emerged. 
Within the domestic sphere, sovereignty, with the coming of constitutional forms of 
government, was transferred from the 'ruler' to the 'people'. The freedom and equality of 
individuals within the State was paralleled by the independence and equality of States in 
their foreign relations, and sovereignty came to constitute the legal expression of their 
independence and equality. This above notion of sovereignty, as well as the principles 
derived from it, are consistent with the traditional doctrine which, as we shall examine in 
the following, has survived to our day. 
1.2. The Basic Components of Sovereignty (Its Main Internal and External 
Aspects): 
In the current state of international affairs, States35 are commonly characterised as 
'sovereign', and the expression 'sovereignty' comes as an implicit, axiomatic characteristic 
of Statehood36. The current political system, which is composed of a large number of 
'sovereign States' as its basic units, is governed by a number of fundamental principles 
which are derived from sovereignty37, and which, in general, represent some of the main 
constituting features of what are commonly known as the fundamental rights and duties of 
States38. Although the limited space of this section does not permit us to provide a 
comprehensive examination of all the basic elements derived from sovereignty. 
nevertheless, light will be shed on two major aspects of sovereignty, namely, its application 
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within the internal sphere of a State (internal sovereignty), and its external applications. 
This will involve a brief examination of three basic principles that are considered as basic 
elements of sovereignty and are often used interchangeably with the expression 
'sovereignty', namely, the principles of independence, non-intervention, and the equality of 
States. 
Regarding the internal aspects of sovereignty, the tribunal in the North Atlantic 
Coast Fisheries arbitration39 once indicated that "one of the essential elements of 
sovereignty is that it is to be exercised within territorial limits ... " Therefore, with regard to 
this observation it appears that sovereignty is essentially territorial4o, a principle which was 
also upheld by Judge Huber in his famous award in the Island of Palm as case41 in which he 
indicated that sovereignty: 
... in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence 
in regard to a portion of a globe is the right to exercise therein, to the 
exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State .... territorial 
sovereignty .... serves to divide between nations the space upon which 
human activities are employed, in order to assure them at all points the 
minimum protection of which international law is the guardian. 
Therefore, sovereignty within the internal sphere of a State is the total and exclusive 
power of the State, in the form of legitimate authority over all persons and things within the 
locale of its jurisdiction (its territory)42. This notion signifies the principle of domestic 
jurisdiction which refers to " ... the exclusive internal competence of the highest legislative, 
judicial, and administrative (executive) authorities of the State.,,43 International law sets 
limits on the exercise of domestic jurisdiction by States in two ways. First, a State may not 
prescribe rules or seek to enforce them outside its territorial limits and within the 
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jurisdiction of another State, without the consent of the territorial authority of that State. 
Second, the principle of domestic jurisdiction protects a State from unwarranted intrusion 
, 
whether legislative, administrative or physical, by another State44 ; hence, the significance 
of the principle of non-intervention examined below. 
Among the basic elements of sovereignty within the external sphere is 
independence. On the relationship between sovereignty and independence, Korowicz.f5 
pointed out that the two concepts are interchangeable by indicating that "sovereignty means 
independence, and independence implies sovereignty." Moreover, "independence does not 
exist without sovereignty and vice versa, but sovereignty is a broader notion and covers the 
first". Independence is considered as the political and legal autonomy of the State, in its not 
being subject to any external direction or interference or control by any other like 
authority46 without its consent47 . However, independence within this context must not be 
confused with the concept of absolute sovereignty already examined above48 , which 
contemplates the total absence of any form of restriction or limitation, whether legal or 
moral, on States' freedom of action in their internal as well as external affairs. The 
independence of States in international law is not absolute, but subject to the rules of 
international law49, in particular, the respect and observance of the independence of other 
States, which is epitomised by refraining from interference in the internal affairs of other 
States50. In this respect, although Art. 2(7) of the Charter indicated that "[n]othing in this 
present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State .... ", nevertheless, such limitation 
according to the same article does not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII". Moreover, one must also not forget the provisions of Arts. 2(5-6) and 
103 of the Charter. 
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The rule par in parem non habet iudicium (non-intervention in the internal affairs of other 
States), which is well established in the practice of the ICJ51 , as well as the UN52, reigns 
supreme in international law and inter-State relations and safeguards the exclusive authority 
of States in matters which fall within their own internal sphere of competence. Intervention, 
as Hall53 pointed out: 
... takes place when a State interferes in the relation of two other 
States without the consent of both of them or either of them, or 
when it interferes in the domestic affairs of another State, 
irrespective of the will of the latter, for the purpose of maintaining 
or altering the actual condition of things within it. .. 
Therefore, with regard to the above observation, intervention can also take place in 
the external sphere as well as in the internal, and in a number of forms54. However, Hall 
appears to stipulate that in order for such intervention to be unlawful, it must take place in 
the absence of the consent of the State(s) concerned, a situation which Oppenheim55 calls 
'dictatorial interference' in the external independence or the territorial or the personal 
supremacy of a State. If, in contrast, a certain party, whether a State or organisation or 
committee, is permitted to intervene in a certain matter by the State( s) concerned, then such 
intervention is considered lawful, due to the availability of the consent of the State(s) 
b· h' . 56 su ~ect to t e mterventIOn . 
The third external aspect of sovereignty within this discussion is the principle of 
equality of States, whereby despite the various differences between States with regard to 
their size, or degree of civilisation, or population, or power, whether militarily or 
economically, or form of government, or wealth per capita, all States are considered 
(legally) equal57 . The equality of States doctrine is best illustrated nowadays by the UN 
General Assembly's one State, one vote rule. However, in addition to this practical aspect 
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of the equality doctrine, the doctrine seems to confer several other rights and obligations 
which apply on all States and which are elaborated in the UN General Assembly's 1970 
Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States (Res. 2625 XXV)58. The most significant attribute of the equality 
of States in this respect is that, inter alia59 , " ... no obligation may be imposed upon a 
sovereign State without its consent, direct, or indirect, general or particular, given in 
advance or ad hoc." Further, and as an important corollary to this principle, inter alia60 , a 
State may not be compelled to appear before an international tribunal in the absence of its 
consent which, as the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion in the 1950 Interpretation of the Peace 
Treaties case61 indicated" ... is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases.,,62 
1.3. The Compatibility of the Granting of Consent by States for the 
Submission of their Disputes to International Tribunals with the 
Doctrine of State Sovereignty: 
From the above discussion, it appears that State sovereignty is not absolute, but 
subject to certain limitations imposed by international law63 . However, as an important and 
generally accepted principle of international law which comes as a consequence of State 
sovereignty, namely, the equality of States principle, no State may be compelled to submit 
its inter-State disputes to arbitration or international adjudication under the ICl, or any 
other peaceful means of settlement, without its consent expressly given prior to the 
initiation of the settlement process64 . In this regard Schwarzenberger
65 
pointed out that: 
... the principle of consent reigns supreme in international law. 
States are sovereign and, for this reason, equal in the eyes of 
international law. Par in parem non habet imperium. Unless 
anything to the contrary has been agreed, every State is its own 
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judge and cannot be subjected against its will to the jurisdiction of 
any international court or tribunal.. ... [t]hus, beyond the minimum 
of obligations imposed on States by international customary law 
and general principles of law recognised by civilised nations, every 
subject of international law may decide for itself whether to accept 
any further restriction of the unfettered exercise of its sovereignty. 
From this observation, it appears that sovereIgn States remam free to decide 
whether or not to submit their disputes to the jurisdiction of international tribunals and, 
when they do so, such an undertaking imposes a limitation upon their sovereignty, a 
limitation which arises from the free will of the State(s) concerned and which, in tum, vests 
the tribunal with the necessary powers to adjudicate the dispute in question. The award of 
Walker D. Hines, the sole arbitrator in the case of the 1921 Cession of Vessels and Tugs for 
Navigation on the Danube66 , asserts not only this point but also that the submission of 
disputes by sovereign States to the jurisdiction of international tribunals by means of an 
international agreement is an exercise of their sovereignty. In his words: 
The duty which the Arbitrator is compelled to perform by the 
explicit and unqualified language of the Treaties ... .is the most 
delicate and most difficult task which he is called upon to perform 
under any of the Treaties, but in discharging this duty the Arbitrator 
is not undertaking to interfere in any sense with the sovereign rights 
of the States. On the contrary, he is discharging this grave duty 
solely because all the States which have signed the treaties have 
each, by its sovereign act, called upon the arbitrator to do so. 
Therefore, at least from the viewpoint of the relative sovereignty school of thought 
such an undertaking appears not to derogate from the sovereignty of the State(s) 
concerned67 , since the power to enter into international agreements is an attribute of State 
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sovereignty, a principle which is best illustrated in the judgement of the PCIJ in the famous 
1928 s.s. Wimbledon case68, in which it indicated that: 
[t]he Court declines to see in the conclusion of any treaty by which 
a State undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a 
particular act an abandonment of its sovereignty. No doubt any 
convention creating an obligation of this kind places a restriction 
upon the exercise of the sovereign rights of the State, in the sense 
that it requires them to be exercised in a certain way. But the right 
of entering into international engagements is an attribute of State 
sovereignty [emphasis added]69. 
The application of the PCIJ's general observation above within the context of undertakings 
made by States for the submission of their disputes to the jurisdiction of international 
tribunals is best understood from the statement ofNantwi70, in which he pointed out that: 
... the assumption by a sovereign State of an international 
engagement is not only compatible with that State's sovereignty, 
but that, indeed, the power to enter into such an engagement is only 
attributable to the exercise of sovereignty itself. The result is thus 
not a derogation from sovereignty but merely a limitation on it - a 
limitation which can only be effected through the exercise of 
sovereignty .... [c ]onsequently, the engagement by a sovereign State 
to submit its disputes with another sovereign State or other 
sovereign States to international adjudication, far from being 
incompatible with the concept of sovereignty, is, indeed, 
attributable to the very existence of an exercise of sovereignty itself. 
In conclusion, therefore, it may be said that the act of entering into an international 
engagement by a sovereign State, in which it imposes upon itself an obligation to submit its 
dispute(s) to international arbitration by the signing of a compromis in the case of an 
existing dispute (ad hoc arbitration), or in the case of general undertakings to refer future 
disputes to international arbitration, by the ratification of an international instrument that 
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embodies a certain arbitral compromissory clause or the adherence to a general arbitral 
convention or agreement (bilateral or multilateral), is considered as an exercise of its 
sovereignty. This act, in consequence, imposes a certain limitation upon its sovereignty, 
one which emanates from its own free sovereign will, and does not, therefore, infringe the 
doctrine of State sovereignty. 
2. State Consent as the Basis of the Jurisdiction of International 
Tribunals: 
In this part of the chapter, an examination will be made of the significance of State 
consent in the peaceful settlement of international disputes and the ways and means by 
which consent can be given in the case of international arbitration: 
2.1. The Significance of the Consent Requirement in the Field of Inter-State 
Dispute Settlement: 
The forms and means generally recognised for expressing a State's consent to refer 
disputes to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals will be examined in infra 2.2 of this chapter; 
however, this section will mainly focus on the significance and dimensions of the consent 
requirement in the field of the pacific settlement of international disputes in general and, 
also, the area of the settlement of international disputes by legal means via., arbitration and 
international adjudication under the Ie] in particular. 
From the above discussion it appeared that, as a consequence of State sovereignty 
and the equality of States under international law, State consent is a sine qua non for the 
submission of their disputes to the jurisdiction of international tribunals, and forms the 
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basis of the jurisdiction of international tribunals. This also can be clearly understood from 
the statement of Lauterpache l on this issue. He pointed out that: 
... the theory of the sovereignty of States reveals itself in 
international law mainly in two ways: first, as the right of the State 
to determine what shall be for the future the content of international 
law by which it will be bound; secondly, as the right to determine 
what is the content of existing international law in a given 
case .... [This] second aspect connotes that the State is in principle 
the sole judge of the existence of any individual rules of law, 
applicable to itself. [Therefore] [i]t is a canon of international law 
that the jurisdiction of international tribunals is one voluntarily 
accepted by States. 
Therefore, a State, as a general rule, cannot summon another sovereign State to appear 
before an international tribunal for the purpose of settling a difference between them in the 
way that private individuals can compel one another to litigate under the municipal law to 
which they are subject 72, inasmuch as, the jurisdiction of international tribunals is 
dependant solely upon the consent of the States concerned73 which, therefore, is required in 
any legal proceedings on the international level which involves States as parties. "It hardly 
needs to be said how basic this assumption is. The requirement is normally rigorously 
applied ...... ,,74. This principle has been reaffirmed in the jurisprudence of both the former 
PCIJ and the current IC] on several occasions, such as in the Mavromatis Palestine 
Concessions case75, in which the PCIJ pointed out that its jurisdiction was limited and 
" ... invariably based on the consent of the respondent and only exists in so far as this 
consent has been given .... ". 
In the case-law of the IC], this principle was again strictly observed in the 1995 
East Timor case76 following an application filed by Portugal, the original administrator of 
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East Timor, against Australia as a result of the latter's conclusion with Indonesia of an 
agreement in 1989 concerning the delimitation and exploitation of the continental shelf of 
East Timor. East Timor, a former Portuguese colony, was at that time under the de facto 
rule of the Indonesian Government 77 after being occupied by Indonesia on December 7, 
1975, and annexed as its twenty-seventh province July 17, 1976. This action was strongly 
condemned by a number of States and by the UN which, in several instances, called upon 
Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor and confirmed the right of its people to self-
determination and independence78. The Portuguese application to the IC] claimed that 
Australia, by the signing of the 1989 agreement, had infringed, inter alia, the rights of the 
people of East Timor to self-determination and permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources; and the rights of Portugal as the administrating power with regard to its 
responsibilities towards the people of East Timor. The Court, although recognising the 
soundness of the arguments advanced by the Portuguese side, which asserted the right of 
peoples to self-determination as of an erga omnes character, dismissed the case because 
Indonesia, which was a substantially affected party in the case, had not consented to the 
Court's jurisdiction, pointing out that" ... the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of 
consent to jurisdiction are two different things.,,79 The Court, with reference to its previous 
judgement in the 1954 Monetary Gold case80, further held that: 
.. , the effects of the judgement requested by Portugal would amount 
to a determination that Indonesia's entry into and continued 
presence in East Timor are unlawful and that, as a consequence, it 
does not have the treaty-making power in matters relating to the 
continental shelf resources of East Timor. Indonesia's rights and 
obligations would thus constitute the very subject matter of such a 
judgement made in the absence of that State's consent. Such a 
judgement would run directly counter to the "well-established 
principle of international la1r embodied in the Court's Statute, 
113 
namely that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a State 
with its consent ' [emphasis added]81. 
However, the requirement of State consent in the field of the pacific settlement of 
international disputes is not solely confined to disputes settled by legal means (arbitration 
and international adjudication) but also extends to the case of disputes settled by diplomatic 
means as well, i.e. negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation and good offices. This has 
been asserted through the dicta of the PCIJ in its Advisory Opinion in the Status of the 
Eastern Carelia case82 in 1923 in which it declared that "[i]t is well established in 
international law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its dispute 
with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific 
settlement." Moreover, the State consent principle also extends to the parties' freedom in 
selecting the means suitable for the resolution of their dispute83 . Examples with regard to 
UN practice include Art. 2(3) and 33(1)84 of the UN Charter, as well as the main 
Declarations and Resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, that provided for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, such as UN General Assembly Res. 54/28 adopted on 
January 21, 2000, regarding the United Nations Decade of International Law85 ; the 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States86; the 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of 
International Disputes87; the Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and 
Situations which may Threaten International Peace and Security88; and the Declaration on 
Fact-finding by the UN in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security89. This is also the case in the provisions of some regional treaties that embodied 
certain provisions regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes, such as the 1948 Pact of 
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Bogota90, the Charter of the OAU91 , the 1957 ECPSD92, and the 1957 Helsinki Final Act of 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe93 • In all of the above instruments~ 
no obligation was imposed on the States concerned to submit their dispute(s) to a specific 
means of peaceful settlement. Instead, States were given the freedom to choose among the 
peaceful means provided as they may find appropriate to the circumstances and the nature 
of the dispute in question. 
Within the context of legal means of settlement, consent is not only required at the 
beginning of the settlement process but must continue during the various stages of the 
process until the court or tribunal reaches its decision. This point is best illustrated by the 
incident in the Nicaragua case94 in which the USA withdrew from further proceedings after 
the IC] ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear Nicaragua's claims95 , an important and 
significant decision by the Court which may be used as an example to demonstrate the 
integrity and independence of the IC] even in cases involving the most strongest and 
influential parties96 • However, within the context of ad hoc arbitral practice this factor 
appears to be a much more vital one. The process of ad hoc arbitration appears to consist of 
three main stages. The first and most important is the stage before the initiation of the 
proceedings, in which the major guidelines of the process are negotiated and specified by 
the parties in the compromis, such as the basic considerations with regard to the 
constitution of the tribunal97 ; the law(s) applied by the tribunal; the rules of procedure that 
govern the process98; and the basic considerations with regard to the award99 . Therefore, 
this first stage may be regarded as the institutional stage. The practical stage in the arbitral 
process is the second, namely, when the proceedings have been initiated and the tribunal 
begins to function in accordance with sphere of action defined by the parties in the 
compromis. This is the crucial part of the whole process, in which the game of tug-of-war 
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begins between the disputants who undergo the process of rebutting their claims and 
arguments and refuting those of the other party which are in both instances scrutinised and 
evaluated by the tribunal. The third stage is after the tribunal has rendered its award, when 
the party against whom the award was made is to comply with the terms of the award either 
immediately or in accordance with any time-limits provided. The whole of that process is 
held together by the good faith and full co-operation of the disputants, which must be 
present during the various stages of the arbitral process, from the conclusion of the 
compromis until the tribunal has rendered its award, and any act of frustration or non co-
operation in this regard, which clearly reflects the withdrawal of the consent on the part of 
the non co-operating State, would impede any further progress in the arbitral settlement or, 
indeed, render any chance of a settlement abortive. This appears clear in the statement of 
Fox lOO who pointed out that: 
[i]t is scarcely necessary to review the many stages at which a State 
may call a halt to an arbitration; a State's consent may be refused to 
the recognition of any dispute requiring submission to arbitration, to 
the signing of the compromis which defines the terms of reference 
and powers of the arbitrator, to the constitution of the tribunal either 
by failure to appoint its own national member101 or by failure to 
agree to the neutral members. Even when the arbitration tribunal 
has been properly constituted and has opened its proceedings a 
State may block progress by failure to appear, refusal to afford the 
tribunal the necessary information or facilities for investigation and, 
in the event of some change in the membership of the tribunal, 
refusal to appoint or agree to the appointment of a substitute. 
Consent, not only given at the beginning of the arbitration 
proceedings, but continued throughout the proceedings until the 
tribunal retires to make its award, is, therefore, an essential 
ingredient to the completion of any arbitration [emphasis added]. 
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Regarding the above observation, it may be added that the consent of the disputants must 
also exist after the award has been rendered. Such consent is epitomised by States' 
compliance with the award of the tribunal. The clearest example in this regard is 
Argentina's refusal to acknowledge the award of the tribunal in the 1978 Beagle Channel 
case 102 with Chile, a matter which was strongly resented by the Government of the latter 
and almost brought the two States to the brink of war but was later, however, settled by the 
mediation of the Pope l03 . 
2.2. The Ways and Means of Granting Consent to Arbitration: 
Since a State's consent is a basic prerequisite for it SUbmitting to the jurisdiction of 
an international tribunal, this section of the chapter is intended to provide a brief 
preliminary identification of the generally recognised means for expressing a State's 
consent to the jurisdiction of international arbitral tribunals: 
2.2.1. Consent ad hoc: Special Agreement (compromis d' arbitrage) for ad hoc 
arbitration: 
States' consent in ad hoc arbitration can be expressed by the conclusion of a special 
agreement or compromis d' arbitrage for the reference of a particular dispute that has 
already arisen between the parties to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. The compromis has been 
defined by Oellers-Frahm 104 as " ... an agreement between two or more States with the vie\\ 
of submitting an existing dispute to the jurisdiction of an arbitrator, [or] an arbitral 
tribunaL .. ". According to Art. 52 of the 1907 HCPSID and Art. 2 of the ILC's Model Rules 
on Arbitral Procedure combined, the compromis in general should specify the follo\ving: 
1- The undertaking of the parties to submit the dispute in question to arbitration; 
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2- A definition of the subject matter of the dispute and, if possible, the points that are not 
agreed upon by the parties; 
3- The number, methods of appointment and names of the arbitrators and any fixed time 
limits for their appointment; 
4- The law(s) applied in the case, as well as the rules of procedure that govern the 
functioning of the tribunal and its jurisdiction; 
5- The number of members required for the constitution of a quorum for the conduct of the 
hearings and any additional directions to be considered by them in this respect; 
6- The language(s) to be employed by and before the tribunal for the conduct of the 
hearings; 
7- The time fixed for the closing of the hearings, or within which the award shall be 
rendered including the method to be followed in reaching the award, as well as the main 
considerations therein; 
8- The manner in which the expenses of the tribunal shall be apportioned between the 
parties. 
The compromis is indeed the soul of the arbitral tribunal in particular, as well as the whole 
arbitral settlement in general and provides the framework within the confines of which the 
tribunal is to operate. Although attempts were made to adopt a uniform model draft 
compromis applicable to all forms of inter-State disputes lO5, it may be said that due to the 
variety and divergence of the nature and circumstances of the disputes submitted to ad hoc 
arbitration, the compromis is usually formulated in accordance with the special 
f h · d··d I 106 circumstances 0 eac In IVI ua case . 
The compromis is required not only in the case of ad hoc arbitration, but also in the 
cases of disputes referred to arbitration in compliance with an undertaking to arbitrate'07 in 
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the form of a compromissory ciause108 on the basis that such an undertaking is considered 
nothing more than an acceptance in principle of arbitration as a means of settling any 
dispute that may arise between the parties and cannot be given any effect without the 
conclusion of a special agreement or compromis which, as shown above, defines the 
question(s) to be referred to arbitration, the constitution of the tribunal and the other 
essential provisions in this respect. This applies also to the case of arbitrations under the 
mechanism of a general international convention or treaty for the pacific settlement of 
international disputes 109 which, although it may provide adequate provisions for the 
constitution of the tribunal and similar matters, such as the 1899 & 1907 Hague 
Conventions and the 1928 & 1949 General Acts for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes for example, nevertheless, may still may require the conclusion of a compromis in 
order to define the question(s) which the tribunal is to decide. In both cases, such 
. . ·d db· h S· & F 110 d M rt III provIsIOns are consl ere y some wrIters, suc as Impson ox, an u y as 
nothing other than a mere pactum de contrahendo, an agreement to enter into negotiations 
for the conclusion of the compromis, which does not entail an obligation to reach an 
agreement in that respect. 
2.2.2. Consent ante hoc: General Undertakings to Refer Future Disputes to 
International Arbitration: 
2.2.2.1. Compromissory Clauses: 
Compromissory clauses or 'jurisdiction clauses' serve to furnish a method for the 
pacific settlement of disputes and can be agreed upon and included in an international 
treaty 112 of any kind I13. Although there are various trends in compromissory clause practice 
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with regard to the means of settlementl14, nevertheless, the limited scope of this section 
only permits us to examine those relevant to the central topic of our study on international 
arbitration, namely, arbitral compromissory clauses. In this regard, there exist two major 
forms of arbitral compromissory clauses, namely, 'special' and 'general' liS. Special 
arbitration clauses contemplate that all or all of a certain class of disputes arising out of the 
treaty containing the clause are submitted to arbitration l16. General arbitration clauses relate 
usually either to all disputes that may arise between the parties117 or to the interpretation or 
application of the treaty in force between the parties containing the compromissory 
clause l18. However, the content of arbitration clauses may vary considerably. In this regard, 
frequent international treaty practice shows that a number of multilateral conventions 
contain provisions for the settlement of disputes by arbitral tribunals, combined in part with 
other methods, either cumulatively or alternatively. An example of the former is Art. 4 of 
the 1947 Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Transjordan (Jordan)119 which provided 
that the parties are to settle their disputes " ... by peaceful means in conformity with the 
provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations". However, in certain other 
cases the clause may adopt a more general approach, such as Art. 19 of the Extradition 
Treaty between Brazil and Argentina, which provided that "[a ]ny dispute between the High 
Contracting Parties shall be settled by peaceful means recognised in international law". 
These forms of clauses leave the choice of suitable means of settlement to the parties, 
thereby upholding the principle of the freedom of selection of means already examined 
above. As regards compromissory clauses where the means of settlement are enumerated 
alternatively, an example is Art. 15 of the European Agreement Concerning the 
International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Inland Waters, signed on May 25, 2000 
which provides that: 
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1. Any dispute between two or more Contracting Parties 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement 
shall so far as possible be settled by negotiation between the 
Parties in dispute. 
2. Any dispute which is not settled by direct negotiation may be 
referred by the Contracting Parties in dispute to the 
Administrative Committee which shall consider it and make 
recommendations for its settlement. 
3. Any dispute which is not settled in accordance with paragraph 1 
or 2 shall be submitted to arbitration if any of the Contracting 
Parties in dispute so requests and shall be referred accordingly 
to one or more arbitrators selected by agreement between the 
parties in dispute. If within the three months from the date of the 
request for arbitration the Parties in dispute are unable to agree 
on the selection of an arbitrator or arbitrators, any of those 
Parties may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
to nominate a single arbitrator to whom the dispute shall be 
referred to for decision. 
4. The decision of the arbitrator or arbitrators appointed under 
paragraph 3 of this article shall be binding on the Contracting 
Parties in dispute 120. 
The mechanism established by the above article restricts the disputants' freedom of 
selection of means of settlement and resort to a subsequent method is not authorised unless 
the parties have failed to resolve their dispute by a method previously enumerated in the 
clause before that method. Therefore, as a rule in such cases, recourse to an arbitral tribunal 
is only permitted after the exhaustion of the other means 121. The article also provided 
certain other provisions regarding the constitution of the tribunal, a practice which falls in 
line with the provisions of a number of international treaties and agreements, such as Art. 
3(2-4) of the 1965 Cease-Fire Agreement between India and Pakistan following the 
outbreak of hostilities over the disputed boundary between the two States in the Gujerat 
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(lndia)-West Pakistan region, which was the prelude for the Rann of Kutch arbitration l22 . 
Moreover, in certain other international instruments, the relevant provisions regarding the 
peaceful settlement of disputes are contained in optional protocols, such as for example 
with regard to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the 1961 Optional 
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes. The relevant provisions that govern the arbitral process are, in other 
cases, annexed to the original international instrument that embodies the compromissory 
clause, as in the case of Annex 3 (Arbitral Procedure) with regard to Art. 16(2) of the 1996 
Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and other Matter123; and also with regard to Art. 287 of UNCLOS III, Annexes VII 
(Arbitration) and VIn (Special Arbitration). 
2.2.2.2. Arbitral Treaties and Conventions: 
The issue regarding the signing or conclusion of an international arbitral treaty or 
convention as an act of expressing a State's prior commitment to resort to arbitration 
whenever the need arises is a straightforward one. Such forms of treaties which provide that 
any dispute that may arise between the parties in the future is to be submitted to arbitration 
alone, or to arbitration in conjunction with other means of peaceful settlement, may be 
either bilateral or multilateral. The momentum of arbitral treaty practice in the last two 
centuries in both areas has been examined elsewhere in this thesis124; however, the 
effectiveness or otherwise of the major general multilateral arbitral instruments in securing 
States' acceptance will be examined in detail in Chapter Five. 
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Conclusion: 
The forgoing discussion on the voluntary nature of international arbitration 
concentrated on several issues of direct or indirect connection to the issue of State consent 
in the domains of the peaceful settlement of international disputes in general and by legal 
means in particular. The consent requirement is, indeed, a consequence of the State 
sovereignty principle (i.e. the equality of States doctrine), a principle which was 
rationalised by the thoughts and works of numerous writers, has evolved consequently 
during the various stages of the development of political entities and institutions and is well 
established in State and international treaty practice. It is a consequence of this principle 
that there exists no obligation imposed upon States to settle their disputes by peaceful 
means, but on the basis of mutual agreement epitomised in their express consent to employ 
such means, a factor which must be present during the various stages of the settlement 
process until a solution or judgement or award is reached. Therefore, States in the absence 
of any agreement enjoyed the power to refuse recourse to arbitration whenever they 
deemed it to be against their national interests, especially in the case where the dispute 
involved questions of vital importance, which are seldom referred to legal determination in 
State practice in the absence of an agreement. Since, however, the occurrence of disputes is 
inherent and inevitable in an international community composed of a large number of 
sovereign States with diverse political, economic and cultural backgrounds, and for the sake 
of international peace and stability, means were sought by which States were to accept, by 
their own free sovereign will, obligations made in advance to resort to compulsory means 
for the peaceful settlement of disputes by legal means should the need arise. However, 
whether such practice is consistent or not with the principle of State sovereignty and the 
State consent requirement, and whether the freedom of control that States enjoyed over the 
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forms of disputes that were to be submitted to the jurisdiction of international courts and 
tribunals was totally eliminated and whether States welcomed such step will be examined 
in detail in the following chapter. 
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whatever they may be, are as much entitled to be protected by the law as the 
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then the doctrine ceases to be merely innocuous and becomes mischievous. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Striking the Balance: 
Compulsory Arbitration and the Exclusion of Important Issues 
from the Jurisdiction of International Tribunals 
Introduction: 
International law is complex on the questions of State sovereignty, consent and 
compulsion. The present chapter is intended to examine a formula which, seemingly, 
contradicts directly with the findings of our previous discussion above, namely, the 
compulsory settlement of international disputes. The discussion will focus on the true 
nature of compulsory arbitration and whether the concept of inter-State dispute settlement 
by compulsory legal means is in any way incompatible with the consent requirement and 
therefore, State sovereignty. The discussion will also focus on the justiciable and non-
justiciable dispute dichotomy which is integral to any discussion on the issue of 
compulsory settlement of international disputes, regarding: its theoretical dimensions; the 
manner in which the distinction was dealt with and incorporated in actual State practice: 
whether their exists a real line of demarcation between the two; and who is in charge of 
determining the nature of such disputes when the need arises. Light will also be shed on 
one of the most important breakthroughs in the area of compulsory jurisdiction, namely, the 
Optional Clause, and the manner in which the balance between compulsory jurisdiction and 
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States' concerns over the submission of important issues to that jurisdiction was struck in 
the Statute of the ICl. 
1. The Concept and Nature of Compulsory Arbitration: 
Despite the provisions of some international instruments 1 and the views of some 
writers2 who recognise the settlement of disputes as a duty imposed upon States, some 
writers believe that such a duty does not exist. According to Professor Malcolm Shaw3: 
... states are not obliged to resolve their differences at all, and this 
applies in the case of serious legal conflicts as well as peripheral 
political disagreements. All the methods available to settle disputes 
are operative only upon the consent of the particular States .... 
[emphasis added]. 
This view has been upheld by a number of other leading international jurists, such as 
Professor Ian Brownlie4 who, in a Blaine Sloan Lecture given in 1995 at the Pace 
University School of Law, titled: The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in 
Practice, stated that" ... there is a duty in international law to settle disputes peacefully, but 
there is not a duty to settle disputes". The absence of such duty according to him 
" ... constitutes a gap in the international system". Moreover, Steinberger5 stated that 
... [u ]nder present general customary international law, States are 
under no obligation to submit disputes to judicial settlement, nor 
does such obligation result from Arts. 2(3) and 33 of the UN 
Charter. Only by express consent do disputants assume an 
obligation to submit or acquire a right to refer disputes to judicial 
settlement. 
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Writing almost 70 years ago, Lauterpacht6 pointed out that this rule is one of the principal 
modes of the expression of the doctrine of State sovereignty in the international sphere, 
namely, that a sovereign State " ... owes no obedience to a judge above itself'. This in 
practice is illustrated by the lack of any of the major organs of the UN, whether the Security 
Council, General Assembly or the Secretary General, of the power to compel two disputant 
States to resort peaceful means of settlement 7. 
Disputes between nations are inherent In a world where political, strategic and 
economical interests may collide. Therefore, the need to devise means for ensuring State 
recourse to peaceful modes for the settlement of their disputes, in lieu of the destructive 
alternative of resort to force, became central to the notion of a constantly stable world 
community. States have found it impossible to ignore entirely either the requirements of 
international peace and security or the pressures of public opinion. Therefore, means have 
been sought for reconciling their determination not to abandon the existing status quo, 
whereby their freedom of action was unshackled, with the necessity of assuming certain 
obligations towards the peaceful settlement of disputes8. Since States are sovereign and this 
sovereignty entailed that their consent, as already examined above9, is a sine qua non for 
recourse to any peaceful means of dispute resolution, such reconciliation of freedom of 
action with a binding obligation is impossible to achieve in juridical logic. Nevertheless, it 
has been achieved as a matter of terminology in the domain of compulsory arbitration and 
adjudication. The solution in this respect was to adopt certain mechanisms for obligatory 
arbitral or judicial settlement with regard to a certain class of disputes of relatively minor 
importance, generally categorised as 'legal disputes', thereby excluding disputes which are 
considered as non-justiciable or 'political disputes' from the machinery of those 
compulsory mechanisms 10 unless the States concerned have agreed otherwise \vhen the 
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need arises. This approach aimed to remove a major obstacle which has constantly blocked 
the way to any progress in the field of compulsory arbitration or adjudication. namely. the 
unwillingness of States to accept in advance a legal obligation of a general character to 
settle disputes by legal means which may in the future impose a duty upon them to submit 
for legal determination issues of vital importance, which they may not have agreed to 
submit freely. 
Nevertheless, this step which aimed at transforming the settlement of disputes by 
international arbitration into a mandatory duty was, as we shall see in Chapter Five, not one 
effusively welcomed by all States. This may be attributed to a number of factors, some 
serving at the same time as factors behind States' decline to resort to voluntary arbitration 
in principle11 , leave alone the issue of making a commitment in advance to resort to 
arbitration when the need arises within a multilateral compulsory framework. Among the 
interesting arguments advanced in this regard, objecting to the establishment of a 
mandatory multilateral mechanism for the settlement of disputes by compulsory arbitration 
between States, was the one made by Baron Marschall von Bieberstien, of the German 
Delegation to the 1907 Hague Peace Conference. He strongly doubted the fruitfulness of 
such a mechanism by means of a world treaty. In his words: 
It would be an error, however, to believe that a general [treaty 
of arbitration] agreed upon between two States can serve purely and 
simply as a model or, so to speak, a formula for a world treaty. The 
matter is very different in to cases. Between two States which 
conclude a general treaty of obligatory arbitration, the field of 
possible differences is more or less under the eyes of the tr~~ty 
makers. It is circumscribed by a series of concrete and famIliar 
factors, such as the geographical situation of the two countries, their 
financial and economical relations, and their historic traditions 
which have grown up between them. In a treaty including all the 
countries of the world, these concrete and factors are wanting, and 
hence. even in the restricted list of juristic questions. the possibility 
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of differences of every kind is illimitable. It follows from this that a 
general [treaty of arbitration] which, between two States, defines 
with sufficient clearness the rights and duties which flow from it 
might be in a world treaty too vague and elastic and henc~ 
inapplicable12 • 
It is interesting to note that this view was also advanced, almost on similar lines, in 
the British Official Memorandum submitted in 1928 to the Committee on Arbitration and 
Security which was set up by the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference 
during the League of Nations era for the purpose of investigating the issues of arbitration, 
conciliation, security and Arts. 10, 11 and 16 of the League's Covenant13 (and which 
resulted in the framing of the 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes). According to the British Memorandum: 
In contracting an international obligation towards another State a 
country must take into account the nature of its relations with that 
State. Obligations which it may be willing to accept towards one 
State it may not be willing to accept towards another.... More 
progress is likely to be achieved through bilateral agreements than 
through general treaties open to signature by any State which so 
wishes 14• 
Commenting on this view, Lauterpacht15 pointed out that this is tantamount to 
saying that treaties of compulsory arbitration should be concluded only between States 
among whom no serious grounds of disagreement are likely to occur, and not between 
those whose mutual relations are unsettled, and, therefore, particularly in need of an 
effective mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes agreed upon in advance. 
However, is compulsory arbitration or adjudication according to the stricto sensu 
meaning of the term really compulsory, meaning that the consent requirement is totally 
eliminated in such a case? When viewing the issue of compulsory arbitration from a 
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different angle, it appears that although the expression 'compulsory' in the first instance 
appears to contradict the principle of State sovereignty, the expression, as rightfully 
suggested by Lauterpacht16, is a misnomer, inasmuch as it is the State which has agreed to 
submit its future disputes to legal determination. This brings us back to our previous 
discussion on the compatibility of the granting of consent by States for the submission of 
their disputes to the jurisdiction of international tribunals with the principle of 
sovereignty 17. There it was pointed out that the act of entering into an international 
agreement whereby a State assumes a prior obligation to resort to legal means of dispute 
settlement, whether international arbitration or adjudication, is, by its very nature. an 
exercise of its sovereignty. Therefore, what appears to be 'compulsory' is none other than a 
fulfilment of a prior commitment to have recourse to the compulsory means of settlement, 
which the State(s) concerned have freely accepted in advance. This view seems to fall in 
line with Cory's18 conception of compulsory arbitration. She defined it as "[t]he system of 
obligations whereby [S]tates have undertaken, in advance, to have recourse to arbitration 
for the settlement disputes ... [emphasis added]. Therefore, it appears that the basic principle 
of State consent is not at all absent in settlements involving compulsory arbitration or 
adjudication, in the sense that consent has in reality already been given, when the State(s) 
concerned signed or ratified the instrument from which the compulsory commitment to 
resort to arbitration or adjudication arises, whether an international treaty or convention 
containing a compromissory clause that provides for arbitration or adjudication; or an 
international treaty for the pacific settlement of international disputes by, inter alia, 
arbitration; or even the lodging of a declaration under the so-called Optional Clause with 
regard to recourse to the IC]. However, again, it must be stressed that any advance achieved 
in the area of compulsory jurisdiction (with regard to inter-State dispute settlement 
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mechanisms) would not have been possible had States not been given the option to exclude 
certain categories of disputes from the jurisdiction of any courts or tribunals operating 
under those mechanisms. This brings us to the distinction often made between justiciable 
and non-justiciable disputes, which will be examined in the following section. 
2. The Legal & Non-Legal Dispute Dichotomy: What is Justiciable 
and What is Not? 
2.1. Clearing the Ground: 
In his' The Function of Law in the International Community' 19, Lauterpacht pointed 
out that the doctrine of the non-justiciability of disputes is a creation of the doctrine of State 
sovereignty, namely, the aspect concerning a State's right " ... to determine what is the 
content of existing international law in a given case,,20. This aspect of the sovereignty of 
States doctrine connotes that it is the State that is, in principle, the sole judge of the 
existence of any individual rule of law applicable to itself; therefore, as a consequence, the 
settlement of inter-State disputes is solely dependant upon the consent of the disputants:! I . 
The original scope of the doctrine of the non-justiciability of disputes is attributed by 
Lauterpacht22 to Emmerich de Vattel, who was the first to introduce the doctrine into 
international law. Prior to the establishment of the first international mechanism for 
compulsory arbitration by the 1899 Hague Convention, Vattel, although an advocate of 
arbitration as a means for the settlement of disputes between States, adopted the view that 
not all disputes were to be submitted by States to arbitration. In this regard, he pointed out 
that in disputes involving sovereign States, " ... a careful distinction must be made between 
essential rights and less important rights and a different line of conduct is to be pursued 
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accordingly.,,23 In other words, 'rights of lesser importance' were justiciable and ·essential 
rights' were not, in Vattel's view. However, the practical need to distinguish justiciable 
disputes from non-justiciable disputes arose in connection with the attempts to make the 
settlement of inter-State disputes by legal means compulsory24. In this regard, Lauterpacht, 
with a great degree of clarity, elucidated the practical basis of the distinction in relation to 
voluntary, as well as compulsory arbitration, by adding: 
[t]hus in regard to the State's claim, now fully admitted by existing 
law, to remain, as between itself and other States, the judge over a 
disputed right, international lawyers have called into being .... the 
doctrine of non-justiciable disputes. This is based on an alleged 
fundamental difference between two categories of disputes: legal 
and non-legal, legal and political, justiciable and non-justiciable, 
disputes as to rights and disputes arising out of conflicts of interests. 
The doctrine connotes that by the very nature of international 
relations there are certain types of international disputes which are 
not an appropriate object for judicial settlement, in particular for 
judicial settlement following upon an obligation undertaken in 
advance within the frame of so-called 'compulsory' or 'obligatory' 
arbitration25. 
The modem origins of the doctrine are traced by Lauterpacht26 to three events of 
significant importance in the history of international arbitration, namely, the preceding and 
following discussions between the parties to the 1872 Alabama Claims arbitration i.e. the 
USA and Great Britain27; the deliberations in 1873, in its efforts to adopt Draft Regulations 
for International Arbitral Procedure, of the Institut de Droit International which was the 
first competent legal authority to consider the issue of justiciability and whose draft on 
arbitral procedure, adopted in 187528, served as the basis of the discussions of the parties to 
the 1899 and 1907 HCPSID on international arbitration; and the debates of the delegates of 
the parties to those two conventions on the issue. Although both Hague Conventions \\ill be 
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examined in detail in Chapter Five of this thesis, nevertheless, a few remarks on how the 
issue of justiciability was approached in both conferences appear to be necessary within the 
context of the present discussion. In this regard, the circular note handed by Count 
Mouravieff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, on December 30, 189829 
to the diplomatic representatives of the States that were invited to the first Hague Peace 
Conference and which embodied an agenda for the conference, indicated that among the 
aims of the Czarist government initiative was, "[a ]cceptance, in principle, of the use of 
good offices, mediation and voluntary arbitration .. .. [emphasis added]"30. Nevertheless, in 
a draft3l submitted by the Russian delegation to the third commission which was in charge 
of the issue of the pacific settlement of disputes, an enumeration was provided in Art. 10 of 
the draft regarding the issues that were considered justiciable and capable of being subject 
to 'compulsory' arbitration, under the important stipulation stated in Art. 8 of the same 
draft that the vital interest or national honour of the contracting parties remain intact. 
Those issues enumerated in Art. 10 of the Russian draft were: 
I - In case of differences or disputes relating to pecuniary 
damages suffered by a State or its nationals, as a 
consequence of illegal actions or negligence on the part of 
another State or its nationals. 
II - In case of disagreement relating to the interpretation or 
application of the treaties and conventions mentioned 
below: 
1- Treaties and conventions to the posts and telegraphs, 
railroads, and also those bearing upon the protection of 
submarine telegraph cables; regulations concerning 
methods to prevent collisions of vessels on the high 
seas; conventions relating to navigation of international 
rivers and inter oceanic canals; 
2- Conventions concerning the protection of literary and 
artistic property as well as industrial property (patents, 
trade-marks, and trade-names); conventions relating to 
money and measures; conventions relating to sanitation 
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and veterinary surgery, and for the prevention of 
phylloxera; 
3- Conventions relating to inheritance, exchange of 
prisoners, and reciprocal assistance In the 
administration of justice; 
4- Conventions for marking boundaries, so far as they 
concern purely technical and non-political questions. 
However, after a number of suggestions made by the members and modifications to the 
aforesaid article in the fourth, fifth, and fourteenth meetings of the Third Commissions' 
Committee of Examination32, it appeared that the parties were not able to reach consensus 
on the issues that were considered suitable for compulsory arbitration. Therefore, the 
Russian scheme failed33 and the best that the parties were able to reach in this respect was 
Art. 16 of the 1899 HCPSID which stated that: 
In questions of a legal nature, especially in the interpretation or 
application of International Conventions, arbitration is recognised 
by the Signatory Powers as the most effective, and the same time 
the most equitable, means of settling disputes which diplomacy has 
failed to settle. 
However, no precise specification of which forms of international controversies constituted 
a legal dispute was provided. 
The issue of justiciability was again considered at the second Hague Conference in 
1907, where a number of propositions were presented, each embodying an enumeration of a 
number of issues that were considered to fall within the meaning of legal disputes and 
which were considered suitable for compulsory arbitration, again under the proviso that the 
vital interest and national honour of the parties remained intact. However, the second 
Hague Conference in this respect was not as successful as its predecessor. In fact, the whole 
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scheme of distinguishing between legal and non-legal disputes came under attack by a 
number of States, led by Germany34. The argument advanced in this respect by Baron 
Marschall von Beiberstein35 of Germany is of timeless relevance: 
What is the meaning of this word [legal matters]? Is has been said 
that it may exclude 'political matters'. Now it is absolutely 
impossible, in a world treaty, to trace a line of demarcation between 
those two notions. A question may be legal in one country, and 
political in another one. There are even purely legal matters which 
become political at the time of the dispute ..... 00 we desire to 
distinguish 'legal' questions from technical and economic 
questions? This would also be impossible. The result is that the 
word 'legal' states everything and states nothing, and in matters of 
interpretation the result is just the same. It has been asked: who is to 
decide in case of some dispute, whether a question is or whether it 
is not legal? So far we have had no answer. 
The points that may be summed up from the statement above are clear: there is no clear 
dividing line between legal and political disputes (a problem which still persists to this 
day36); that the determination of the nature of a disputes in actual State practice, whether 
legal or political, is subjective and is based on political considerations of the State(s) 
concerned or in accordance with the circumstances at the time when the dispute arises; and 
the absence of any impartial authority capable of determining the nature of disputes when 
the actual need arises. What was achieved in this respect by Art. 38 of the 1907 Convention 
added nothing new to the issue. In fact, the whole article was formulated in terms almost 
identical with Art. 16 of the 1899 Convention, which only specified questions concerning 
the interpretation or application of international conventions as those falling under the 
category of legal disputes. Even though no further specification of what constitutes a legal 
dispute was given, Art. 38 of the 1907 Convention went on to state that in disputes 
involving 'questions of a legal nature' as examined above, " ... it would be desirable 
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that. ... the Contracting Powers should .... have recourse to arbitration, in so far as the 
circumstances permit [emphasis added]. This last part of the article seemed implicitly to 
acknowledge the propositions of Baron Beiberstein above, which contemplated the variable 
nature of disputes between States, and that even those disputes concerning questions of a 
legal nature may, in certain circumstances, deviate from the realms of justiciability and be 
transformed into politically 'non-justiciable' disputes. Moreover, bearing in mind that no 
authority in charge of determining the nature of such disputes was specified, the wording of 
the article in that respect appears to have remitted the whole issue of determination to the 
parties. Although the outcome of the two Hague Conventions provided no definitive answer 
to the question of what is justiciable and what is not, nevertheless, it may be said that they 
were not the last stop for the debate over that question, which was carried on in the work of 
a number of writers and was also the subject of numerous reservation clauses employed 
almost on a regular basis in the provisions of many international treaties and conventions 
that considered the issue of the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Both of these 
will be examined in the following. 
2.2. The Theoretical Dimensions of the Distinction and its Implementation in 
International Dispute Settlement and Treaty Practice: 
The phrases' legal' disputes and 'political' disputes are expressions often employed 
for the purpose of categorising certain controversies that involve States as parties. Each of 
those expressions encompasses a variety of issues and instances and is used to classify 
37 . I . different things. For example, Lauterpacht summed up four major c ear-cut conceptIOns 
of legal disputes in accordance with the views of various writers on the distinction. 
According to him: 
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(a) Legal disputes are such differences between States as are 
capabl~ of judicial se~lement by the application of existing and 
ascertamable rules of mternationallaw' , 
(b) Legal disputes are those in which the subject-matter of the claim 
relates to questions of minor and secondary importance not 
affecting the vital interests of States, or their external 
independence, or internal sovereignty, or territorial integrity, or 
honour, or any other of the interests usually referred to in the so-
called restrictive clauses [reservation clauses] in arbitration 
conventions; 
(c) Legal disputes are those in regard to which the application of 
existing rules of international law is sufficient to ensure a result 
which is not incompatible with the demands of justice between 
States and with a progressive development of international 
relations; 
(d) Legal disputes are those in which the controversy concerns 
existing legal rights as distinguished from claims aiming at a 
change of the existing law. 
Thus, any dispute which falls within any of the above conceptions is considered a 
legal dispute. However, whether each of the disputes above per se is a justiciable dispute is 
another issue. In this regard, Lauterpacht pointed out that the term 'justiciable' appears to 
be much wider than any of the definitions given of legal disputes38 . Therefore, in order for a 
dispute to be justiciable, it must contain the essential elements of each of those definitions. 
On the other hand, the now Judge of the IeJ, Rosalyn Higgins39, once indicated that the 
matters which have been traditionally regarded as political disputes are fourfold. namely, 
those in which the dispute is incapable of being settled by judicial determination due to the 
lack of existing rules of law to applicable to the dispute; those in which the vital interests of 
the State(s) concerned are involved; those in which the motive of one of the parties is to 
promote certain political objectives rather than to resolve a genuine legal controversy; and 
those in which there exists a certain degree of anxiety regarding the likelihood of a party's 
compliance with the judgement or award of the tribunal. Moreover, Schachter4() pointed out 
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three further arguments derived from State practice with regard to proceedings before the 
Ie] on which claims of the non-justiciability of a dispute were based, namely, a breach of 
an international obligation which forms nothing but one element in a complex political and 
historical situation that could not be dealt with satisfactorily in isolation from that political 
context
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; disputes involving the interpretation of clauses or concepts that are claimed to be 
of a political nature even though embodied in the provisions of a treaty42; and the case 
where a particular legal dispute is being adequately dealt with in political or diplomatic 
proceedings in which a judgement by or even a hearing by a court could jeopardise the 
possible settlement43 . However, to add more confusion, Brownlie44 pointed out eleven 
candidate arguments on which a claim of the non-justiciability of a certain dispute may be 
based, some which have already been indicated above. They are, that there is a more 
suitable forum for the settlement of the dispute; that a pronouncement on the merits would 
prejudice, prospectively or retrospectively, the political means of settlement; that no 
effective relief is sought; that the exercise of jurisdiction or the enforcement of any 
judgement which might be given would be ultra vires in terms of the relevant substantive 
law; that the matters in issue are only capable of political appreciation; the absence of one 
of the parties from the proceedings; that there is a collateral reason for the application; that 
the tribunal was asked to decide a purely hypothetical question of a factual nature; that the 
dispute involves issues concerning the personality of parties to a dispute; the case where 
there is an artificial and incomplete formulation of the issues with which the court is asked 
to deal with; and the case where the tribunal is being asked to legislate. Although it is far 
beyond the limited scope of this chapter to explore all the various grounds and arguments 
on which each of the propositions above was based, nevertheless, the conclusion in this 
respect is evident; there appear to be various grounds on which the justiciability or non-
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justiciability of a dispute or the legal nature or the political nature of a dispute may be 
based. However, the main question here is who is to determine that, when the need arises? 
The following discussion will attempt to lay down the basic foundations for any possible 
answer to that question. 
The scholarly debate over the issue of non-justiciability of disputes has focused not 
only on the question of what sort of disputes are legal and, therefore, justiciable and what 
are not, but also, on whether the distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable disputes 
should at all exist. In this regard, there appear to be two major schools of thought, namely, 
that which contemplates the justiciability of all disputes and that which contemplates the 
existence of certain disputes which, by their nature, are considered non-justiciable. This is a 
complex debate, which is based mainly on the method of evaluation of the propositions 
made by each side, such as those indicated above, and their usefulness as criteria for 
determining the justiciability or non-justiciability of disputes in the light of the legal or 
political nature of a dispute and State and international tribunal practice in that respect, an 
examination of which would fall beyond the limited scope of this part of the chapter. The 
following brief discussion on that issue, therefore, will only shed some light on some of the 
main distinctive feature of the arguments advanced by each side. In this respect, the views 
of Lauterpacht in his 'The Function of Law in the International Community', appear to be 
representative of the school of thought not in favour of the distinction. Lauterpacht, a non-
advocate of the distinction himself, aimed in his aforementioned work to establish three 
main propositions, namely, that no international tribunal dealing with matters of 
international law is justified in declining to render a decision on a matter on the ground of 
non liquet due to the absence of applicable rules of law; that the large scale of a matter does 
not deprive it of its susceptibility to adjudication according to law; and that the pol itical 
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character of some disputes does remove or dominate the legal nature of all international 
disputes which, in his view, are all inherently justiciable45 . In this regard, he pointed out the 
dual character of all international disputes involving States as parties which, in his view. 
comprise both political and legal aspects. In his words "[t]he State is a political institution. 
and all questions which affect it as a whole, in particular in its relations with other States 
are therefore political,,46. He further added that: 
[w]hile it is not difficult to establish the proposition that all disputes 
between States are of a political nature, inasmuch as they involve 
more or less important interests of States, it is equally easy to show 
that all international disputes are, irrespective of their gravity, 
disputes of a legal character in a sense that, as long as the rule of 
law is recognised, they are capable of answer by the application of 
legal rules47. 
Therefore, all international disputes involving States as parties are considered by 
Lauterpacht as justiciable and any claim to the contrary is, according to him, " ... nothing 
else than the expression of the wish of a State to substitute its own will for its legal 
obligation ... ,,48. This view, which contemplated the justiciability of all international 
disputes, was also shared by a number of certain other writers, such as Kelsen49 and 
Borchard5o. However, this view did not remain unchallenged. In this regard, Schlochauer51 , 
within the context of dispute settlement under the Iel, pointed out that it is necessary to 
, 
distinguish between legal disputes and political disputes which he refers to as 'conflicts of 
interests'. In the latter, in his view, the matters at issue are not differences of opinion as to 
questions of international law, but rather, demands to have certain legal situations or 
relationships altered or to have political claims recognised. Political disputes, in his vie\\. 
" ... are not justiciable, and can therefore only be settled by diplomatic means or by non-
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judicial methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes [emphasis added]. Also in this 
respect, Collier and Lowe52 point out that disputes not being capable of resolution by a 
judicial process, and not susceptible of a decision on the basis of law are non-justiciable 
disputes and, therefore, ought not to be submitted to judicial procedures. Although they 
acknowledge the impossibility of drawing up a list of the kinds of disputes that are 
considered as legal disputes and, therefore, justiciable, nevertheless, they point out that 
" ... it is clear that some disputes are not legal,,53. They support their view by the practice of 
ICJ in the Haya de la Torre case 54 and the Hostages case55. In the former case, the Court, 
after rendering its judgement in the Asylum case56 in which it found, inter alia, that 
Columbia's grant of asylum to Haya de la Torre was invalid according to the procedure of 
the Convention of Asylum signed between it and Peru at Havana in 1928, was confronted 
with the task of determining whether or not Haya de la Torre was to be handed over to 
Peru, an issue which formed the main source of tension between the two States and 
subsequently gave rise to the Haya de la Torre case57. However, the Court, having in mind 
that the aforementioned treaty between the two States did not prescribe any method that 
was to be resorted to in a case where asylum had been irregularly granted, artfully evaded 
rendering a decisive judgement on this particular question by pointing out that there are 
different ways of terminating asylum but, however: 
... these courses are conditioned by facts and by possibilities which, 
to a very large extent, the Parties are alone in a position to 
appreciate. A choice amongst them could nor be based on legal 
considerations, but only on considerations of practicability or of 
political expediency; it is not part of the Court's judicial function to 
h h · 58 make suc c Olce . 
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The Court in this respect aimed at avoiding any contact with the political aspects of the 
dispute and stuck to the treaty interpretation task it had set for itself from the beginning. 
However, its hands were tied in this case, since the treaty did not contain any provisions 
covering this sort of situation. The court, after dealing with all the legal issues it could, 
opened the eyes of the disputants to the unsuitability of settlement of this form of disputes 
through legal processes and that such disputes were only susceptible to settlement by the 
employment of political processes 59, a position which, according to Collier and Lowe60, 
was taken due to the fact that the question was purely a political one and entirely devoid of 
any legal content. 
In the Hostages case between Iran and the USA regarding the former's detention of 
the diplomatic and consular staff in the US embassy compound in Tehran, Iran argued that: 
[t]he Court cannot and should not take cognisance of the case .... For 
this question represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an 
overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and 
which involves, inter alia, more than 25 years of continual 
interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the 
shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes 
perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict 
with all international and humanitarian norms .... Consequently, the 
Court cannot examine the American Application divorced from its 
proper context, namely the whole political dossier of t~~ relations 
between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years . 
On this certain aspect of Iran's contention, Sir Robert Jennings62 , in a Josephine Onoh 
Memorial Lecture given at the University of Hull on January 21, 1986, titled' International 
Courts and International Politics', commented that it was obvious that the Court could not 
(and Iran was indeed assuming that the Court could not) undertake to examine in general 
terms 25 years of the history of the relations between it and the USA. In his view, such an 
152 
issue appears to be clearly a non-justiciable one, and one which " ... is a matter for historians 
of international relations, perhaps, but not for a court of law." On this particular point the 
Court did recognise, however, that: 
... legal disputes between sovereign States by their very nature are 
likely to occur in political contexts, and often form one element in a 
wider and longstanding political dispute between the States 
concerned63 
Nevertheless, it firmly rejected the view that" ... because a legal dispute submitted to the 
Court is only one aspect of a political dispute, the Court should decline to resolve for the 
parties the legal questions at issue between them,,64. Hence, the Court by this reply 
indicated that it was willing to separate the legal aspects of the case from its political 
aspects, and to rule only on the former. 
When turning to international treaty practice, it appears that the vast majority of the 
treaties concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes by legal means concluded prior to 
WWI almost uniformly employed the distinction between legal and non-legal issues65 . In 
this regard, despite the insufficiency of the provisions of both HCsPSID on the issue of 
justiciability66, the era between the 1899 HCPSID and World War I witnessed the 
conclusion of over a hundred treaties that were influenced by the distinction between legal 
and non-legal disputes adopted by both Hague Conventions67, a practice which was 
engendered by the Agreement of October 14, 1903, between France and Great Britain for 
the Settlement by Arbitration of Certain Classes of Questions which may arise between 
them68 . The employment of the distinction in inter-State treaty practice also was carried 
into the post WWl era. However, the approaches regarding the methods devised for settling 
each category of disputes appeared far from giving the impression of a uniform practice. 
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This appears clear from Habicht' s69 survey of the treaties for the pacific settlement of 
international disputes concluded or renewed between the end of WWl and 1930 in which 
he pointed out the following 11 systems: 
1- Arbitration of legal disputes; 
2- Compulsory adjudication of legal disputes; 
3- Arbitration of all disputes; 
4- Arbitration of legal disputes and investigation of all other disputes; 
5- Arbitration of legal disputes and conciliation in all other disputes; 
6- Compulsory adjudication of claims of right, and conciliation in all other disputes; 
7- Compulsory adjudication of legal disputes, and conciliation followed by arbitration in 
all other disputes; 
8- Conciliation followed by arbitration in all disputes; 
9- Conciliation in all disputes followed by compulsory adjudication of legal disputes; 
10- Conciliation in all disputes followed by compulsory adjudication of legal disputes and 
arbitration of non-legal disputes; 
11- Conciliation followed by compulsory adjudication in all disputes. 
What draws attention from Habicht's survey are those systems that provided for the 
settlement of all international disputes. However, such treaties were very few in number, 
and most of them did make a distinction between legal and non-legal disputes. Moreover, 
the vast majority of those treaties, as well as those not belonging to the aforementioned 
category of so-called comprehensive treaties, did contain significant reservations 70. The 
practice of inserting certain reservation clauses 71 in the provisions of treaties for the 
purpose of providing a sphere of application which the provisions of the treaty regarding 
the peaceful settlement of disputes were not to exceed, was extensively in the first half of 
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the 20th century 72. Reservation clauses, such as those exempting the vital interests, 
independence or national honour ... etc, of the parties were made expressly. However, in 
latter agreements, the large variety of issues excluded were compressed and disguised 
under other shorter but also general formulas73 such as disputes which fall 'essentially' or 
'solely' or 'by their nature' " ... within the domestic jurisdiction ... " of the States 
concerned74 • Moreover, the obligatorium to adjudicate in some of instruments was limited 
to disputes " ... with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their receptive 
rights ... ,,75 or, 'legal disputes'. In some such cases, a list of such disputes is provided. For 
example, according to Art. 36(2) of the Statutes of both the former PCIJ and the current 
IC1: 
(a) the interpretation of a treaty; 
(b) any question of international law; 
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute 
a breach of an international obligation; 
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach 
of an international obligation. 
However, one must not forget in this respect the system of reservations attached to 
declarations filed under the Optional Clause which will be discussed elsewhere
76
. 
The intention of the parties behind the insertion of such clauses within the 
provisions of treaties or agreements for compulsory or obligatory arbitration is clarified by 
Lauterpacht 77 who considered such practice as: 
... an expression of the view that important controversies which are 
likely to occur must be excluded from the ~cope. of obligatory 
arbitration. For reservations are, as a rule, mgenIously fra~ed 
generalisations of anticipated possible disputes, in regard to which 
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either of the contracting parties is anxious to preserve freedom of 
action .... 
This view, which contemplated the elastic and general nature of matters usually excluded 
from international arbitration in reservation clauses and also their stabilising affects on 
commitments to resort to arbitration, can also be easily understood from Wilson's78 
following observation on the issue: 
[w]hen an arbitration agreement with reservation prOVISIOns is 
concluded, there is no implied consent on the part of the signatories 
to arbitrate a dispute as to the nature of the controversy arising 
between them. A review of practice seems to establish that, if an 
arbitration convention is ratified in which this point is not covered, 
but in which there are set forth certain categories of disputes which 
are not to be arbitrated, the presumption is that each State may 
decide for itself whether a particular dispute falls inside or outside 
of the reserved classes of questions. 
This observation brings us to the subjective criteria used by States in determining whether 
a dispute is justiciable and whether it is not, a problem underlined earlier by Baron 
Bieberstien at the 1907 Hague Peace Conference79, and one which appears to be mainly 
influenced by the concerned State(s) political and / or general strategic calculations. In this 
regard, Steinberger80 pointed out several factors that States take into account when 
determining whether or not a certain dispute is appropriate for submission to judicial 
settlement, namely, the political climate between the disputants; the interdependence with 
other fields of relations or frictions; prospects of settlement of the dispute by other non-
legal means of dispute resolution (i.e. negotiations, good offices, mediation, conciliation, 
inquiry and fact finding) bilaterally or multilaterally employed, for example, within the 
framework of an international organisation; the applicability of legal rules; the certainty of 
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the laws to apply and also the predictability of a possible decision; the effect of a decision 
on the settlement of the dispute in part or entirely; the effect of the reaction of internal and 
international public opinion to their conduct; the prospects for and the means of 
enforcement of the decision. Hence, Steinberger throws the ball into the Government court 
by concluding that" ... justiciability or non-justiciability is a political question, with the 
answer left to the discretion of a disputant"sl. This falls in line with the views of a number 
of other writers, such as HedgesS2, who pointed out that: 
... a legal dispute is not truly justiciable unless the mental attitude of 
States is such to make it so. In other words, although every legal dispute 
is potentially susceptible of solution by arbitration, yet it is not actually 
susceptible unless the parties are willing to treat it in that way. 
Judge Hudsons3 in this respect also indicated that: 
[a]ll disputes between States are in some sense political, and any 
controversy may be lifted by agitation to the arena of high politics. 
[However, disputes of any kind] may be submitted to the process of 
justice according to law if the parties so desire.... [emphasis 
added]. 
In actual dispute settlement practice, it appears that there is a mass of arbitral 
jurisprudence and a significant body of judicial decisions on State responsibility; treaty 
interpretation; and disputes involving boundary or territorial sovereignty questionss4. 
Nevertheless, practice has also shown that even such categories of disputes are not alH'(~vs 
considered by States suitable for legal determination by international arbitration or 
adjudications5. For example, with regard to the latter category of disputes above, it appears 
that States have submitted a great number of important and highly controversial boundar: 
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and territorial disputes to legal determination by international tribunals. Examples include 
the submission of an important boundary dispute by India and Pakistan for legal 
determination by an arbitral tribunal (the Rann of Kutch arbitration)86 following a fierce 
war between the two nations; and the dispute between Yemen and Eritrea regarding 
sovereignty over the islands of Hanish in an almost similar atmosphere of hostilitl7 . 
Nevertheless, even such disputes, although capable of being settled by the application of 
the rules of international law, are sometimes endowed with political baggage too great to 
allow their settlement by arbitration or international adjudication. Current examples in this 
regard include the ongoing dispute regarding the question of Jammu and Kashmir between 
India and Pakistan88, and also the dispute between Iran and the UAE over the islands of 
Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs89. Hesitation to resort to international 
adjudication in such cases by one or both parties may also be attributed to the strict nature 
of this means of settlement which is in theory a " ... win-or-Iose, zero-sum game,,90. 
Therefore, any judgement rendered on this category of disputes based on the strict 
application of the rules of international law constitutes an official legal acknowledgement 
of the validity of the claims of one of the parties, in whose favour the judgement is made, 
an acknowledgement which not only results in the other party losing its case and deprives it 
of the freedom of action it used to enjoy prior to its submission of the dispute to legal 
determination91 but, also, may undermine the validity of any legal or political grounds on 
which any further claims made by that party on the issue in the future may be based. a risk 
which neither party is willing to take. However, this proposition may be refuted on the 
ground that such a path has been walked by a large number of States who submitted to the 
jurisdiction of international tribunals questions of vital political importance. The classical 
examples in this regard are the 1794 arbitration under the Jay Treatr
92 
and the 1871 
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Alabama Claims arbitration93 . Moreover, if there was a real intention to seek a settlement of 
a standing dispute by legal means acceptable to both parties, then they could authorise the 
tribunal to decide on the basis of justice and equity or a decision ex aeque et bono. 
Therefore, what can be inferred from this is that the main problem in this respect is not the 
existence of deficiencies in the legal means of settlement, but the absence of the political 
will to resort to those means. In other words, the dispute is non-justiciable because one or 
all of the parties want it to be that way. 
So the question arises whether compulsory jurisdiction provides any remedy to such 
subjective criteria used by States for determining the justiciability of disputes and their 
refusal to seek a settlement by legal means. In the Nicaragua case (Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility)94, the Court, in the face of a strong respondent, firmly declared by an II-to-5 
vote that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute regarding alleged unlawful acts of 
aggression in the form of military and paramilitary activities carried out by the USA against 
the Republic of Nicaragua, in terms of Art. 36(2) of the Statute, and also in terms of the 
1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the two nations, despite the 
contentions made by the USA challenging the Court's jurisdiction in this particular case, 
mainly on the grounds that, inter alia, the dispute was: 
... not a narrow legal dispute; it is an inherently political problem 
that is not appropriate for judicial resolution .... The international 
Court of Justice was never intended to resolve issues of collective 
security and self-defence and is patently unsuited for such a role95. 
Charles de Visscher96, the former Judge to the ICJ, once pointed out that "[r]ecourse to an 
international court implies that, and is only completely effective when, the dispute is 
completely separated from politics". The issues involved in the Nicaragua case were. from 
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the USA's point of view, of a political and non-justiciable nature, However, in the Court's 
majority judgement, the dispute was a legally justiciable one that was susceptible to judicial 
determination, despite the above claims to the contrary raised by the USA. 
This brings us to the question raised earlier, namely, who is in charge of determining the 
political and, therefore, non-justiciable nature of a dispute? The answer would be the State, 
in the case of an ad hoc settlement or even the situation where there does exist a prior 
commitment to resort to international arbitration or adjudication at the time when the 
dispute arises, but, however, outside any effective compulsory framework. This is clear 
within the context of ad hoc inter-State arbitral settlements, in which it is seldom that an 
arbitral tribunal renders a judgement on the justiciability of a certain dispute, inasmuch as 
that decision has already been made by the disputants97 . However, in the case of 
international adjudication under the ICl, once the parties have lodged their declarations 
under Art. 36(2) of the Statute, thereby accepting compulsory jurisdiction, then, the whole 
issue falls within the scope of the Court's jurisdiction98. Although the Court has never 
rejected a case on the ground that the dispute involved non-legal issues99, however, the 
Court may in certain circumstances refrain from rendering a judgement in a particular case 
or aspect of a case if the question(s) were of an actual political nature, whose 
determination falls beyond the Court's judicial functions, such as in the Haya de la Torre 
case and Hostages case, both examined above 100. However, it was the Court who 
determined that and not the parties. This appears to be one of the main sources of States' 
reluctance towards compulsory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction under Art. 36(2) of its Statute is not absolute, but subject to any reservations 
attached by one of the parties to its original instrument or declaration through which it 
accepts the Court's jurisdiction, and which was the only possible way to make compulsory 
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jurisdiction in advance acceptable to States. The extent of the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction, as well as States' declarations made under the Optional Clause. will be 
considered in the following. 
3. The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the ICJ: 
The following discussion aims at examining the compulsory jurisdiction of the IC] 
In the light of reservations attached to States' declarations and the effect of such 
reservations on the Court's jurisdiction. However, first of all, a general overview of the 
various other means of conferring jurisdiction upon the Court will be presented. 
3.1. The Ways and Means by which Jurisdiction is Conferred upon the ICJ: 
According to Art 36(1) of the Court's Statute: 
The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties 
refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the 
United Nations or in treaties or conventions in force. 
The wording of the above article, namely, the aspect regarding the jurisdiction of 
the Court as comprising 'all cases which the parties refer to it' implies that all parties lOI to a 
dispute must agree that the case should be referred to the Court for determination 102. Such 
agreement or 'consent' is the only basis of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases l03 . 
Jurisdiction, in general, may be conferred upon the Court either ad hoc after a dispute has 
arisen by the signing of a special agreement (compromis) to that effect; or ante hoc, in 
advance, prior to the existence of a dispute, either under a treaty or under a compromissory 
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clause embodied in the provision of treaty or a declaration filed under Art. 36(2) of the 
Court's Statute (the system of the Optional Clause will be examined separately in 3.2). 
Moreover, jurisdiction may be conferred upon the Court post hoc, after the initiation of the 
proceedings by the unilateral application of a plaintiff State (the principle of forum 
prorogatum). Each of those means will be examined in the following: 
3.1.1 Special Agreement (compromis): 
Jurisdiction may be conferred upon the Court after a dispute has arisen, namely, by 
the conclusion of a special agreement or compromis in which the parties specify the issues 
to be determined. The parties are to notify the Registrar of the Court of the agreement 
pursuant to Art. 40( 1) of the Statute. This means of conferring jurisdiction upon the Court 
has been employed in a number of cases, such as the Asylum case 104, the Minquiers and 
Ecrehos case105, and the Continental Shelf case l06 between Tunisia and Libya. 
3.1.2. Treaties and Compromissory Clauses Conferring Jurisdiction upon the Court: 
Jurisdiction, according to Art. 36(1) of the Statute, may also be conferred upon the 
ICJ by international" ... treaties or conventions in force." Numerous international treaties 
and conventions on both the bilateral or multilateral levels embody compromissory clauses 
conferring jurisdiction on the ICJ for the settlement of disputes that may arise between the 
parties. Such clauses, as in the case of arbitral compromissory clauses, may be either 
special 107 or general 108, and may be combined in part with other means of settlement109. 
Among the famous examples in which the jurisdiction of the ICJ was established pursuant 
to the compromissory clause was the Nicaragua case (Jurisdiction)llo between the USA 
and Nicaragua, in which the Court's jurisdiction founded by virtue of Art. 24(2) of the 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation concluded between the two States in 1956. 
However, treaties containing such clauses may not be invoked unless they are operative on 
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the day of the institution of the proceedings and all the parties to the proposed proceedings 
must also be parties to the Court's Statute. Moreover, such treaties must also be registered 
with the Secretariat of the UN in accordance with Art. 102 of the Charterlll . 
3.1.3. The Principle ofJorum prorogatum: 
In conditions in which the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court operates by way of 
exception, the principle of forum prorogatum often makes possible the exercise of or 
submission to the jurisdiction of the Court through a method less formal than express 
acceptance of it112• This principle, which achieved some prominence in 1948 after the 
famous Corfu Channel case l13 between Albania and the United Kingdom, is a major 
particularity of judicial procedure proper, in the sense that it is almost impossible to be 
applied by a tribunal in ad hoc arbitral proceedings I 14. It contemplates that jurisdiction may 
be conferred upon the Court by a respondent State post hoc, by means of acts subsequent to 
the initiation of the proceedings, namely115, by formal agreement conferring jurisdiction 
upon the Court; or by informal agreement as a result of successive and independent 
statements of consent made by the defendant State; or from the conduct of the proceedings 
from which the tacit waiver of the requirement of express consent to the Court's 
jurisdiction may be deduced, each of which takes place after the matter has been 
unilaterally brought before the Court by an applicant State. 
Some have regarded proceedings instituted under the principle offorum prorogatum 
as politically motivated and an abuse of Court procedures I 16. However, it is interesting to 
note that although the Court witnessed a number of cases 117 instituted on the basis of forum 
prorogatum following the Corfu Channel case in 1948, the issue was not regulated in the 
Rules of the Court until 1978118, when Art. 38(5) was added. The Article indicated that: 
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[w]hen the applicant State proposes to found the jurisdiction of the 
Co~rt upo~ a consent yet to be given or manifested by the State 
agamst which such application is made. It shall not however be 
entered in the General List, nor any action be taken in the 
proceedings, unless and until the State against which such 
application is made consents to the Court's jurisdiction for the 
purpose of the case [emphasis added]. 
In this respect, Rosennel1 9 pointed out three factors which enabled the Court to establish its 
jurisdiction based on forum prorogatum and which were deliberately omitted from the 
Statute and the Rules of the Court. The first is that in the case of proceedings instituted by 
application, neither the Rules of the Court nor its Statute require that the consent of the 
respondent State should be transmitted to the Court with the application; the second is that 
there are no provisions in the Statute or Rules of the Court as to specification of the form in 
which a State's consent to the Court's jurisdiction is to be expressed 120. This was also 
recognised by the Court in the Corfu Channel case (Preliminary Objections)121 in which it 
indicated that "[ w ]hile the consent of the parties confers jurisdiction on the Court, neither 
the Statute nor the Rules require that this consent should be expressed in any particular 
form". The third factor is that there is no indication in the Rules or the Statute describing in 
as many words when proceedings should be instituted by application and when by special 
agreement. However, in any instance, the Court will not accept jurisdiction under forum 
prorogatum unless there is a real and not merely apparent consent l22 . As the Court 
indicated in the Corfu Channel case (Preliminary Objections)123, the State's consent must 
be " ... a voluntary and indisputable acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction". Therefore. at 
least from the Court's point of view, there appears to be no possibility for a respondent 
State to be dragged into legal proceedings it never really intended to participate in. Indeed, 
such a situation would clearly constitute an infringement of the State consent requirement 
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which, as we have seen above, is a fundamental element of one of the basic principles of 
State sovereignty, namely, the equality of States doctrine, and would be a serious departure 
from the Court's own well established jurisprudence regarding the consensual nature of the 
settlement of disputes by peaceful means. The applicant State relying on forum prorogatum 
invites a positive reaction from the defendant State, a subsequent acceptance of the Court's 
jurisdictionI24 . Therefore, a State not wishing to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court must 
refrain from any action from which consent may be deduced. Such an approach has been 
successfully followed by States in a number of case in which the respondent State has 
clearly and consistently rejected the invitation to submit to the Court's' jurisdiction made by 
the applicant State 125. The traditional example in this respect is the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company case. In that case, the United Kingdom suggested that Iran's objections to the 
admissibility of certain claims put forward in the latter's memorial were not considered as 
objections to the Court's jurisdiction, and could only be decided if the Court had 
jurisdiction; therefore, from the applicants' point of view, such action had conferred 
jurisdiction upon the Court on the basis of the principle of forum prorogatum. This view, 
however, was rejected by the Court. The Court's reply in this respect deserves extensive 
quotation: 
The principle of forum prorogatum, if it could be applied to the 
present case, would have to be based on some conduct or statement 
of the Government of Iran which involves an element of consent 
regarding the jurisdiction of the Court. But the Gove~ment has 
consistently denied the jurisdiction of the Court. Havmg filed a 
Preliminary Objection for the purpose of disputing the )uri.sdictio~, 
it has throughout the proceedings maintained that ObJectIOn. ~t IS 
true that it has submitted other Objections which have no dIrect 
bearing on the question of jurisdiction. But they are clearly 
designed as measures of defence which it would be necess.ary to 
examine only if Iran's Objection to the jurisdiction were rejected. 
No element of consent can be deduced from such conduct on the 
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part of the Government of Iran. Consequently, the submission of the 
United Kingdom on this point cannot be accepted I26. 
3.2. The System of the Optional Clause: 
As indicated above, it would have not been possible to endow the international court 
with compulsory jurisdiction had States not been given the freedom to exclude certain 
categories of disputes from the court's compulsory jurisdiction. This system of compulsory 
jurisdiction was first introduced in the Statute of the PCIJI27 and came as a compromise 
between those who wanted true compulsory jurisdiction over legal disputes, as was 
proposed in 1920 by the Committee of Jurists which prepared the Statute of the PCIJ, and 
between those who wanted to retain the exclusively consensual basis of the Court's 
jurisdiction. The Optional Clause, a potentially important landmark in the history of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of international courts and tribunals, was taken over almost 
virtually unchanged in the Statute of the current ICJ 128 • Art. 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ 
reads: 
The States Parties 129 to the present Statute may at any time declare 
that they recognise as compulsory ipso facto and without special 
agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same 
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes 
concernmg: 
(a) the interpretation of a treaty; 
(b) any question of international law; . 
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constItute 
a breach of an international obligation; 
(d) the nature or extent of reparation to be made for the breach of an 
international obligation. 
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From the wording of the article above, it appears that acceptance of the Optional 
Clause is, in accordance with the stricto sensu phrasing of the expression. optional; 
however, once a State has filed a declaration thereby accepting the Court's jurisdiction, 
then reference to the Court, as stated in Art. 36(2) above, becomes" ... compulsory ipso 
facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same 
obligation ... ". A State making a declaration under the Optional Ciause I30 possesses the 
right to bring before the Court another State accepting the same obligation and vice versa. 
Professor Ian Brownlie I3I pointed out that the expectation in this regard was that a general 
system of compulsory jurisdiction would be generated as States' declarations multiplied. 
Although he considered this conception sound enough, nevertheless, the effectiveness of 
this system, as Professor Brownlie rightfully asserted, was reduced due to the conditions in 
which it functioned. Among the main contributing factors cited by him in this respect is the 
crippling role of the reservations attached by States to their declarations made under the 
Optional Clause, in which certain matters are excluded from the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction. These will be examined below. 
The Court's conception of what forms a legal dispute was stated in its practice in 
the Border and Transborder Armed Actions case I32 in which it pointed out that a legal 
dispute was a dispute" ... capable of being settled by the application of principles and rules 
of international law .... ". Therefore, despite a State's claim to the contrary, all disputes are 
considered by the IC] as legal or justiciable disputes once they are capable of being settled 
by the application of the principles of international law. A State's own assessment of the 
non-justiciability of a certain dispute is invalid in proceedings initiated under the Optional 
Clause inasmuch as it is the Court which, under Art. 36(6) has the power to determine its , 
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own jurisdiction. The classical example in this regard is Court's practice in the Nicaragua 
case
l33
. 
A d· d 134 ccor mg to Ju ge Mosler ,to the extent that both parties have accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, the only preliminary objection possible against the 
jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of an application based on the Optional Clause 
is, therefore, that the dispute belongs to one of the categories exempted in a party's 
declaration. The Court's compulsory jurisdiction becomes deadlocked if the dispute in 
question is a matter excluded in a State's declaration of acceptance of the Court's 
jurisdiction, inasmuch as it is beyond the Court's competence to entertain a dispute which 
falls within the scope of a reservation made a party. The most recent example in this respect 
is the Court's ruling on June 21, 2000, in the Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 10 
August 1999 between India and Pakistan135, in which it found that it had no jurisdiction to 
entertain the application filed by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan regarding the alleged 
downing, on August 10, 1999, of an unarmed Pakistani military aircraft (the Atlantic) in 
Pakistan's territory by Indian forces on the ground that, inter alia, India's declaration 
excluded among other things "disputes with the Government of any State which is or has 
been a Member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The most common of reservations 
attached to State's declarations are those regarding past disputes; time-limits (ratione 
temporis) regarding the duration of a Declaration 136; those excluding disputes in regard to 
which the parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of 
peaceful settlement; and those regarding the exclusion of matters which fall within the 
137 h d h h' domestic jurisdiction of the State(s) concerned. However, some ave argue t at t IS 
latter form of reservation is unnecessary since, if a subject matter of a dispute falls within 
the domestic jurisdiction of a State according to current international law, it cannot be a 
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legal dispute governed by international law and, therefore, does not come within the scope 
of the Court's compUlsory jurisdiction. The inclusion of this form of reservation is said138 
to be probably governed less by legal considerations than by political factors, and may be 
ascribed to the general reluctance on the part of States to entrust the settlement of their 
disputes to third parties beyond their control. Moreover, some States have even sought to 
increase the effectiveness of such forms of reservation by reserving to themselves the right 
to determine when a dispute falls within the scope of the domestic jurisdiction of the 
State(s) concerned. Among the most popular examples in this regard is the famous so-
called 'Connally reservation' or 'Connally amendment' of the USA in its declaration of 
1946 in which it excluded "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of 
America"139. Although the USA withdrew its acceptance of the Optional Clause in the 
aftermath of the ICJ's ruling on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in the Nicaragua case, 
nevertheless, the declarations of a number of other States, albeit low in number, still do 
contain so-called 'automatic reservations' formulated on the same lines as the Connally 
formula. Sudan's 1958 declaration and Malawi's 1966 declaration are examples. A similar 
formula, was that in the 1972 declaration of the Republic of the Philippines, which 
excluded disputes "which the Republic of the Philippines considers to be essentially within 
its domestic jurisdiction,,14o. Such forms of reservation have been criticised by a number of 
writers, such as Professor Brownlie 141 , who considers them as incompatible with the Statute 
of the Court on the ground that they contradict with the power of the Court under Art. 36(6) 
to determine its own jurisdiction and also are not genuine acceptance of the Court's 
jurisdiction ante hoc. In this regard, Rosenne1 42 also added that such subjective reservations 
would arguably nullify wholly or partially the acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. With 
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regard to the Court's practice regarding the validity of such automatic reservations it , 
appears that although criticism has been advanced with great vigour on such practice by the 
late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, as well as by other judges in the Norwegian Loans case 143, 
nevertheless, the Court has avoided making a definitive pronouncement on that issue. 
However, Rosenne 144 considered the Court's decision of November 26, 1984, in the 
jurisdictional phase of the Nicaragua case, to be an implicit rejection of the view that such 
reservations vitiate the acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 
A declaration, being made under Art. 36(2) which expressly limits the effects of the 
declaration to " ... any other State accepting the same obligation .... " is always subject to the 
condition of reciprocity. This means that the Court can only have jurisdiction by virtue of 
Art. 36(2) where the declarations of the two parties in dispute meet. This does not mean, 
however, that both declarations of the parties must be in identical terms, but both 
declarations must grant jurisdiction to the Court to entertain the dispute in question. This 
also opens the way for a party to invoke a reservation made in the declaration of the other 
party for the purpose of challenging the Court's jurisdiction 145. It is interesting to note that 
the majority of declarations registered by States under the Optional Clause make reciprocity 
an express condition for their acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. This would seem to be 
superfluous, since the principle of reciprocity is already inherent in the system of the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the IC] under the Optional Clause l46 . However, Art. 36 of the 
Court's Statute provided a rather confusing provision in Paragraph 3 which indicated that 
the Declarations made under the Optional Clause may be unconditional or ..... on condition 
of reciprocity on the part of several or certain States, or for a certain time". This reciprocity 
condition is, unlike the one already examined above, optional and does not form an integral 
part of the Statute 147. The clearest example in this respect is the reservation regarding 
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disputes with Commonwealth countries, which is usually framed on similar I ines to clause 
2(b) of the Canadian declaration, which excluded "disputes with the Government of any 
other country which is a member of the Commonwealth ... ". This is a similar formulation to 
the reservation of India above, which barred the Court's jurisdiction in the Aerial Incident 
of 10 August 1999 case l48 . 
There are currently 64 States that have accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction 
under the Optional Clause, out of the total of 189 members of the UN 149, less than a third of 
the members. Moreover, to add insult to injury, a considerable number of those declarations 
accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction contain reservations which would curb the 
Court's jurisdiction on certain matters. This appears to reflect the great degree of mistrust 
that States have for the concept of compulsory settlement of disputes in general. States 
seem to prefer the rather traditional method of bringing claims before the Court, namely, by 
express agreement relating to a defined dispute l50 . Some States may have accepted the 
jurisdiction of the Court under the Optional Clause, because it may be useful to them one 
day in compelling a certain party to appear before the Court for the purpose of redressing a 
certain wrong, a chance which would have been unlikely through the traditional 'non-
compulsory' means of conferring jurisdiction upon the Court, which depends on mutual 
agreement. However, some of those States would block any path they can, that may result 
in them being put in the same position, through the reservations that they attach to their 
declarations, in which they exclude certain issues that they would hesitate to bring before 
the Court voluntarily, let alone under compulsory jurisdiction. An interesting example in 
this respect can be found in the Indian declaration of acceptance of the Courf s jurisdiction 
of September 18, 1974, in which it excluded in clauses 2, 4, 5 and 10 respectively the 
following: 
171 
2. disputes with the government of any State which is or has been 
a member of the Commonwealth of Nations' 
4. disputes relating to or connected with fa~ts or situations of 
hostilities, armed conflicts, individual or collective actions 
taken in self-defence, resistance to aggression, fulfilment of 
obligations imposed by international bodies, and other similar 
related acts, measures or situations in which India is, has been 
or may in future be involved; 
5. disputes with regard to which any other party to a dispute has 
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice exclusively for or in relation to the purpose of such 
dispute; or where the acceptance of the Court's compulsory 
jurisdiction on behalf of a party to the dispute was deposited or 
ratified less than 12 months prior to the filing of the application 
bringing the dispute before the Court; 
10. disputes with India concerning or relating to: 
a. the status of its territory or the modification or delimitation 
of its frontiers or any other matter concerning boundaries; 
b. the territorial sea, the continental shelf and the margins, the 
exclusive fishery zone, the exclusive economic zone, and 
the other zones of national maritime national jurisdiction 
including for the regulation and control of marine pollution 
and the conduct of scientific research by foreign vessels; 
c. the condition and status of its islands, bays and gulfs and 
that of the bays and gulfs that for historical reasons belong 
to it; 
d. the airspace superjacent to its land and maritime territory; 
and; 
e. the determination and delimitation of its maritime 
boundaries. 
The crippl ing effects of such reservations on the scope of the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
ICJ need no comment here. However, some of those reservations may appear necessary to 
the Indian Government in view of the traditional state of hostilities that exists between it 
and Pakistan, especially concerning the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir
l51
, which is 
under Indian control and which is the subject of electrified military tension and constant 
indirect clashes between the two States. Indeed, the first of those reservations above 
successfully blocked the Court's jurisdiction in the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 case 
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· h P k· 152 Th· . WIt a Istan . IS may seem to echo the earlIer statements indicated above made by 
Baron Beiberstein at the 1907 Hague Convention and the arguments advanced by the 
United Kingdom in its Memorandum submitted to the Committee of Arbitration and 
Security in 1928, which doubted the fruitfulness of any general international compulsory 
mechanism for the peaceful settlement of international disputes that would apply to the 
international community as a whole l53 , even if such a mechanism was restricted to a limited 
category of disputes, in view of the diversity of inter-State relations which in some 
situations would render even those limited categories of disputes unsuitable for legal 
determination when circumstances change or when the counter-disputant is a State with 
which it originally may not have enjoyed friendly relations. 
Although the limited scope of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction under the Optional 
Clause may not have satisfied the earlier advocates of a real compulsory jurisdiction during 
the framing of the Statute of the PCIJ, nevertheless, in current political reality, it appears 
more than enough to a great many sovereign States. A State's consent prior to the initiation 
of any legal proceedings in each individual case, as Professor Elihu Lauterpacht l54 pointed 
out, is " ... required because it always has been required and that. .. is the way States want 
it" . 
Conclusion: 
The general position of States towards the issues of compulsory arbitration and 
adjudication within a general multilateral mechanism covering all kinds of disputes what so 
ever are largely influenced by the question regarding the submission of important issues to 
such means of settlement. Indeed, many States apprehended that the obligatorium arising 
from such instruments might force them in the future to submit matters which those States 
may see as too vital to submit to legal determination, an action which they definitely would 
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not take voluntarily. Moreover, even a genume legal dispute may be considered non-
suitable for legal determination in certain circumstances. The major crack in the wall in this 
respect was the Optional Clause; however, the relative success of the Optional Clause may 
be considered as a result of the system by which it operates. Not only was each State 
individually given its say on the issues that are to be excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
IC] in accordance with its own respective personal calculations, but also it was given the 
freedom to specify the duration of its Declaration under the Optional Clause. The system in 
this regard appears to provide States with a certain degree of confidence that the things they 
view as their own business are not to be subject to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 
Moreover, it technically was able to embody the various proposals of States on issues that 
were to be excluded from the Court's jurisdiction, albeit at the expense of a real general 
compulsory jurisdiction. Nevertheless, once a State puts its foot in the circle by accepting 
the Optional Clause, it then loses any freedom it used to enjoy in subjectively determining 
the justiciability or otherwise of a dispute and, therefore, whether to resort or not to judicial 
settlement in view that the IC] is given the power under Art. 36(6) to determine whether a 
given dispute falls within the scope of its jurisdiction if that issue is disputed by one of the 
parties, taking into account any reservations attached to the parties Declaration. This indeed 
appears to be among the main issues that deter States from accepting the Optional Clause. 
The question regarding the determination of the justiciability or otherwise of 
international disputes within the domains of ad hoc arbitration is really a question of chance 
inasmuch as, unlike proceedings before the IC], the question is already determined by the 
parties before the initiation of the arbitral process. This raises a major source of concern 
since each State has its own conception of what forms an important or 'non-justiciable' 
issue, or in other words, the issue as a whole is subject to the subjective determination of 
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the State(s) concerned. In this regard certain categories of disputes, such as territorial 
sovereignty claims or boundary delimitation matters or even treaty interpretation matters. 
have been the subject matters of disputes submitted to legal determination by international 
tribunals, but even those categories of disputes may, from a State's political point of vie\\ 
when the dispute arises, become too important to submit to legal determination due to their 
political content and, therefore, be seen as non-justiciable. The difficulties arising from this 
subjective determination process also persist in the domains of practical State treaty 
formulation with regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes by, inter alia, arbitration. 
States, in order not to leave anything out and to avoid the confusion that may occur when a 
dispute arises as to the exact nature of that dispute and whether it is covered by the 
obligatorium, have resorted to the practice of inserting vague, general and far-reaching 
reservation clauses, regarding the matters that were to be excluded from the peaceful 
settlement machinery established by those treaties. They thereby block any possibility of a 
dispute which, at the time, may affect a State's vital interests from being the subject of legal 
determination by an international arbitral tribunal which, as things currently stand, is 
usually constituted by the disputants in each individual case, who also vest the tribunal with 
the necessary jurisdiction in order for it to carry out its functions. Although, as already 
indicated above, the problem appears to be less significant within the domains of standing 
international tribunals with compulsory jurisdiction such as the IC] which is empowered by 
Art. 36(6) of the Statute to determine its own jurisdiction, nevertheless, even the IC] may 
be denied jurisdiction if it is faced with a (carefully drafted) reservation inserted in a State' s 
declaration of acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction which excludes the matter from the 
Court's jurisdiction. The Court's practice in the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 case 
155 h" examined above supports t IS vIew. 
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Therefore, what can be said in conclusion is that since the determination of the 
justiciability or non-justiciability of a dispute is a decision which principally lies mainly 
within the scope of State dominance, it may easily be said that the adoption of an 
acceptable definition of what is 'political' as distinguished from' legal' is non-foreseeable, 
either now or in the near future, and any attempt to be made in that regard, as pointed out 
by the former Judge Herman Mosler, would itself " ... amount to a political choice"156. 
Therefore, in consequence, it may also equally be said that the establishment of an 
international tribunal with a real and general compulsory jurisdiction appears also 
unforeseeable in the near future. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
The Past General Inter-State Arbitral Mechanisms: 
A Critical Analysis 
Introduction: 
The purpose of this chapter is to shed some light on general inter-State arbitral 
mechanisms adopted during the past two centuries. The discussion will provide a general 
background of those instruments with regard to their establishment, current status whether 
in force or not, and how the issue regarding the justiciability of disputes was approached. 
1. The Hague Machinery of 1899 and 1907: 
1.1. The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes of 1899: 
The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 18991 
was one of the fruits of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, brought to light on the initiative 
of Czar Nicholas II of Russia with the aim of adopting effective measures for the reduction 
of military and naval armaments, and to devise means of averting armed conflict between 
states by the employment of peaceful methods of settlement. The initiative began with the 
Circular Note handed by Count Mouravieff, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs at that 
time, on August 12, 18982, to the diplomatic representatives of the States that \\cre invited 
to the conference. This was followed by another Circular Note handed bv the Mr 
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Mouravieff to the aforementioned representatives on December 30, 18983, which indicated 
the topics that were to be discussed at the proposed conference, namely: 
1. an understanding stipulating the non-augmentation, for a term to 
be agreed upon, of the present effective armed land and sea 
forces, as well as the war budgets pertaining to them; 
preliminary study of the ways in which even a reduction of the 
aforesaid effectives and budgets could be realised in the future; 
2. interdiction of the employment in armies and fleets of new 
firearms of every description and of new explosives, as well as 
powder more powerful than the kinds used at present, both for 
guns and cannons; 
3. limitation of the use in field fighting of explosives of a 
formidable power, such as are now in use, and prohibition of the 
discharge of any kind of projectile or explosive from balloons or 
by similar means; 
4. prohibition in naval battles of submarine or diving torpedo 
boats, or of other engines of destruction of the same nature; 
agreement not to construct in the future war-ships armed with 
bans; 
5. adaptation to naval war of the stipulations of the Geneva 
Convention of 1864, on the base of the additional articles of 
1868; 
6. neutralisation, for the same reason, of boats or launches 
employed in the rescue of the shipwrecked during or after naval 
battles; 
7. revision of the declaration concerning the laws and customs of 
war elaborated in 1874 by the Conference of Brussels, and not 
yet ratified; [and what concerns us most in this regard] 
8. acceptance, in principle, of the use of good offices, mediation 
and voluntary arbitration, in case where they are available, with 
the purpose of preventing armed conflicts between nations; 
understanding in relation to their mode of application and 
establishment of a uniform practice in employing them
4
. 
In that Note, it was stated that the Czar 
" ... considers it advisable that the conference should not sit in the 
capital of one of the Great Powers, wh~re are centred so many 
political interests, which might, perhaps Impede the ~rogress of a 
work in which all countries of the universe are equally mterested. 
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One month later, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands expressed her assent that 
the proposed conference be held at her city of residence, the Hague. Accordingly the 
Netherlands' Minister of Foreign Affairs, on April 7, 1899, extended a formal invitation to 
the governments invited, to send their delegates to meet at the Hague5. 
Although much is usually said on the meetings, deliberations and outcome of the 
1899 Peace Conference, nevertheless, mention in this respect should also be made of the 
circumstances which gave rise to the Russian proposal in the first place and how the 
invitation was perceived by those powers invited to attend. It is interesting to note that 
despite the pacifist tone of the Czarist scheme, the whole scheme in the beginning was 
designed as a means to achieve another end6. The real and original intention behind it had 
nothing to do with peace, but was rather to spare an already weak Russian economy from 
being further weakened by the rearming of its weak military with new and more advanced 
weaponry in order to bridge any gap between it and the Austrian military. However, in 
order not to leave any ground for misgivings and to avoid invidious distinction, the Russian 
proposal was not to be confined to Austria alone, but was to include all nations7• Some of 
Russia's chief politicians who had formulated the Czarist peace proposal admitted that the 
whole scheme was nothing than a piece of 'hypocrisy and guile' that was wrapped in 
humanitarian wrappings8, such as, Mr Witte9, the Russian Finance Minister at that time, 
who even considered it as one of the greatest mystifications known to historylO. 
The Czarist invitation was received with mixed reactions by many of the Great Po\vers \\ho 
were invited to the conference" and there was considerable speculation among the Pmvers 
on the reasons behind the reasons offered as to why the Russian Government proposeJ an 
international conference on peace and disarmament. The whole scheme from their point of 
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view was pointless, inasmuch as there had been no major war to be terminated by another 
peace conference of the likes of Westphalia or Vienna or Paris, and the issue regarding 
disarmament on land or sea was simply unacceptable to many of those Powers. However. 
despite all that, the Powers were trapped in a corner, in that international courtoisie at that 
time forbade them from rejecting the invitation. Therefore, those powers really needed a 
way out, but one by which the Czarist Government would not lose face. That way out was 
clause 8 of the Russian Circular Note regarding the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes12, in particular the aspect concerning international arbitration. As pointed out by 
Professor Georg Schwarzenbergerl3 : 
... the reformist movement had pressed the need for learning and 
implementing the lessons of the Alabama Claims Arbitration. Here 
was a generally agreeable subject if only for the purposes of 
discussion: progress in international adjudication. While the 
reformist movement would expect from it an, at least, partial 
realisation of its programme, the governments could keep any 
developments under their own tight control. They were confident 
that, on essentials, their freedom of action could be preserved. 
The Conference in general was attended by twenty-six States who were divided into 
three commissions; the first and second commission dealt with the military and naval 
proposals while the third commission was to deal with good offices and mediation, 
international commissions of inquiry and arbitration 14. The efforts of the three commissions 
resulted in the Final Act of the 1899 Peace Conference, which consisted of the conclusion 
of three conventions, three declarations and six wishes
l5
. 
As to the key feature of the Final Act of the 1899 Peace Conference in this respect. 
viz. the Convention for the Peaceful Adjustments of International Differences, which is 
generally recognised as the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
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Disputes, the main motive of the parties to the Convention behind its adoption \\"as to 
obviate " ... as far as possible, recourse to force in the relations between States ... ,,16. To this 
end, the Conference adopted a mechanism which comprised three various methods of 
dispute settlement, namely, good offices and mediation (Arts. 2-8), international 
commissions of inquiry (Arts. 9-14) and above all, arbitration (Arts. 15-57). The issue of 
arbitration was divided in the Convention into three main categories. The first was 
concerned with the system of international arbitration, which was defined in Art. 15 as: 
" ... the settlement of differences between States by judges of their own choice, and on the 
basis of respect for law". Arbitration was also recognised by the parties17 in questions of a 
legal nature and especially in the interpretation and application of international conventions 
as: " ... the most effective, and at the same time the most equitable, means of settling 
disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle,,18 The Convention also considered the 
questions to be considered by arbitration 19. The second issue was concerned with the 
functioning and the facilities of the Permanent Court of Arbitration which was established 
by the 1899 HCPSID and will be examined in infra 1.5 ahead, and the third issue embraced 
a set of optional rules and procedures that were to be applied by the parties when resorting 
to arbitration, unless they had agreed otherwise. The basis of the discussions of the parties 
regarding international arbitration was the Draft Regulations for International Arbitral 
20 . fl' I Procedure adopted by the Institut de Droit International (The InstItute 0 nternatJOna 
21 Law) on August 28, 1875 at the Hague . 
1.2. The 1907 Convention: 
Although the 1899 Peace Conference was devoutly hoped to be only the first of an 
endless series of conferences meeting at the Hague, the next to be held the year after the 
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1899 Conference, the years passed by and Russia, which had called for the first conference , 
found itself at war with Japan, a conflict which was later terminated owing to the good 
offices of President Roosevelt of the USA who, in view of the Russian - Japanese war at 
the time, proposed a second peace conference on the Czar's behalf. The initiative was 
resumed by the Czar, who himself proposed a second peace conference to be held at the 
Hague. This was accepted by everyone invited. The Netherlands Government invited the 
parties in order to meet at the Hague on June 15, 1907. The conference met as scheduled 
and adjourned on October 18, 190722 . 
The Conference of 1907 was attended by forty-four States, divided this time into 
four commissions, which considered various issues such as the pacific settlement of 
international disputes, naval war, land war and prize law. The Final Act of the 1907 Hague 
Peace Conference resulted in the adoption of thirteen Conventions, one Declaration, several 
recommendations and an Annex containing a Draft Convention Relative to the Creation of 
a Judicial Arbitration Court23 . The 1899 HCPSID, like all the other conventions adopted by 
the 1899 Peace Conference, was revised in the 1907 Conference. As to international 
arbitration, the provisions of the 1907 Convention were almost the same as those of the 
previous Convention except for a few slight modifications on a number of provisions such 
as the requirement for the tribunal to be composed of, along with the one national member 
appointed by each side, three neutral members (one to be appointed by each side and the 
third or the umpire to be chosen by the two appointed neutral members along with the other 
two national members together)24. Another distinctive feature of the 1907 HCPSID \\as 
Chapter IV of the Convention under the heading "Arbitration by Summary Procedure,,25 
which includes a set of summery rules of procedure that are to be followed by the parties 
" ... in the absence of other arrangements ... ,,26 when resorting to arbitration. This chapter 
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provided for a tribunal composed of three members, one national member appointed from 
each side and a third neutral member or umpire appointed by agreement between the 
national members, or in case of disagreement, by lot. Members were given powers to settle 
the time limits within which the parties were to submit their cases and it was also provided 
that the proceedings are conducted exclusively in writing, although, the tribunal was given 
the right to demand oral explanations from the agents of the two parties as well as from 
experts and witnesses, whenever necessary27. 
Despite the deceptive intentions of the founders of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace 
Conferences, both Conferences were attended by all the major powers at that time, this in 
itself being a point among several others in the favour of the Hague Conferences. 
Moreover, they were the first international instruments to consider the question of the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes as a whole28. This, in tum, resulted in the 
adoption of two of the most prominent landmarks of international dispute settlement viz. 
the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID. These both codified the laws of international arbitration29 and 
which provided a set of arbitral procedure rules which, although they appear rudimentary, 
influenced the formation of a number of international instruments following their 
adoption3o• The provisions of the 1899 HCPSID in particular on international arbitration 
were considered by some writers31 as customary international law, due to the wide 
recognition they received. The significance of the two Hague Conventions and the 
important role they have played in the field of dispute settlement since their adoption was 
acknowledged by the UN's General Assembly Resolution 44/23 of 17INov/1989, which 
proclaimed the period 1990-1999 the UN Decade of International Law and proposed the 
• 32 0 h . holding of a third international conference at the end of this century. t er promment 
features of the Hague Conventions include the establishment in 1899 of the PCA \\hich 
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was able to survive two World Wars and is considered as the first and oldest standina 
c 
international court till this day. However, the efforts made by the 1907 Convention for the 
establishment of an International Prize Court33 and a Court of Arbitral 1ustice34 did not 
share the same success. Nevertheless, the latter did pave the way for the establishment of 
the PCIJ35 , which was later on succeeded by the current IC136. 
1.3. Justiciability and Compulsory Arbitration at Both Conferences: 
Regarding the issues of compulsory arbitration and non-legal (political) disputes at 
the 1899 Conference, it appears from clause 8 of the Russian circular note above that the 
third commission, which was in charge of the pacific settlement of international disputes, 
was intended only to deal with voluntary arbitration. However, as already pointed out 
elsewhere, Art. 10 of the Russian draft37 submitted to that commission contained an 
enumeration of a number of legal or justiciable issues that were intended to be subject to 
compulsory arbitration, with the proviso stated in Art. 8 of the same draft that the vital 
interests and national honour of the contracting States were to remain intact38. However, 
after a number of suggestions made by the members and modifications to Art. 10 of the 
Russian draft in the fourth, fifth and fourteenth meetings of the Third Commission's 
Committee of Examination, the aforementioned article was finally omitted, thanks to the 
requirement of unanimity for any decision to be made by the commission, as well as a 
strong and vigorous resistance led by Dr Zorn, the German delegate, who totally rejected 
the idea of including compulsory arbitration in an international instrument of which 
Germany was to be a member39. In his statement to the Committee of Examination at its 
fourteenth meeting, he indicated that: 
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· .. [t ]he Germa~ ~overnment is not in a position to accept 
compulsory arbItratIOn .... The principle of compulsory arbitration 
shall be. maintained in all cases when already adopted by special 
conventIOns. But Germany can go no further and believes she has 
already done much by accepting the list of arbitrators and the 
Permanent Court. 
Dr Zorn attempted to justify the position of his government towards the issue by indicating 
that: 
When a permanent court shall be established and in operation, the 
opportune time for enumerating cases of arbitration which will be 
obligatory for all will come after individual experience. But to 
hasten this evolution too greatly would be to compromise the very 
principle of arbitration, towards which we are all sympathetic. 
Therefore, the best the parties could achieve in this respect was Art. 1640 which stated that: 
In questions of a legal nature, and especially in the interpretation 
and application of international conventions, arbitration is 
recognised by the signatory Powers as the most effective, and the 
same time the most equitable means of settling disputes which 
diplomacy has failed to settle. 
The same difficulties were repeated in the proceedings of the 1907 Peace Conference. 
where a number of propositions were presented, each embodying an enumeration of a 
number of legal matters that were to be considered subject to compulsory arbitration, again 
subject to reservation of questions of vital interests and national honour; however. again, 
none of these propositions were adopted due to the strong opposition made by a number of 
States led by the German delegate, Baron Marschall von Beiberstein, whose vie\\s on the 
issue of enumeration have already been cited elsewhere41 • All the parties were able to 
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achieve under these circumstances was Art. 38 of the 1907 HCPSID which was almost an 
exact duplicate of Art. 16 of the 1899 Convention above, with the addition that 
"[c]onsequently, it would be desirable that, in disputes about the above - mentioned 
questions, the contracting Powers should, if the case arose, have recourse to arbitration. in 
so far as circumstances permit". This provision may indicate the failure of both conventions 
to impose any real direct obligation on the parties to submit their disputes, either legal or 
non-legal, to any form of arbitration, whether voluntary or compulsory. The impact that 
Arts. 16 and 38 of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions receptively had on the non-
justiciability question has already been discussed elsewhere42 . However, what really draws 
attention in this regard was that, although no compulsory mechanism was established by 
either convention 43, Art. 40 of the 1907 HCPSID went on to state the rather strange and 
contradictory provision that the contracting Powers: 
... reserve to themselves the right of concluding new agreements, 
general or particular, with a view to extending compulsory 
arbitration to all cases which they may consider it possible to 
submit to it [emphasis added]. 
Such wording was also repeated in the Final Act of the 1907 Peace Conference
44
, which 
indicated the Powers' unanimity: 
1. In admitting the principle of compulsory arbitration; 
2. In declaring that certain disputes, in particular those ~e~ating to 
the interpretation and application of the provIsiOns of 
international agreements may be submitted to compulsory 
arbitration without any restriction. 
. . b t45 Therefore, recourse to arbitration under both Hague ConventiOns IS Y agreemen 
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The 1899' s Convention's approach to the issue justiciability according to Lauterpacht-+6 
" ... marked the first recognition in conventional international law of the doctrine of 
'inherent limitations"'. Despite the inadequacy of the provisions of both conventions on 
that issue, the period between the 1899 HCPSID and WWl witnessed the conclusion of 
over a hundred treaties that were influenced by the distinction adopted by both Hague 
Conventions 47. 
1.4. The 1899 & 1907 Conventions Today: 
The number of States parties to the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID has multiplied 
significantly ever since the adoption of both conventions and currently stands at 95 States48 
the most recent of them to adhere to the 1907 Convention being Chile (1998); Guyana 
(1998); South Africa (1998); Costa Rica (1999); Republic of Korea (2000); Zambia (2000); 
Latvia (2001); Macedonia (2001); and Morocco (2001). This multiplication of parties to the 
Hague Conventions seems to distinguish them from the other mechanisms adopted during 
the 20th century which, in contrast, were renounced by a number of State-Parties to them. 
However, as already pointed out elsewhere49, despite this relatively high number of States 
Parties to the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID, the current level of utilisation (if it was ever 
utilised) of the arbitral machinery of both Hague Conventions by those States is in general 
still far from giving a positive impression. 
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1.5. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA): 
1.5.1. The peA in a Glance: 
The PCA is an independent legal institution and one of the fruits of the Hague 
Conferences established in the beginning by the Convention of 1899 for the purpose of 
" ... facilitating an immediate recourse to arbitration for international differences, which it 
has not been possible to settle by diplomacy."so The PCA enjoys the competence to 
arbitrate all classes of inter-State disputes submitted to it by mutual agreement between the 
parties, unless they have agreed to constitute another tribunal of their choices1 . Unless the 
disputants have agreed on the application of other rules ofprocedures2, the PCA is to apply 
the rules provided in Chapter III of both Hague Conventions regarding arbitrations3 • The 
structure of the PCA consists of an International Bureau, which serves as a registry of the 
court and has charge of the archives and conducts all the administrative businesss4 ; a 
Permanent Administrative Council, which is charged with the direction and control of the 
International Bureau, composed of the diplomatic representatives of the States that had 
participated in the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID and the Minster of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands as PresidentSS ; and a court of arbitration. Along with arbitration, the PCA 
provides other services for the settlement of disputes between States, such as good offices 
and mediation, commissions of inquiry (fact-finding) and conciliation. 
The PCA is considered by some writerss6 as " ... the first global mechanism for the 
settlement of inter-state disputes". In the words of Mr James Scott
S7
: 
... it is only fair to say that the machinery, however imperfect. 
devised by the First Hague Peace Conference has nevertheless 
rendered inestimable services to the cause of arbitration by putting 
the stamp of approval of an international conference. upon 
arbitration as a means of settling difficulties, and by turnmg the 
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m~nds and thoug~ts of nations in controversy to the Hague, where 
thIS temporary tnbunal of a very special kind can be called into 
being for the settlement of their disputes which diplomacy has 
failed to settle. 
1.5.2. A Real Permanent Court?: 
A controversial aspect of the PCA was its composition. In this respect, the parties to 
both Hague Conventions were to select four persons who, according to Arts. 23 and 44 of 
the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID respectively, were to be " ... at the most, of known 
competency in questions of international law, of the highest moral reputation, and disposed 
to accept the duties of arbitrator". The names of those four persons were to be inscribed in a 
list notified to all Contracting Powers, and they were to be appointed for a six-year 
renewable term. Disputing parties wishing to have recourse to the PCA were to select the 
tribunal from the names inscribed in the list58 . Therefore, it appears that the question of an 
automatic compulsory jurisdiction does not at all exist in the case of the PCA, and the only 
form of jurisdiction it enjoys is that conferred upon it by the parties resorting to it. 
The 'list of arbitrators' formula constituted a major ground of challenge regarding 
the real nature of the PCA which, according to the above provisions, was deprived of the 
status of a real permanent court inasmuch it was not composed of a panel of permanent 
judges like the PCIJ or its successor the ICl, moreover, each tribunal is established for the 
purpose of arbitrating a certain case and ceases its duties once an award is rendered. 
Therefore the name 'Permanent Court of Arbitration' according to some of its critics is , 
misleading. Such doubts as to the true nature of the so-called 'permanent court' is clear in 
the comments of even some of the delegates of the 1899 who had played an active role in 
its creation, such as the Dutch delegate, Mr Tobias Asser59, who stated that "[i]nstead of a 
Permanent Court, the Convention of 1899 only created the phantom of a court, an 
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impalpable ghost, or, to speak more plainly, it created a clerk's office with a list". 
Similarly, Mr de Martens60 who asked "[w]hat, then is this court whose judges do not even 
know each other? The Court of 1899 is only an idea which takes the form of body and soul 
and then disappears again". The attack on the true nature of the PCA was repeated again at 
the 1907 Peace Conference by a member of the delegation of the United States of America 
who argued "In a word, the Permanent Court is not permanent, because it is not composed 
of permanent judges; it is not accessible because it has to be formed for each individual 
case; finally, it is not a court, because it is not composed of judges,,61. Professor Hazel 
FOX
62
, a prominent scholar in the area of arbitration, considered the word 'Court' as a 
'complete misnomer' and even recommended that the title 'Permanent Court of 
Arbitration' should cease to be used and that anything done by the so-called Permanent 
Court in the future should be done in the name of and under the auspices of the 
International Bureau. 
1.5.3. The peA Today: 
In the first years following its establishment, the PCA lived its golden years of glory 
and was responsible for most of the inter-state arbitrations and some important fact-finding 
commissions that took place during the first fifteen years of its existence63 . The case-law of 
the PCA covering the period between 1902 and 1922 is compiled and edited in the two 
series of J .B. Scott's, Hague Court Reports, 191664 and 193265. Such success of the PCA in 
the beginning of its existence may be expected in view that it was the first of its kind, 
however, the high noon of PCA utilisation was to come to an end following the 
establishment of the PCIJ, the creation of which calls for some examination here. 
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The change in loyalty from the ideal of international arbitration to judicial settlement, is 
best illustrated in the observation of Muller and Mij s66 on the issue. According to them: 
With the outbreak of the First World War much of the international 
political system collapsed and this cast a shadow over the Court [the 
PCA] as well; no cases were referred to it. In the interbellum new 
optimism led to the foundation of the League of Nations and to a 
new lettee in the Peace Palace: the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCB). The international community now had recourse to 
two mechanisms to settle their differences. Nevertheless, the 
installation of the famous roommate did not help the PCA, and little 
or no use was made of its facilities. The number of cases which 
were referred to it went down to almost zero. Perhaps part of this 
can be explained by the fact that, with the creation of the PCB, the 
world finally had what idealistic minds had always craved for: a 
real world court. At that time, the more flexible and ad hoc mode of 
dispute settlement 'arbitration' was generally seen as the best viable 
way to settle dispute states could agree upon; judicial settlement of 
disputes, however, was the dream67• 
Indeed, the endeavours for the establishment of an international court which, unlike the 
PCA, possesses a permanent character can be traced back to the Draft Convention Relative 
to the Creation of a Judicial Arbitration Court annexed to the Final Act of the 1907 Hague 
Peace Conference68 . However, in spite of the use of the term "arbitration" which was 
chosen according to the wishes of certain members to the 1907 Conference, the functions 
and organisation of the proposed court would not have been that of a court of arbitration, 
but of an international court of justice stricto senso69 . The tragedy that the international 
community witnessed during WWl and which left its mournful imprint on the minds of a 
large majority of the world population was the compelling force which impelled so many 
States to abandon the hesitations and doubts of 1907, which had blocked the way to the 
70 . f h . d 
establishment of the proposed court . Calls for the establIshment 0 suc a court game 
significant momentum during WW 1 when various proposals that embodied certain schemes 
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d 71 b . d d d' b . 72 were rna e y In epen ent aca emiC odies and also a number of draft conventions 
were presented by neutral States 73. The efforts which led to the establishment of the court 
which was named the Permanent Court of International Justice were initiated in accordance 
with Art. 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which indicated that: 
The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the 
League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent 
Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear 
and determine any dispute of an international character which the 
parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory 
opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Councilor 
by the Assembly. 
The Council, acting in accordance with Art. 14 of the Covenant, formed a Committee of 
Jurists which was entrusted with the duty of drafting the Statute of the new court and which 
began its work on June 16, 1920. The Committee was able on July 20, 1920 to adopt a draft 
scheme of the Courts Statute which, after extensive discussions in the League's Council 
and Assembly and also after a number of amendments and additions were made to its text74, 
was unanimously adopted by the Resolution passed by the League's Assembly on 
December 13, 192075 and came into force on September 2, 1921. The Statute was later 
amended again by the Protocol of September 14, 192976 and the revised Statute came into 
force on February 1, 193677. 
Not only was the workload of the PCA almost totally wiped out following the 
establishment of the PCIJ, but the PCA was even faced with a proposal calling for its 
abolition, namely, that submitted by the Argentinean delegation to the First Assembly of 
the League of Nations in 1920, which was unanimously rejected by the committee to which 
it was referred78 . Therefore, under the new circumstances, the PCA had to fight for its share 
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of the market. As early as the 1930s, the PCA started to realise that new fields had to be 
found in which the court could extend its area of operations79 • The first of those fields to be 
discussed by the Administrative Council of the PCA was arbitration between States and 
non-State entities, however, as soon as work started out in that direction, WW2 broke out 
and it was not until 1962 that any rules of this kind were adopted80. Moreover, the success 
of those rules did not live up to the expectations of their framers inasmuch as, inter alia, by 
then there were already a number of other successful and more specialised institutions 
operating in that field. The significantly low number of disputes submitted to the PCA has 
even induced the Court's Secretary General in 1960 to hand over to the Parties to the 1899 
& 1907 HCsPSID a Circular Note81 which encouraged those States to make full use of the 
Court's facilities and attempted to water - down any differences between the recourse to 
the PCA and to the ICl. However, it was not until 1981 that the PCA witnessed a major 
boost through the famous Iran / USA Claims Tribunal established in co-operation with the 
International Bureau of the PCA. Further impetus was given to the PCA through the US / 
UK arbitration Concerning Heathrow Airport user Charges (1989-1993)82 and also its 
assistance in the high profile Hanish Island case between Yemen and Eritrea [two 
phases]83. The current case-load of the PCA consists of five cases84, namely, Saluka 
Investments B. V. v. Czech Republic arbitration; the 'OSP AR' arbitration between Ireland 
and the United Kingdom; Eritrea - Ethiopia 'Boundary Commission', and also 'Claims 
Commission'; and the arbitration between The Netherlands and France regarding the 
application of the Convention of December 3, 1976, on the Protection of the Rhine against 
Pollution by Chlorides and the Additional Protocol of September 25, 1991. However, in all 
of the past and current cases mentioned above, the involvement of the PCA was limited to 
providing registry service only. 
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Even some of the States parties to the PCA did not take matters very seriously with regard 
to the qualifications of the persons nominated by them as national arbitrators under Arts. 23 
and 44 of the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID respectively, inasmuch as there have been some 
instances where the national members nominated were judges who were eminent in 
municipal law but had little knowledge of international law. In other cases, the names of 
nominees have appeared on the list long after their owners' retirement or even after their 
death85 ! For example during the 1980s the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay and 
Switzerland named members who were first appointed in the 1940s and still appeared on 
their lists of nominees four decades later86. 
The current number of States Parties to the 1899 & 1907 HCsPSID is 95 States87. However, 
in the domains of inter-State disputes, the vast majority of those States have never stood as 
disputants before the PCA. The International Bureau of the PCA in 1991 assigned a work 
group of experts consisting of 22 international lawyers for the purpose of advising the 
Administrative Council and the International Bureau on the measures to be taken in order to 
improve the functioning of the PCA, and which resulted in a number of proposals and 
recommendations88. These included: increasing awareness of the Court and of the facilities 
and services available through the International Bureau of the Court89; the development of 
the constitutional9o, procedural91 and organisational92 measures of the Court; the adoption 
of a set of optional rules based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States)93, which \vere 
considered by the group as the most recent, most comprehensive and most tested in 
practice, and later paved the way for the adoption of other optional rules based on the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, such as, the 'Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional 
Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of which Only One is a State in 
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1993,94; the 'Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitration involving 
International Organisations and States in 1996,95; and the 'Permanent Court of Arbitration 
Optional Rules for Arbitration between International Organisations and Private Parties', 
also in 199696. 
Although it has now been more than a decade since the findings of the work group, 
speaking on the inter-State dispute settlement level, no significant advance appears to have 
occurred with regard to the level of State-members' recourse to the PCA. Even in the recent 
cases cited above, namely, the Iran / USA Claims Tribunal; the US / UK arbitration 
Concerning Heathrow Airport user Charges; and both phases of the Hanish Island case, 
the level of involvement of the PCA in those cases was limited mainly to providing 
premises and registry services to the parties. With this in mind, one may ask the logical 
question, since the vast majority of those States have seldom (if ever) utilised the PCA for 
the settlement of their inter-State disputes, and in many other instances had preferred to 
resort to the ICJ for their inter-State disputes or other specialised institutions in non-inter-
State disputes, what is the point in their keeping on with the PCA? A possible answer to 
that question can be deduced from an observation made once by the former President of the 
PCA and now Judge of the ICJ, Professor Pieter Kooijmans97, who stated that: 
[a]lthough a not inconsiderable number .... of states is party to the 
1899 and / or 1907 Conventions and thereby a Member of the 
Administrative Council of the Court [the PCA], the Court's 
significance seems to lie more in the .fact that it nation~l ~foups 
nominate the candidates for the InternatIOnal Court of JustIce than 
in its role as an institution for dispute settlement. It might be 
interesting to ask the governments concerned why th~y k~ep i.n 
existence (keep alive would be a rather weird expressIOn In thIS 
respect) an institution which they steadfastly refuse to use. Frankly 
spoken, I do not expect too many honest replies. 
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This issue has also been pointed out to by the work group above assigned by the PCA99 
which found that: 
[n Jon-recourse to the PCA may also be attributed to certain 
constitutional, procedural and organisational deficiencies of the 
Court. While many States Parties to the Conventions [1899 & 1907 
HCsPSID] do select as members of the PCA 'persons .... of known 
competence in questions of international law .... and disposed to 
accept the duties of arbitrator .... ' it often appears that persons are 
selected more with a view to their function in a 'national group' for 
nominating candidates to the International Court of Justice, than to 
their serving as arbitrators, since they hold public offices of a 
quality likely, in practice, to preclude their appointment to tribunals 
which the parties to a dispute would want to convene and function 
expeditiously, and for which independence and the appearance 
thereof, are of critical importance. 
Indeed, the nomination of the candidates or judges to be of the ICJ by the national members 
of the PCA 100 is considered as an important function of those groups in the eyes of their 
respective governments. However, questions have arisen as to the significance of this 
function since the decision in the end according to Art. 8 of the ICJ's Statute lies between 
the General Assembly and the Security Council, and governments in that respect are under 
no obligation to vote for the candidates originally chosen by their national groupslOI. 
A view critical of the PCA is that of Professor Hazel FOX I02. In her words: 
... it seems certain today that the original intention of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration should act as a court of international law is 
obsolete. In so far as States are prepared to submit legal to an 
international tribunal, the appropriate and more efficient machinery 
exists in the International Court of Justice. The International Court 
is more efficient because it has a permanent body of salaried judges 
ready to try disputes; the Permanent Court of Arbitration ~ffers 
Parties a I ist composed of the national groups of the States partIes to 
the Hague Conventions .... [However] a State which is considering 
resort to the Permanent Court of Arbitration is uncertain as to the 
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identity of the persons who may determine the dispute and, more 
important, uncertain whether the tribunal will be constituted at all. 
When this uncertainty concerning the constitution of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration is weighed against the prestige, permanence 
and development of a uniform jurisprudence which the International 
Court offers, it is evident that the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
cannot compete in the international field as an established tribunal 
for the determination of legal disputes. 
Although it is noted that this view dates back to 1972 during the climax of the PCA's 
recession, nevertheless, things nowadays appear almost not that far from what they used to 
be then when it comes to the PCA's work load in the field of inter-State disputes. However, 
to suggest that the PCA is not useful at all would be an exaggeration. In the non-inter-State 
dispute settlement field, the PCA currently holds a noticeably better record and the 
Secretary-General of the PCA has been requested on a number of occasions recently to 
designate an appointing authority under Art. 7(2) of the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules 103. However, when it comes to inter-State dispute settlement, it appears that the PCA 
is, in addition to the factors indicated in this part of the chapter, a victim of the general 
change in the international attitude towards general inter-State arbitration in general. 
2. The League of Nations Era: 
The end, in 1918, of the First World War which resulted in an estimated number of 
50,000,000 killed and wounded, induced the international community to pursue the 
translation into reality of past dreams regarding the adoption of a kind of international 
framework which would undertake the duty of preserving peace between potentially 
antagonistic nations 104 • The answer to those hopes was crystallised in the establishment of 
the League of Nations in 1919 with the aim of averting, as far as possible, the possibility of 
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war in international relations and devising means for peaceful settlement of international 
disputes between States based on a triple formula of security, disarmament and arbitration. 
Although this era witnessed the conclusion of a large number of bilateral treaties that 
provided for arbitration105 as well as the famous 1925 Pact of Locarno106 and the General 
Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration and Protocol of Progressive Arbitration signed at 
Washington in 1929107, nevertheless the discussion in this regard will focus solely on those 
instruments devised under the direct auspices of the League of Nations, namely, the 
League's Covenant; the 1924 Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes; and the 1928 General Act. 
2.1. The League's Covenant: 
The main articles in the League's Covenant concerned with the maintenance of 
peace and peaceful settlement were Art. 11-13 and 15 108. However, by a closer examination 
of those articles, it appears that their functions may be divided into two main categories, 
viz., the prevention of war (Art. 11) and the duty to settle any dispute likely 'to lead to a 
rupture' between any of the members by peaceful means, namely, arbitration, judicial 
settlement (the PCU) or inquiry by the Council of the LeaguelO9. 
Regarding its mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the Covenant in its 
Art. 12(1) imposed a general obligation on all the members to settle any dispute ..... likely 
to lead to a rupture ... " by either arbitration, judicial settlement (the PCU) or to inquiry by 
the Council of the League. However, Art. 13 provided a more elaborate description of the 
Covenant's peaceful settlement mechanism by indicating in paragraph 1 that: 
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[t]he Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall 
arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for 
submission to arbitration or judicial settlement, and which cannot 
be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole 
subject-matter to arbitration or judicial settlement. 
The aforesaid paragraph first of all clearly indicated the members' acceptance of the 
principle of arbitration and judicial settlement as means for settlement of their disputes. 
However, it appears from the wording that paragraph 1 did not impose any mandatory duty 
to submit disputes to arbitration. This further on is supported by the rather general phrasing 
that recourse to arbitration or the PCIJ was to be sought once that the dispute was 
recognised by the parties as suitable for submission to arbitration or the PCIJ, and after it 
appeared that a diplomatic settlement of the dispute had proved to be unattainable. 
However, paragraph 2 of the same article provided an enumeration containing a number of 
disputes that were considered as suitable for submission to arbitration or the PCIJ: 
Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of 
international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if 
established, would constitute a breach of any international 
obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be 
made for any such breach, are declared to be among those which are 
generally suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial 
settlement. 
The above formula came later on under Art. 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ to be categorised 
as 'legal disputes'. However, the express incorporation of the justiciable and non-justiciable 
dispute distinction in the text of the Covenant was deliberately avoided during its framing 
according to Lauterpacht11O, who on the British Official Commentary on the Covenant 
which indicated the relative recognition by the Covenant of the distinction, indicated that: 
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[t]his view [that expressed in the British Official Commentary]~ 
however, although not wholly incorrect, cannot be accepted without 
serious qualification. In the first instance, as the main purpose of the 
doctrine of non-justiciable disputes is to limit the general obligation 
undertaken in a treaty of compulsory arbitration; and as Article 13 
contains no such obligation, it is difficult to accept the view that the 
doctrine of necessary limitations of the international judicial 
function is impliedly contained in the Covenant. Not only does no 
express reference to the doctrine appear in the Covenant, but a 
study of the origin of Article 13 shows that such reference was 
deliberately excluded. 
Paragraph 3 of Art. 13 indicated that for the consideration of any of the 'legal disputes' 
enumerated in paragraph 2 above, the court to which the case should be referred to was the 
PCIJ, unless the parties referred the dispute to any other tribunal agreed upon by them or 
stipulated in any convention existing between them. However, disputes that were 
considered not suitable for arbitration or judicial settlement, in other words political or non-
justiciable disputes, were to be submitted to the Council under Art. 15. Nevertheless, given 
that the intention of the Covenant was that the Council was to deal only with 'non-
justiciable' disputes, the functions of the Council were framed accordingly. No judicial or 
arbitral powers were vested in it and its primary function was to secure by any means 
possible to it the settlement of disputes by the common consent of the parties lll . 
Paragraph 4 of Art. 13 provided the guidelines that were to be observed by the 
members regarding compliance with any arbitral award or decision of the Court. It 
indicated that such judgements were to be carried out by the members ..... in full good 
faith ... " and also proscri bed the resort to war against any member of the League that had 
complied with such judgements, giving the League's Council the power to determine \\hat 
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steps should be taken against any member who failed to comply with such international 
judgements in order to give effect thereto. 
When evaluating the provisions of the Covenant in this respect it appears that 
contrary to the provisions of the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID, no procedural rules for 
arbitration were provided by the Covenant and, most of all, no compulsory obligation to 
resort to arbitration was devised. Regarding the distinction between justiciable and non-
justiciable disputes, although from the discussion above it appears that any express mention 
of the distinction in the Covenant was avoided, the categories of disputes enumerated in 
Art. 13(2) came to be recognised later on under Art. 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ as legal 
disputes. However, when looking at Art. 15 of the Covenant I 12 and in particular paragraph 
8, one may clearly notice that certain disputes were exempted from the Council's powers. 
Nevertheless, the most serious blow to the virtue of the whole League system was Art. 
12( 1) of the Covenant which indicated that the parties to any dispute were to agree not to 
resort to war until the three-month cooling off period after the rendering of any arbitral 
award, or judicial decision, or report by the Council has elapsed 113. In the light of this 
provision, it appears that the League failed to fulfil one of the main objectives behind its 
creation, namely, the prevention and outlawry ofwarl14 • 
2.2. Plugging the Holes in the League's Covenant: The 1924 Geneva Protocol 
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes: 
The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
l15 
adopted 
by the League in 1924 by its Fifth Assembly, commonly known as the "Geneva Protocol', 
was another effort made by the League of Nations in order to fulfil its aims for the 
maintenance of international peace and security based on its triple formula of security. 
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disarmament and arbitration. It was adopted following the failure of the Draft Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance submitted to the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations and was 
influenced by some of the comments made by the members on the Draft Treatyl16. The 
1924 Protocol, in view of the Covenant's failure to outlaw war in general, was intended to 
be a supplement to the Covenant. Therefore, the central ideas of the Protocol were, first, the 
absolute proscription of all forms of aggressive warfare; second, the adoption of a 
mechanism of collective security with the obligation to jointly take measures of collective 
defence or the imposition of collective sanctions against an aggressor; third, the devising of 
a mandatory procedure for the pacific settlement of international disputes, and fourth, the 
reduction of armaments 117. 
Regarding its mandatory procedure for the pacific settlement of international 
disputes, the Protocol made arbitration the foundation of its system 118. Its provisions in this 
respect attempted to plug the gaps in Art. 15 of the Covenant, by indicating that if a dispute 
submitted to the Council was not settled by it as provided in para. 3 of Art. 15 of the 
Covenant, then the Council was to persuade the parties to submit the dispute to either 
arbitration or judicial settlement I 19. In case of their failure to agree to do so, a Committee of 
Arbitrators was to be constituted at the request of at least one of the parties to the dispute 
who were both to agree on the particulars 120 of the constitution of the aforesaid 
Committee l21 . If they failed, in whole or in part, to agree on the particulars of the 
constitution of the Committee, within the time limit fixed by the Council, then the Council 
. 122 . d I h . 
according to Art. 4(2,B) was granted the power to mtervene m or er to sett e t e pomts 
remaining in suspense. However, in the case where none of the parties asked for arbitration, 
then the dispute was again to be considered by the Council, and the members to the 
Protocol were to comply with any recommendations unanimously agreed upon by the 
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Council based on its report, other than the representatives of any of the parties to the 
dispute123 . If unanimity was not reached, then the dispute was to be submitted to 
compulsory arbitration in which the Council was itself to constitute the Committee of 
arbitrators 124. All signatory States were to undertake to comply in full good faith with any 
judicial sentence or arbitral award or solutions recommended by the Council, and in the 
case where a State disregarded any such undertakings and resorted to war, then " ... the 
sanctions provided for by Art. 16 of the Covenant, interpreted in the manner indicted in the 
present Protocol, shall immediately become applicable to it.,,125 
It appears that the Protocol attempted to establish a framework of mandatory 
procedures which, in order to block any attempt made by any of the parties to frustrate or 
avoid the arbitral or judicial settlement process, was backed up by the Council's 
intervention and also supported by the imposition of sanctions on any party which 
disregarded or refused to comply with an arbitral award or judicial sentence126. However, 
there were some loopholes in the Protocol's compulsory system for the settlement of 
disputes, such as that contained in Art. 3 which stated: 
The signatory States undertake to recognise as compulsory, ipso 
facto and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice in the cases covered by 
paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, but without 
prejudice to the right of any State, when acceding to the special 
protocol provided for in the said Article and opened for signature 
on December 16th, 1920, to make reservations compatible with the 
said clause [emphasis added]. 
Therefore, the jurisdiction of the PCIJ under the so-called 'Optional Clause' could have 
been barred even from the categories of 'legal' disputes enumerated in Art. 36(2) of the 
Statute, an issue already examined in our discussion on the ICJ 127. Another loophole this 
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time concerning arbitration was that in Art. 5 in which the Protocol attempted to overcome 
the insufficiency of Art. 15(8) of the Covenant in dealing with a dispute which a party 
claimed arose out of 'a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic 
jurisdiction' of that party, by granting the arbitrators the power to take the advice of the 
PCIJ on the issue, through the medium of the Council. The advisory opinion of the PClJ 
was to be binding on the arbitrators, who, if the opinion of the Court was in the affirmative, 
were to confine themselves to so declaring in their award and the party claiming that the 
dispute was solely within its domestic jurisdiction was no longer under the obligation to 
submit the dispute to arbitration. Although Art. 5 went on to state that if such claim made 
by a party was sustained by the PCIJ that decision was not to prevent the consideration of 
the situation by the League's Councilor Assembly under Art. 11 of the Covenant, 
nevertheless, the powers of those two organs in this respect were limited to encouraging the 
parties to reach an agreement through mediatory or conciliatory measures. Neither had the 
power to render a decision or make a recommendation, even if it were by a unanimous vote, 
which was to be binding on any of the parties to the dispute128 . 
The provisions of the Protocol regarding the determination of the aggressor; the 
129 . I b" 130 I d t application of sanctions and also regardmg compu sory ar ItratlOn e 0 a 
considerable degree of controversy between a number of members of the Council, and, 
hence, it never entered into force 131 , However, ultimately, Great Britain's refusal to accept 
the scheme was the decisive factor behind its failure l32 • Nevertheless, the Protocol's aims 
were further pursued in the Briand-Kellogg Pact of August 27, 1928
133 
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2.3 The 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes: 
In 1928 the League of Nations attempted to assemble and complement the 
numerous existing bilateral treaties for arbitration and conciliation by means of one 
extensive consolidating treatyl34. This was achieved through the adoption on September 26, 
1928, of the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 135 by the 
League's Assembly during its Ninth Session at Geneva l36. The main idea of the General 
Act was the compulsory settlement of all disputes, either legal or non-legal, by conciliation 
or judicial settlement or arbitration. Therefore, the Act consisted of four chapters, viz. 
chapter one, Conciliation (Art. 1-16); chapter two, Judicial Settlement (Art. 17-20); chapter 
three, Arbitration (Art. 21-28); and chapter four, General Provisions (Art. 29-47). 
The General Act was intended "to take into consideration the special situation of the 
different States with regard to the various methods for the pacific settlement of disputes" 
and to make the whole system "as elastic as possible,,137. This elasticity can be deduced 
from a number of the General Act's provisions. For example, States according to Art. 38 
had a choice either to accede to the General Act as a whole or to certain portions of the Act 
indicated as follows: 
A. either to all the provisions of the Act (Chapters I, II, III and IV); 
B. or to those provisions only which relate to conciliation and 
judicial settlement (Chapters I and II), together with the general 
provisions dealing with these procedures (Chapter IV); 
C. or to those provisions only which relate to conciliation (Chapter 
I), together with the general provisions concerning that 
procedure (Chapter IV). 
States were also able to make their accession to the Act conditional subject to 
certain reservations enumerated in Art. 39(2)138 by which the parties were able to exempt 
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certain categories of disputes from its compulsory dispute settlement mechanism. However, 
other forms of reservations such as those excluding issues that might affect the vital 
interests, national honour, independence or constitution of any of the States concerned were 
not permitted l39• 
Regarding its mechanism for arbitral procedure, the General Act adopted two 
different approaches, whose application, depended on the form of dispute in question 140• 
The first approach was regarding legal disputes or "disputes with regard to which the 
parties are in contlict as to their respective rights" which, according to Art. 17 included 
" ... in particular those mentioned in Art. 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice." The submission of such disputes to arbitration was made optional. 
On the other hand, their submission to judicial settlement was made compulsory for all 
parties who had accepted Chapter II of the Act regarding the settlement of such disputes 141 . 
The second approach was regarding non-legal (non-justiciable) disputes which were first of 
all to be submitted to conciliation 142. However, if after one month 143 from the termination 
of the work of the Conciliation Commission no agreement had been reached between the 
parties, then the dispute, subject to any reservations made by the parties under Art. 39(2), 
was to be brought before an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, which unless the parties had agreed 
otherwise l44, was to be composed of five members, one to be appointed from each side and 
the other two including the Chairman (umpire) to be chosen from the nationals of a third 
party 145 . Special backup provisions were introduced to ensure the establishment of the 
arbitral tribunal, first of all, by a third party agreed between the disputants in the case where 
one of them, within the period of three months after the constitution of the tribunal had 
been requested by one of the parties, had failed to participate in the appointment of the 
members of the tribunal 146. if they failed to reach agreement on the third party, then each 
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party was to designate a different party for the constitution of the tribunal 147. If the two 
parties thus chosen failed to agree on this issue, then the task was to be entrusted to the 
President or Vice President or oldest member of the PCIJ successively and in a descending 
scale, in the case that either of them was prevented from so acting l48 . The General Act also 
embodied certain provisions regarding vacancies that may occur in the tribunal 149. The 
parties, according to Art. 25, were to draw up a special agreement, called a 'compromis' 
determining the subject of the dispute and the procedures to be followed, and if the parties 
had failed after three months from the constitution of the tribunal to conclude such 
agreement, then the dispute was to be brought before the tribunal by the unilateral 
application of either of the parties 150 which, in this case, was authorised according to Art. 
26 to apply the provisions of the 1907 HCPSID I51 so far as necessary. However, in such a 
case, the tribunal, according to Art. 28, was obliged to apply: 
... the rules in regard to the substance of the dispute enumerated in 
Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice [and] in so far there exists no such rule applicable to the 
dispute, the tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono. 
Some of the main factors that distinguished the 1928 General Act form the 1924 
Geneva Protocol was that the General Act excluded the League's Council from playing any 
part in the settlement of disputes l52 . It also made recourse to a previous convention, 
namely, the 1907 HCPSID for the settlement of certain points by the Conciliation 
Commission 153 or the ad hoc arbitral tribunal 154. The General Act was intended to provide a 
comprehensive and acceptable system for the adjustment of international differences by 
compulsory means, which took into consideration States' attitudes towards the provisions 
of previous international instruments l55 regarding the tangled issues of non-legal (political) 
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disputes and their settlement by compulsory means l56. However, like its predecessors, some 
of the provisions of the General Act were subject to criticism157 especially that empowering 
a tribunal to render a decision ex aequo et bono embodied in Art. 28158• Moreover, the 
effectiveness of the 1928 General Act as an instrument for the settlement of inter-State 
disputes by compulsory peaceful means was hampered by its permitting partial accessions 
and reservations l59 . This appears clear when examining the reservations of some of the 23 
States who acceded to the Act160. 
Due to the fact that the 1928 General Act is attached to the League's system, which 
has now ceased to exist and is replaced by the current UN, it has been disputed whether or 
not its text is still valid l61 . This issue was clearly recognised by the General Assembly of 
the UN in its efforts to update the text of the 1928 General Act through its Resolution 268 
(III) on April 28, 1949162 which indicated that: 
... the efficacy of the General Act of 26 September 1928 for the 
pacific settlement of international disputes is impaired by the fact 
that the organs of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court 
of International Justice to which it refers have now disappeared 163. 
Therefore, in order to meet with the new circumstances, a revised version of the General 
Act was adopted in 1949164. However the aforesaid Resolution went on to say that the 
amendments to the text of the General Act 
... will only apply as between States having acceded to the General 
Act as thus amended and, as a consequence, will not affect the 
rights of such States, parties to the Act as established. on. 26 
September 1928 as should claim to invoke it in so far as It might 
, . 165 
still be operative [emphasIs added] . 
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The most recent debate on this issue was in the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 case 
[Jurisdiction] between India and Pakistan, in which the latter invoked, inter alia, Art. 17 of 
the 1928 General Act166 as basis of the ICJ's jurisdiction in its dispute with the former 
regarding the alleged downing, on August 10, 1999, of an unarmed Pakistani military 
aircraft (the Atlantic) in Pakistan's territory by Indian forces. In this case India, the 
defendant, arguendo contended, inter alia, that numerous provisions of the General Act, 
and in particular Arts. 6,7,9 and 43-47 refer to organs of the League of Nations and to the 
PCIJ, and, in consequence of the demise of those institutions, the General Act has "lost its 
original efficacy"; that the General Assembly of the UN indicated during its adoption of the 
1949 Revised General Act that the parties to the 1928 Act cannot rely upon it except" ... in 
so far as it might still be operative, that is, in so far .... as the amended provisions are not 
involved" and that Art. 17 is among those provisions amended in 1949. Further grounds for 
challenge of the ICJ's jurisdiction by India were that the 1928 Act was according to her 
point of view an international agreement of a political character and, therefore, not 
automatically binding on successor States like her and Pakistan who were both under 
British control at the time of the agreement as one unit (the British Indian Empire) before 
there partition in 1947 into two independent sovereign States. Moreover, under that point, 
India argued that it had made no notification of succession as required by Arts. 17 and 22 of 
the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties of 1978, and that in 
its communication of September 18, 1974, addressed to the Secretary-General of the UN it 
has expressly stated that 
[t]he Government of India never regarded themselves as bound by 
the General Act of 1928 since her independence in 1947, whether 
by succession or otherwise. Accordingly, India has never been and 
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is not a party to the General Act of 1928 ever SInce her 
Independence. 
The Court in this respect recognised that the question whether the 1928 General Act is to be 
regarded as a convention in force for the purpose of Art. 37 of the Statute of the ICJ has 
already been raised, but not settled, in previous proceedings before the Court167. However, 
the Court, again, declined to address this question and instead relied as a upon India's 
communication above to the Secretary-General of the UN to declare that India cannot be 
regarded as having been a party to the 1928 General Act on the date of the Pakistani 
application, therefore, consequently, Art. 17 of the 1928 Act was not regarded as forming a 
basis for the Court's jurisdiction in this case. 
With the circumvention of the ICJ from addressing the question regarding whether 
the 1928 General Act was still operative after the demise of the institutions to which it 
refers and the adoption of an updated version (the 1949 Revised General Act), it may be 
said that although not all State-parties to the 1928 Act have denounced it168, nevertheless, 
the question regarding its applicability or otherwise in current day inter-State dispute 
settlement practice appears to be still a live and open issue169• 
3. The UN and International Arbitration: 
The emphasis of the UN on its role in the preservation of international peace and 
security can be deduced from the clear wording of the Charter's Preamble which stated the 
determination of its members" ... to save succeeding generations from the scourge of \\aL 
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind ... " Therefore the UN 
Charter in its very first article recognises that one of the main purposes of the organisation 
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for the maintenance of international peace and security is " ... to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or 
settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to the breach of the 
peace." 170. Alongside the Charter, the UN General Assembly adopted a number of 
resolutions and declarations that supported the provisions of the Charter regarding the 
peaceful settlement of disputes between States!7!. The peaceful means provided by the 
Charter can be found in Art. 33( 1) which indicated that: 
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, 
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional 
agencies and arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own 
choice. 
The following discussion will examine the major inter-State arbitral mechanisms 
adopted under the auspices of the UN, namely, the 1948 Revised General Act for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and the proposed International Convention on 
Arbitral Procedure of the ILC. 
3.1. The Revised General Act of 1949: 
In order to meet with the new circumstances that arose out of the cessation of the 
League of Nations and its organs, which were referred to in the 1928 General Act for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, the General Assembly of the UN, following a 
Belgian proposal, adopted on April 28, 1949, Resolution 268 (1I1)!72 which instructed the 
Secretary General of the UN to " ... prepare a revised text of the General Act, including the 
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amendments mentioned hereafter, and to hold it open to accession by States, under the title 
"Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes." The 
amendments made to the text of the original General Act173 mainly substituted references to 
the former League of Nations and PCIJ with references to the newly created UN and IC] 
respectively174 and the whole scheme was almost an exact duplicate of its predecessor. 
Therefore, the same weaknesses that existed in the 1928 General Act were also present in 
the 1949 one. However, from the very outset this new system came under strong criticism 
and was opposed by a number of States led by the former Soviet Union which considered 
that the compulsory settlement of disputes was incompatible with the provision on States' 
sovereignty embodied in the UN Charterl75 . The Revised General Act came into force on 
September 20, 1950176; however, only seven States had declared their accession to it by mid 
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3.2. The ILC's Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure of 1958: 
In its very first session on April 12, 1949, the ILC which was established pursuant 
to the UN General Assembly Resolution 174 of November 21, 194i78 selected arbitral 
procedure as one of the main topics for codification. The aim of the ILC in this respect was 
the adoption of a so-called 'Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure' which was to 
represent both a codification of the existing law on international arbitration, and a 
formulation of what were considered by the Commission as desirable developments in the 
field. The ILC took as its basis the traditional characteristics of arbitral procedure
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. Its 
endeavours in this respect were guided by the principle of non-frustration, i.e. to prevent 
the impediment or frustration that may occur before or during an arbitral settlement caused 
by the ill-will of one of the parties to the dispute, who wishes to obviate from recourse to 
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arbitration. Therefore, a number of procedural safeguards were adopted for securing the 
effectiveness of the undertaking to arbitrate, in accordance with the original common 
. t t· f h . 180 M 
In en Ion 0 t e partIes . oreover, any dispute that may arise between the parties before 
the constitution of the arbitral tribunal regarding the arbitrability or otherwise of a certain 
dispute was according to Art. 1 (1) to be " ... brought before the International Court of 
Justice for decision by means of its summary procedure". However, if the tribunal was 
already constituted, any such dispute was then according to paragraph 3 of the same article 
to be referred to it. 
Two main drafts were submitted by the ILC on 1952 and 1953 respectively. 
However, both of them were subject to strong criticism on the part of a number of States 
led by the former Soviet Union, who perceived some of its provisions as a clear departure 
from one of the main fundamental principles of arbitration, namely, the autonomy of the 
will of the parties l81 . Therefore, in view of the many suggestions and comments made by 
Governments for the improvement of the draft, the General Assembly of the UN on 
December 14, 1955, adopted Resolution 989(X) which invited the ILC to take into 
consideration those comments made by the various Governments" ... in so far as they may 
contribute further to the value of the draft on arbitral procedure, and to report to the General 
Assembly at its thirteenth session.,,182 At this stage, the members of the Commission were 
convinced that a large proportion of those comments and conflicting observations were not 
calculated to improve the draft, but rather to destroy it, and that the whole Resolution was 
regarded as a polite rejection of the Commission's draft convention. It was noticed that 
States apparently preferred the traditional system of arbitration under which the States 
parties to the dispute remained masters of the procedures to be followed and could possibly 
frustrate or delay a settlement whenever their case might be lost, rather than the 
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Commission's proposed draft convention which was based on the 1907 HCPSID and the 
1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and presented a 
watertight and strict system of judicial arbitration 183. States were divided among themselves 
as to their position towards the Draft of the ILC. One group of States, including the USA 
and the United Kingdom, were ready to adopt by resolution of the UN General Assembly 
the Commission's Draft. Another group which included the former Soviet Union. Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Byelorussia and others totally opposed any endorsement of the Commission's 
Draft and urged its rejection in toto or, at least, that some significant and fundamental 
amendments be made to it on the ground that it violated the autonomy of the will of the 
parties, a principle so well embedded in arbitral proceedings. A third group of States 
adopted the moderate view that, there being no sufficient time to make a further 
examination and amendments to the ILC's Draft, the General Assembly of the UN should 
nonetheless take note of it184, and this indeed was what the Commission opted for in its 
419th Meeting in 1957, after determining that the draft should be presented to the General 
Assembly as a set of Model Rules which States could use in concluding bilateral or 
multilateral agreements for arbitration or when settling disputes by ad hoc arbitration 185. As 
a result the Commission at its tenth session in 1958 drew up a set of 'Model Rules on 
Arbitral Procedure' 186 which were, after extensive discussions in the Sixth Committee of 
the General Assembly, adopted by Resolution 1262(XIII) on November 14, 1958187 . The 
Model Rules, as indicated in Art. 3 of the aforesaid Resolution were to be brought" ... to the 
attention of Member States for their consideration and use, in such cases and to such extent 
as they consider appropriate, in drawing up treaties for arbitration or compromis." 
To all those who may have complained over the existence of certain loopholes in 
the arbitral process, the ILC's Draft was the remedy to their concerns. Indeed the Draft was 
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praised by some experts as " ... the high watermark of legal scholarship in the field of inter-
State b 't t' ,,188 d " b" h' I 189 ar 1 ra IOn... ,an ... super In Its tec mca craftsmanship ... " . However, did 
the ILC' s scheme encompass the seeds of its own destruction? In this regard, the draft was 
criticised by a number of prominent international jurists, such as Judge Stephen 
Schwebel
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who, although recognising the distinctiveness of the Commission's Draft, 
nevertheless, stated that: 
... it should have been obvious that the generality of States was not 
at that time, as they are not at this time, prepared to accept it. The 
Commission's Draft repeatedly would have endowed the 
International Court of Justice with compulsory jurisdiction over 
crucial questions of the arbitral process. If States generally were 
then and are today unwilling to accord the Court compulsory 
jurisdiction, why should it be supposed that they would be disposed 
to grant it such pervasive compulsory jurisdiction in the process of 
international arbitration? 
Moreover, Professor Carlston 191 in an extensive remark questioned" ... whether the larger 
interests of the international community would be served by transforming the .... conception 
of ad hoc arbitration into the conception of judicial arbitration ... " as the Commission 
envisaged. He argued that: 
... it must be remembered that arbitration is but one of a number of 
means for pacific settlement of disputes available to parties; that the 
International Court of Justice is already available to the parties in 
dispute with an established procedure of judicial settlement such as 
the Commission would like to create for ad hoc arbitration: the 
strength of the existing system of international arbitration as a 
means for the pacific settlement of disputes lies in its flexibility and 
responsiveness to the will of the parties, even though as a procedure 
it is subject to the interruptions which the Commissio~ ... :seeks to 
remedy; that these interruptions or breakdowns of arbItratIOn have 
in practice been few in number as against the great number of 
international arbitrations which have taken place successfully; that 
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many o~ these breakdow~s could have perhaps been avoided by a 
more skilled use of techmque; and, finally, that ultimate end to be 
sought is to preserve all the various procedures to be developed 
through history which will conduce to the amicable settlement of 
international disputes. Abuse of the privileges of the process of 
arbitration which has upon occasion occurred does not necessarily 
mean that those privileges should be destroyed when their existence 
represents a continuing safeguard to the great number of states and 
a strong inducing factor leading them to adopt the process as a 
means for the settlement of their disputes. The theoretical perfection 
of the process should not be carried to the point where it loses its 
unique identity, merges with the system of adjudication of the 
International Court of Justice, and discourages recourse to the 
arbitral process by states 192. 
Indeed, the efforts of the ILC were conducted in a time when inter-State arbitration was 
suffering from a drastic setback 193. The Commission's Draft attempted to alter a 
fundamental principle of arbitration, one which, as already stated elsewhere l94 , constituted 
one of its main attractive features, namely, party autonomy, by transforming arbitration into 
a rigid, stringent judicial process, despite the fulfilment of that role already by the ICJ. The 
Commission from the very beginning should have expected strong negative reactions from 
States towards their proposals, especially when having in mind that certain (influential) 
States 195 were in principle clear in their opposition to voluntary legal means of settlement, 
leave alone a stringent and watertight framework as that of the ILC. However, despite the 
fact that the ILC's Draft failed to acquire convention status, it still represents a unique and 
ideal dispute settlement framework that States could make use of when the actual need 
arises 196. 
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Conclusion: 
The adoption of an effective, comprehensive and, most of ali, acceptable 
mechanism for the compulsory settlement of inter-State disputes in general based on 
arbitration has been one of the major aims of the international community for a \ery long 
time. The push for such a mechanism started with the 1899 HCPSID which was later 
followed by its successor, the 1907 Hague Convention. However, no binding obligation to 
settle disputes arose out of any of those instruments. Even the PCA established by the 1899 
Convention was more like a shadow, a so-called court which lacked any form of 
jurisdiction except for that conferred upon it by the parties. Although the PCA played a 
considerably active role in the field of inter-State dispute settlement at the time of its 
establishment, nevertheless, things were to change drastically following the establishment 
of the PCIJ which States viewed as a real permanent court, and resulting in their turning 
their backs on the PCA. The PCIJ was looked at as a vital necessity following the scourge 
of the first Great War which was an inducing force behind the establishment of the Court. 
However, that step towards peace was preceded by the opening of a new era in international 
organisation through the establishment of the League of Nations of which the PCIJ forms 
an integral part of within its machinery. Nevertheless, neither the PCIJ nor the instruments 
established under the auspices of the League of Nations, namely, the 1924 Geneva Protocol 
and 1928 General Act, provide any definitive description as to the disputes suitable for 
submission to voluntary legal means of settlement leave alone compulsory means, a 
stumbling block in the way of any major success in the field of compulsory dispute 
settlement. Moreover, the first of those two instruments never came into force and the 
status of the second, whether operative or not, has still not been definitely. 
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Following the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the UN, 
interests in arbitration was again revived through the 1949 Revised General Act which was 
not as successful as its predecessor. Nevertheless, the most significant step towards the 
achievement of a comprehensive and reliable compulsory mechanism for the arbitral 
settlement of inter-State disputes was the proposed Draft Convention of the ILC. whose 
success of was severely aborted. Neither of these two mechanisms, nor those examined 
above, succeeded in gaining general State acceptance due to various reasons, mainly the 
questions regarding compulsory settlement and the submission of non-justiciable disputes 
to arbitration. However, when looking at the picture as a whole, it appears that the framers 
of these latter two mechanisms did not take into account the general mood towards 
arbitration which has changed dramatically following the World War197. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
General Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis put forward in the introduction was to demonstrate the 
pattern of the rise and fall of inter-State arbitration as a means of international dispute 
settlement through the reflection of the legal doctrine over the past 100 years. During 
the process, several key issues were examined. The disinclination to arbitral practice 
during the past century can be looked at from two different angles. The first is regarding 
States' disinclination to resort to arbitral tribunals, a turning point which started 
following WWI, especially with the establishment of the PCIJ which is now succeeded 
by the current Iel. Although it was far beyond the limited scope of this thesis to provide 
a detailed examination and analysis of the causes why the vast majority of States of the 
international community have declined to resort to arbitral tribunals for the settlement of 
their disputes, an enormous task which indeed would require sociological and 
psychological analysis of the international relations framework within the past over 100 
years and the position of each individual State towards arbitration respectively, a 
number of factors which may induce a State not to resort to arbitration were examined. 
These were: the importance of the dispute; the effects of previous negative experiences 
with arbitration; the avoidance of the reaction of internal political factions within the 
State or government; and the nature of dispute settlement by legal means in general. 
What can be deduced from our discussion is that any State which may have been under 
the influence of any of those factors in the past may give way to arbitration if the 
interests of that State so requires. Therefore, it cannot be said that any of those factors 
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constitutes a constant obstacle that deters States from arbitration, but their impact rather. 
is dependent on the circumstances of each individual State. In this regard, one cannot 
overlook the issue regarding the justiciability or otherwise of international disputes and 
State practice therein. 
The second angle is concerned with the disinclination for the practice of the general 
international arbitral treaty. In this regard it appears that none of the mechanisms 
examined in Chapter Five have succeeded in gaining general State acceptance or 
received universal application l . Moreover, it also appears that no serious efforts for the 
establishment of a general inter-State arbitral mechanism, of the like of those examined 
in Chapter Five, were ever made following the failure of the ILC's Draft Convention. 
Even the plans which aimed at revising the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID were turned down 
in 1994 by the broadly based Steering Committee set up by the International Bureau of 
the PCA for the purpose of preparing the Centenary of the PCA as part of the UN's 
programme under the 'Decade of International Law (1989-1999)'2. The Committee 
decided that a revision of The Hague Conventions which were 'structurally sound', in 
the members' view, was not necessary at the time3. A large number of States are already 
members of the Statute of the IC] and are bound by a number of regional agreements 
and treaties containing various methods for the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes4, irrespective whether those States have made full use of those instruments in 
I . 5 actua practIce. 
The issue regarding general arbitral treaty practice in the past century may also itself be 
looked at from two different angles. The first is concerning the periods in which most of 
those mechanisms (in particular those established in the post WWl period) were found. 
When recalling the findings of our discussion on the momentum of arbitral practice 
(tribunal activity6) in particular in the era following the establishment of the pel], right 
through until 1958, it appears that the actual practice of submitting inter-State disputes 
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to arbitration did not seem to indicate that States were willing to welcome a multilateral 
instrument concerned with the settlement in general of all forms of inter-State disputes 
whatsoever by arbitration, either alone or in conjunction with other means, and still less 
so, within the context of a compulsory framework. Something indeed seemed to be 
wrong regarding the strategy that was followed in that respect, which seemed like an 
attempt to sell to many States something they did not actually want to buy. This is best 
illustrated by the ill fate of ILC's Draft Convention which was considered as the high 
watermark in inter-State arbitral treaty craftsmanship according to a number of leading 
international jurists. 
The compulsory framework adopted by those mechanisms mentioned above brings us to 
the second angle from which the issue of arbitral treaty practice in the 20th century may 
be looked at, namely, the compulsory nature of those mechanisms. States were and still 
are concerned, to a large extent, with the element of freedom of action they enjoy when 
a dispute arises outside of any binding multilateral framework. This may be clearly 
deduced from our discussion on the dichotomy between justiciable and non-justiciable 
disputes. In other words, States' main concern is their freedom to determine what action 
should be taken in accordance with the circumstances of the present time and situation, 
rather than the terms of a treaty commitment made, perhaps, years before the occurrence 
of the dispute. Even if they agree to adhere to a certain mechanism, many States will 
still want to exclude issues that they may feel as not-suitable for submission to those 
mechanisms. However, having in mind that such issues are sometimes as volatile as the 
political mentality which determines them when the actual need arises, no precise clear-
cut specification of those issues within the context of a multilateral treaty has ever been 
brought to light, but only general, broad and far reaching phrases. This may be ascribed 
to the multiplicity of States that adhered to those mechanisms, each having its own 
specification of what should be excluded, and the difficulty in embodying all those 
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proposals into one instrument (hence the relative success of the Optional Clause in 
addressing the concerns of each individual State, albeit at the expense of a real general 
compulsory jurisdiction). It seems that the scope of those general arbitral instruments 
was too broad. There was no central focus on a certain topic, and each mechanism 
covered a wide spectrum of issues of a public international law character (e.g. 
international boundary delimitation, State responsibility, treaty interpretation etc ... ) all 
of which may become non-justiciable in certain circumstances, when the application of 
the machinery is called for. Therefore, States did not know what should be excluded and 
what should not. Although some may argue that this is also the case under the IC], the 
difference between the two systems seems to be that, while all members of the UN are 
according to Art. 93(1) of the UN Charter ipso facto parties to the Statute of the IC], in 
other words, they may resort to the Court on a consensual (voluntary) basis, States 
under the ICJ's system are not obliged to adhere to the compulsory aspect of the Court's 
system (the Optional Clause) as a condition to their becoming members to the Court. In 
contrast, in the 1924 Geneva Protocol, the 1928 and 1949 General Acts, and the ILC's 
proposed Draft Convention, the whole deal came in one package; a State either adhered 
to the system and became ipso facto subject to its compulsory framework, or remained 
outside it. This seems difficult to accept, especially when recognising the broad and 
generally undefined sphere of application of those instruments. With the failure of the 
past general inter-State arbitral mechanisms examined in Chapter Five, one may ask 
whether the adoption of a new general arbitral mechanism in the near future appears 
possible. And if one is adopted, will the level of utilisation be as desired? The answer to 
those questions simply appears to be in the negative. 
This, however, does not imply that such a mechanism is not needed. Nor does it mean 
that arbitration as a means for the settlement of disputes is currently undesired or 
neglected. Indeed, arbitration is central to the dispute settlement mechanism of a 
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number of very important current-day international instruments, such as, the WTO and 
UNCLOS. This also comes hand in hand with the already long-established tradition of 
the compromissory clause attached to the provisions of numerous international treaties 
and agreements, which has replaced the now abandoned practice of bilateral or 
multilateral treaties of arbitration. However, arbitration within those instruments did not 
form the central topic, but rather came as an integral part. It was a means of settlement 
of matters that were already well defined and known to the parties who had negotiated 
them in full during the process of formulating the agreement or treaty, rather than the 
settlement of something unspecified and undefined (or even unexpected) which may 
arise in the future, as in the case of the general inter-State arbitral mechanisms 
examined in Chapter Five, which were intended to settle almost everything, at any time 
and any place. 
Arbitration is a flexible and reliable means of dispute settlement that can be adjusted in 
accordance with the living circumstances and varying needs for the settlement of the 
new set of complicated and technical disputes of today. This statement may be 
supported by the success and popularity of specialised arbitration which is rapidly 
expanding; the examples mentioned above may suffice in this respect. Arbitration is not 
only capable of addressing a new set of disputes which have emerged but also of 
addressing the needs of a new set of States which have emerged with the end of 
colonialism and the proliferation of the members of the international legal community 
during the 20th century, and the various diversities that have emerged as a result. As 
already examined in this thesis, many of those States held certain reservations with 
regard to the western origins of international law which is usually applied by arbitral 
tribunals. However, in the current state of affairs, the Ie] is witnessing a considerable 
boost in its popularity among many Afro-Asian States, who used to look at the Court 
with suspicion in the past. Indeed the instability in inter-State relations has induced a 
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number of States in those regions to seek the services of the Court Thi . d' 
. s may In lcate 
that many of those States have now started to overcome their past fears and hesitations 
towards legal means of dispute settlement which apply international law. Howeyer. 
arbitration clearly lags far behind international adjudication in this respect. 
Arbitration is no less inferior to international adjudication under the IC] when it comes 
attaining a final and binding settlement by the parties. It might appear, on the surface. 
that arbitration is a more flexible and sufficient alternative in view of the parties' control 
over the tribunal's constitution, the rules of procedure of the tribunal and, most of all. 
the law(s) applied by the tribunal, all of which may be tailored in accordance with the 
varying circumstances, as well as the varying cultural or' ideological or religious 
backgrounds and systems of the parties, a privilege not available when resorting to the 
IC]. Nevertheless, to be fair, these advantages can in certain circumstances amount to a 
disadvantage. It appears difficult (but not impossible) for States whose relations have 
long been strained as a result of political, ideological or religious rivalry, or who have 
been involved in constant interference in each other's domestic affairs, or even direct 
military engagement, simply to leave all of that aside and sit and negotiate all the above 
details of the arbitral process in a trustful and co-operative atmosphere, not to mention 
the time consumed during such efforts. This preferably would require the outside 
supervisory or mediatory assistance of a third party, such as that given by France in the 
case of the Hanish Island arbitration between Yemen and Eritrea. On the other hand. the 
IC] is an already constituted Court composed of a number of salaried judges who haye 
nothing other to do than adjudicate disputes that are submitted to the Court. It is an 
institution that is clearly visible, one that is ready and open to any State(s) \vhich may 
seek its services at any time. In comparison ad hoc arbitration is more like a mirage that 
needs to be chased, a shadow without a body in which the disputants must negotiate the 
details of the process fully before any settlement can take place, and eyen worse. are to 
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share the expenses of the tribunal, which are usually equally d' 'd d b h IVI e etween t e 
disputants and may in the end result in a very heavy bill. 
However, if the field of ad hoc inter-State arbitration were supervised and contained by 
an international legal institution or body, would the situation change? The nearest 
candidate (in fact it appears to be the only one) for such a role would be the PCA. 
However, it appears that the PCA itself suffers from the same problem as ad hoc 
arbitration, namely, the lack of a backing body, This shortcoming of the PCA was relied 
upon by Robert Badinter, the originator of the proposal for the (unutilised to date) Court 
of Arbitration and Conciliation established under the 1992 Convention on Conciliation 
and Arbitration of the OSCE, for discharging the PCA in his initial proposal7. This issue 
within the present context raises a fundamental question, namely, could the 
organisational backup that the ICJ enjoys as the 'major judicial organ of the UN' be a 
factor behind States' preference for the ICJ rather than the un-backed and 
organisationally independent PCA? Indeed, unlike the PCA which was solely 
mentioned for its role in nomination of the Judges of the ICJ in the Court's Statute8, the 
attachment of the ICJ to the UN system and Charter9 appears to have played a constant 
promotional role in favour of the ICJ, The 'lack of awareness of the PCA's facilities' 
was among the factors behind the lack of recourse to the PCA indicated by the work 
group assigned by the International Bureau of the PCA in 1991 for the purpose of 
exploring what measures can be taken in order to improve the functioning of the PCA I 
o
. 
The group proposed a number of recommendations that it viewed as capable of 
improving awareness of the Court, The first was obtaining the endorsement of the UN. 
Others included, inter alia, the publication of a brochure containing descriptions of the 
facilities and services provided by the PCA; seminars and lectures on the potential role 
of the PCA; encouragement of members of the PCA and academic and other lawyers to 
write journal articles on the PCA and the other dispute settlement mechanisms available 
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under the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID; and a circular note to States Parties to the 1899 and 
1907 Conventions encouraging them to refer to the PCA by means of compromissory 
clauses attached to the provisions of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements 
concluded ll . However, despite the importance of the group's recommendations and 
noticeable increase in State accession to The Hague machinery, more than ten years 
since the publication of those recommendations, it appears that the level of utilisation of 
the Court's inter-State dispute settlement mechanism still remains the same. This 
continued low level of recourse to the court comes hand in hand with the almost total 
abandonment of the practice of ad hoc inter-State arbitration for decades now. 
As already examined in this thesis, even the States parties to the PCA preferred to have 
recourse to other means of settlement instead of it, and the major preoccupation of the 
national groups assigned to the Court is their participation in the nomination of Judges 
of the ICJI2. Moreover, the PCA was even looked at by some of its founders (more than 
a hundred years ago) as not being a real court or tribunal stricto sensa but" ... a clerk's 
office with a list ... "l3, an accusation that may raise the question of the ability of such an 
institution to compete today against a far more organised and better supported 
contemporary ICJ. Although some may view the almost total abandonment of the 
PCA's arbitral mechanism following the establishment of the PCIJ as proof that this 
mechanism is ineffective or unreliable, however, it must not be forgotten that the same 
mechanism was able to resolve tens of disputes effectively prior to the establishment of 
the PCIJ. Moreover, the 'list of arbitrators' formula appears in the dispute settlement 
prOVIsIons of recent and successful major international instruments, for example. 
UNCLOS. Leaving aside the 'real court or otherwise' arguments, it appears that the 
PCA with its 'list of arbitrators' formula is not as bad as some of its critics may think it 
is; it is just a question of choice. 
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It must not be forgotten that the PCA was responsible for the majority of arbitral 
settlements that took place in the period following its establishment. However. that 
record changed dramatically following the establishment of the PCIJ, succeeded now by 
the ICJ. The same also may be said about ad hoc arbitration, since such practice 
occurred mainly under the auspices of the PCA following its establishment. This may 
underline an interchangeable relationship between the two. Therefore, it would appear 
that any surge in the level of utilisation of the PCA' s inter-State arbitral machinery 
would be reflected positively in the area of ad hoc general inter-State arbitration and 
vice versa. But when it comes to adopting a possible strategy for improving the level of 
utilisation in both areas, which of the two should be started with? The more logical 
option would indeed be the PCA, an actual structure. However, any efforts in that 
respect bring us back to the two points raised earlier, namely, the Court's lacking of 
organisational back up, and the need for UN endorsement. When looking at what has 
been offered by the UN so far as support to the PCA, it appears that the PCA was 
granted observer status by the General Assembly of the UN in Res. 48/3 of October 13, 
1993, who also in Res. 54/28 of January 21, 2000, congratulated the PCA on its 100th 
anniversary and commended it for its role in the international system of peaceful 
resolution of disputes and invited States" ... to consider making full use of the facilities 
of the Court and support its work" 14. However, the UN should link the PCA more 
strongly to its dispute settlement system, in particular Art. 33. Such a step requires the 
launch of a major international campaign led by the Secretary-General of the PCA 
among the States Parties and also non-parties to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conyentions 
in order to rally support for this aim. He can rely on the valuable suggestions once made 
by Mr. PJ. Jonkman 1S, former Secretary-General of the Court, who indicated that the 
strength of the PCA settlement system lies in the fact that it can be a valuable 
complement to judicial settlement by the Iel He further pointed to certain categories of 
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disputes that were more suitable to be submitted to the PCA such d' h 
, as Isputes t at are 
composed of complex political elements; disputes comprised of a considerable number 
of claims (mass claims); and disputes essentially involving questions of a highly 
technical nature. The General Assembly of the UN should draw the attention of its 
members to the capability of the PCA in resolving such disputes in a separate 
resolution(s), and should also include the PCA in any resolution concerning the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes next to the IC] in the future l6 . Moreover, the 
General Assembly under Art. 14 of the UN Charter and the Security Council under Arts. 
36(1) and 37, when recommending means for the peaceful settlement of international 
disputes, should also mention to the disputants the availability of the PCA, especially if 
the dispute in question concerns any of the categories above. 
However, before any efforts in this regard, the PCA must not forget that it has some 
serious cleaning up to do, and any step towards creating stronger links with the UN 
system should be preceded first of all with some radical measures. When looking at how 
things currently stand, it appears that the qualifications of the persons nominated by 
some States as arbitrators under Arts. 23 and 44 of the 1899 and 1907 HCsPSID 
respectively should be strictly reviewed. Such persons currently include 17 ministers of 
foreign affairs; heads of international organisations; senior diplomatic representatives; 
and chief justices. Such people are not likely always to be able to act as arbitrators in 
accordance with the aforementioned articles when they are needed, due to the 
responsibilities they hold under their respective positions. Moreover, an institution 
concerned with conducting and sponsoring research and studies regarding the settlement 
of disputes in general (not just the facilities, services provided by and reputation of the 
PCA) should also be attached to the Court's structure. Indeed, such an institution would 
be capable of generating awareness of the Court's potential and could playa strong 
promotional role for the Court, capable of giving a positive impression of the level of 
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expertise and expenence the Court has in the field. The Court's success in the 
settlement of the categories of disputes indicated above may further encourage States 
non-parties to the Court to have recourse to it for the settlement of other categories of 
disputes. This may assist in removing any pressure on the ICJ's workload and may 
indirectly restore States' confidence in ad hoc arbitration outside the Court's 
framework. However, the adoption of an up-to-date verSIOn of the 1907 Hague 
Convention, that should encapsulate the experience gained by the international 
community in the years since its adoption with regard to dispute settlement mechanisms 
and meet with current international tribunal standards, should also be reconsidered in 
the future. Such a step will not only increase awareness of the newly refurbished court 
and restore the confidence of its members after a long period of inactivity, but may also 
give many Third World or new States this time a chance to participate in such efforts. It 
should not be forgotten that it is those States which have most problems and may form 
the main clients of the Court in the future. Therefore, they should be given a say during 
the process of revitalising the Court. This will also assist in removing any apprehension 
that some of those States may have regarding what they may view as the western 
origination or pro-colonialism nature of the Court. 
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Notes to Chapter Six: 
~ Although some may point ou~ th~ gradual. incr~ase in State accessions to the 1907 HCPSID as proof of 
Its success, nevertheless, the cntenon used ill this respect for determining the success or otherwise of the 
instruments under consideration is the level of State application, not accession. This in the case of the 
1907 Convention, appears almost nil. With regard to the 1928 and 1949 General Acts, the practice of the 
ICJ does not seem to provide a definitive answer as to their status. However, again when reviewino their 
success in the light of State application and the rare occasions on which jurisdiction of the IC] ha~ been 
sought via. both General Acts, one will reach the same conclusion as in the case of the Haoue 
• b ConventIOns. 
2 UN General Assembly Res. 44/23 of November 17,1989. 
3 See PJ.H. Jonkman, Update and Recent Developments, in International Bureau of the PCA (ed.), 
International Alternative Dispute Resolution: Past, Present and Future: The Permanent Court of 
Arbitration Centennial Papers, The Hague, Kluwer Law International Law, 2000, pp. 121. 122. and 124. 
4 E.g. the Inter-American Committee on Peaceful Settlement; the 1957 ECPSD; the 1975 Final Act of the 
Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; and the Principles adopted under the 1991 
Valletta Report of the Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of the OSCE, later modified 
at Stockholm 1992. 
5 In this respect, one must not forget the obsolescence of the 1964 Commission of Mediation, Conciliation 
and Arbitration adopted by the (former) OAU; and the 1945 Pact of the League of Arab States, as well as 
the failure of the 1948 Pact of Bogota. Even the Court of Arbitration and Conciliation established under 
the 1992 Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration of the OSCE has not been seized with a single case 
until now. 
6 Supra 1.1 of Chapter Two. 
7 S. Muller & W. Mijs (eds.), The Flame Rekindled, op cit, pp. 8-9. 
8 In particular Arts. 4-6. 
9 Chapters XIV and VI. 
10 The PCA: New Directions, op cit, pp. 9-10. 
II Ibid, pp. 11-13. 
12 See, PCA, New Directions, op cit, p. 10. 
13 Mr. Tobias Asser, the Dutch delegate to the 1899 Hague Peace Conference. Quoted from, ] .B. Scott, 
HCR, op cit, 1916, p. xviii. 
14 Para. 11. The ICJ was also mentioned in para. 16 of the Resol~tion which states that" ... ~tates have the 
obligation to solve their disputes by peaceful means, includmg resort to the InternatIOnal Court of 
Justice". 
15 Introduction by the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in S. Muller & W. Mi.is 
(eds.), op cit, pp. 1,3. 
16 Such as the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly. Relati~ns ~d 
Co-operation among States (Res. 262~(XXV~ adopted on October 24, 1970); the l!~~r~~~\I~~e~ aratlOn 
on the Peaceful Settlement ofInternatIOnal Disputes (Res. 37110 adopted on Nove - ) 
17 For the current panel of arbitrators of the PC] A dincl~~~nl ~:~~~::i~;:n~~l~~~:~::o~:~: ~:;:~:~~a~ 
web-site of the PCA [http://www.pca-cpa.org un er 
on 1010112002. 
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